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SUMMARY 
The world was shocked by the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 because it was 
unexpected and out of keeping with the deposed Shah's attempts at secular 
modernisation. This thesis attempts to make sociological sense of the implications 
of the Revolution for education in Iran in terms of ideological influences. 
The research reported in this thesis attempts to discover the nature of the 
social and cultural changes that occurred following the 1979 Revolution. 
Adapting Max Weber's interpretative approach, it focuses on the changing 
patterns of shared meanings and social relations in schools in one area of North 
West Iran. Taking a deliberately one-sided approach to educational change, this 
thesis isolates the impact of Islamic ideology on schools in the area where 
ethnographic fieldwork was conducted in 1995-96. Interviews, participant 
observation in schools, questionnaires and analysis of official documents were the 
chosen methods of research. The aim was to discover how Islamic ideology has 
been promulgated and how it has affected the day-to-day social relations of school 
teachers, pupils and administrators as well as their relations with parents and local 
authority officials. 
The main findings not only confirm the pervasiveness of Islamic ideology 
in Iranian schools but also document its influence over matters such as curriculum 
design and delivery, the segregation of the sexes in schools, and the teachers' 
conditions of work and professional development. Nevertheless, there is also 
evidence that the stated aims of educational reform were not always achieved and 
that some changes were ironic. The findings also showed that the recent history of 
change in Iranian schools calls for a flexible understanding of such notions as 
modernity, tradition, patrimonialism, and bureaucracy. Iran has certainly tried to 
modernise its educational system since 1979 but it has done so in ways which 
challenge much of the received wisdom about modernisation processes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Like many other theses, this one has its roots in the author's biography. The mid- 
1970s were the years in which I started down the road which, unbeknown to me at the 
time, was to lead to doctoral studies in the sociology of culture and religion. Having 
originally dreamed of studying medicine at university I changed my mind after being 
influenced by numerous Iranian intellectuals. Their interpretations of Islam seemed to 
offer fresh routes towards social justice, so I decided to study Theology and Islamic 
Sciences at the University of Tehran. 
After three and a half years of Theology I felt the need to further my studies 
with an MA in Comparative Religions and Gnosticism, hoping that this would be a 
good way into the sociology of culture and religions, on which Dr Shari'ati had 
already made his mark. At that time, however, it was not possible to take my interests 
in these branches of sociology further. 
At the same time I also developed a strong interest in education, especially in 
rural areas. I began work as a teacher in rural primary schools in 1976 and 
subsequently gained experience of teaching at all levels of general education in Iran 
(primary, guidance and high school) as well as in higher education. The opportunity 
to pursue further studies of educational development, from a sociological point of 
view, did not arise until the early-1990s. 
The University of Tabriz, in North West Iran, kindly provided me with the 
wonderful opportunity to conduct doctoral research on cultural topics in sociology. 
This thesis is the fruit of my attempt to bring sociological perspectives to bear on 
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relations between culture and education in schools in a rural area of Iran. But, as will 
become clear at several places below, this type of research is not without its problems. 
For example, sociological studies of Shi'ite Islam are not numerous, so the 
conceptual and theoretical framework for my research was not available `ready made'. 
Limitations of time and resources also meant that I could only focus on selected 
aspects of education in one small part of a large and very diverse country with a rich 
history. And it is extremely important to stress that, since sociology studies only one 
dimension of reality, it leaves many other, equally significant aspects of reality 
untouched. Other studies using other disciplinary approaches are required if a good, 
all-round result is required. 
Sociological studies of culture and religion do not entail any judgments about 
the truth or validity of holy scriptures, theology, doctrines or values. Indeed, my 
preference is for an `interpretative sociology' which tries to avoid reducing people's 
faith and beliefs to a matter of social forces. My sociological observations about 
`Islam' are not, therefore, about religious truth: they are only about the pattern of 
social relations and cultural norms through which Iranian Muslims `translate' Islam 
into action. In other words, this thesis is about everyday cultural practices, associated 
with Islam, in the setting of rural schools. This is why the thesis title makes no 
mention of Islam. 
After the introductory Chapter, the remainder of the thesis falls roughly into 
two parts. The first part, consisting of Chapters 2 to 4, considers the historical, 
cultural and ideological forces which paved the way for the Iranian Revolution of 
1979. The second half of the thesis is an analysis of information collected mainly 
during two, three-month periods of fieldwork in North West Iran in 1995 and 1996. It 
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was necessary to arrange the chapters in this two-part fashion in order to establish 
clearly the extent to which Islam had influenced education in Iran (a) prior to 1979 
and (b) in the years following the Revolution. It must be acknowledged, however, 
that the second half of the thesis is primarily where my claim to make a substantial 
contribution to sociological knowledge is based. Very few researchers have 
conducted fieldwork in Iran in recent decades; even fewer have conducted empirical 
studies of schools. The originality of my work therefore also lies mainly in the 
findings arising from my fieldwork and in my analysis of their significance for a 
sociological understanding of educational change in Iran since 1979. The latter point 
is all the more important because, as I shall explain in Chapter 6, it is rare for official 
permission to be given for fieldwork in Iran. Nevertheless, it was possible to collect 
original information by means of interviews, participant observation and 
questionnaires after negotiating access to my informants and respondents through 
informal and formal channels. My findings about change in school curricula, 
textbooks, relations between teachers and students, Teachers' Councils, relations with 
Local Education Authorities, career development and the New System of Education 
all cast new light on patterns of educational change. In this respect my thesis can lay 
claim to originality. 
Chapter One sets out my reasons for adopting a theoretical perspective heavily 
influenced by Max Weber. It argues for the usefulness of taking an `interpretative' 
stance to matters of culture and religion. But it is critical of Weber's limited 
understanding of the social dimensions of Islam. 
Chapter Two analyses the political and ideological currents and events leading 
up to, and leading out of, the Iranian revolution. It examines the significance of what 
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can be considered, with the benefit of hindsight, to be the episodes which had the 
most formative effect on the revolution and its aftermath. 
Chapter Three discusses theoretical perspectives on the Iranian Revolution to 
provide part of the background understanding of social change in Iran. It also 
establishes the broad outlines of the main currents running through Islamic ideology 
in Iran: populism, nationalism and islamism. 
Chapter Four gives a brief account of the historical evolution of the country's 
school-level education system in the period leading up to 1979, with special emphasis 
on the educational policies of governments under the Pahlavi dynasty. The gradual 
separation of religion from state-controlled education is highlighted. 
Chapter Five reports briefly on the post-1979 educational policies shaped by 
Islamic values. Their impact on institutional changes, philosophy of education and its 
goals, curricula and women's education is discussed. It also provides a very brief 
account of the impact of Iran's economic situation on schooling. 
Chapter Six, after discussing the methodological strategies and methods of 
research, focuses on the changes that have occurred in school curricula and textbooks 
since 1979 in accordance with ideological pressure to make education conform with 
the new Islamic philosophy of education. Changes in the content of a sample of 
textbooks are presented in the Appendix. 
Chapter Seven focuses on gendered social relations among students, teachers 
and administrators in Iranian schools. The main aim is to explain how ideological 
concerns play a significant role in shaping social interactions between males and 
females through (a) the establishment of new notions of appropriate relationships (b) 
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the shaping of agenda items discussed in the Teachers' Council, and (c) the conduct of 
new religious practices in schools. 
Chapter Eight has a special focus on the central role of teacher training 
programmes after 1979. Then it discusses briefly the changes that have occurred in 
methods of teaching and assessing students. Finally, there is an analysis of teachers' 
perceptions of the ways in which their professional role and social status have 
changed since the revolution. 
Chapter Nine sets out a brief consideration of the New System of Education 
beginning from the early years of 1990s. It contains arguments about its difference 
from the Old System of Education, its new philosophy, teachers' responses to the 
New System in schools and current problems in delivery. 
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Chapter One 
MAX WEBER, MODERNITY AND ISLAM 
The theoretical perspective from which this thesis is written is most heavily 
influenced by the work of Max Weber, the eminent German scholar who helped to lay 
the foundations for the development of social sciences in the early twentieth century 
(Beetham 1974; Mommsen 1974). It is therefore important to clarify the 
distinctiveness of Weber's approach to the practice of social scientific investigations. 
This will involve a brief discussion of some of his basic concepts, but there is no 
intention to examine the many and diverse interpretations of Weber's work (see 
Albrow 1990; Bcckford 1989; Brubaker 1984; Käsler 1988; Roth & Schluchter 1979; 
Scaff 1989). Consideration will then be given to the questions that Weber raised 
about the sociological study of religion and about Islam in particular. The purpose of 
this opening Chapter is to set the scene for the specific issues with which this thesis is 
concerned, namely, the influence of government sponsored Islamic ideology on 
school-level education in a rural area of present-day Iran and the responses of teachers 
to this influence. 
Interpretative Sociology, the label usually given to Weber's approach to 
sociology, is based on use of the human faculty of `understanding'. This is mainly 
because the subject of sociology is human beings who are self-conscious and 
intentional and who sometimes behave unexpectedly in ways which would defy study 
by experimental methods. Interpretative sociology is therefore different from factorial 
theories, according to Blumer's classification of theoretical types such as Positivism, 
Functionalism, Conflict Theory, and Exchange Theory which seek to study human 
groups in the same way as they would study animals, plants and soulless beings 
(Tanhaei 1992: 54-63). The assumption of these approaches to science is that they 
can control or predict human behaviour in determinate fashion. But the methodology 
of interpretative sociology is associated with probabilities: not certainties. Moreover, 
an interpretative researcher should not just examine a relationship between 
independent variables and dependent variables; but it is also necessary to understand 
and analyse events and phenomena in terms of their meaning. 
In defining Sociology and `social fact', Weber, unlike his French 
contemporary, Emile Durkheim, did not separate social structures and institutions 
from meaningful human actions. So, the notion of `social action' forms the core of 
his sociology. This means that sociologists should try to understand how humans use, 
create and evaluate their various social relationships. Weber therefore preferred to use 
the active terms `Vergesellschaftung' and `Vergemeinschaftung' (meaning `the 
processes of societalisation' and `the processes of community formation') instead of 
the relatively static terms `Gesellschaft' and `Gemeinschaft'. Since humans interpret 
their social relationships and actions differently at different times, Weber also 
emphasised the need to situate social structures and relationships in their historical 
contexts. In short, social structures are probabilistic and changeable outcomes of 
intentional human action which can be understood, for sociological purposes, in terms 
of the meanings invested in them. 
Weber's definition of sociology is as follows: 
`The term "Sociology" is open to many different interpretations. In the 
context used here it shall mean that science which aims at the 
1) 
interpretative understanding of social behaviour in order to gain an 
explanation of its causes, its course, and its effects. ' (Freund 1968: 93) 
Interpretative understanding, for Weber, involved grasping the meaning of actions 
with certainty. Yet, there is a hierarchy of understanding, of which the highest degree 
is intellectual understanding of rational action. The experiences of other people can 
sometimes be understood easily through sympathetic sharing, but there is no 
guarantee that this will explain everything, especially in the case of motivational 
understanding. For the certainty of understanding may be weakened either by the 
interference of incomprehensible external factors like chance, or by psychological 
complexity, as when two people react differently to the same circumstance. In these 
cases, interpretative understanding should rely on the findings of other sciences, such 
as psychology, psychoanalysis and biology, which investigate these problems. 
Although Weber did not believe that the ability to put one's self in the place of other 
actors was an absolutely reliable way of producing meaningful interpretation, it is a 
useful method for grasping what needs to be explained. It presupposes a rational and 
authentic ideal-type of social action based on interpretative understanding, and it 
offers the greatest possible objective validity to the interpretative method. 
Weber refined his analysis of social behaviour, or action, by classifying it into 
four types: `traditional, affectual, rational value-oriented and rational goal-oriented. ' 
Traditional conduct is based on mechanical reaction in blind submission to custom, 
and, therefore, includes incomprehensible elements. Affectual conduct comprises 
sensory, emotional, instinctive and passionate elements which only psychology and 
psychoanalysis can investigate. Rational value-oriented action is conduct which 
originates from the beliefs of the agent, without taking account of the foreseeable 
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results. Rational goal-oriented action is the most amenable to interpretative sociology 
because it involves the highest degree of rational verifiable proof. When the purpose 
of conduct, after deep consideration, has been decided, the agent chooses the 
appropriate means, taking account of their foreseeable results. 
Each of these types of social action is an ideal-type or a pure case against 
which to determine whether specific conduct approaches the ideal in the purest sense 
or departs from it. So, an ideal-type, whether in the form of traditionalist conduct, 
affectual conduct, or rational value-oriented or goal-oriented conduct, is never more 
than a Utopian scenario which is designed theoretically to facilitate research. Its 
validity depends entirely on its usefulness in research, nothing else. In other words, it 
is only a `paradigm', the aim of which is to enable sociologists to grasp the meaning 
of social action, processes, relationships and structures. So, although an ideal-type is 
necessarily a deliberate abstraction and selection from the complexity of empirical 
reality, it offers a better analytical grasp of it. 
In his extended `debate with the ghost of Karl Marx', Weber argued for the 
heuristic use of ideal-types. The problem with Marx's materialistic conception of 
history, to Weber, was that it took just one factor, the economic, as the only real one 
for comprehensive explanation of the whole of history. Weber responded one-sidedly 
to this one-sided point of view by writing The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, in which he tried to prove that if the economic aspect could affect the 
other elements of society, the cultural aspect could also do so, but only as understood 
in a ideal-type way. 
One of the aims of this thesis is to show, in the spirit of Weber's use of ideal- 
types, that much can be learned about education in Iran after 1979 by isolating,, for 
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analytical purposes only, the influence of religious ideas. Of course, education has 
also been shaped by many other factors, but this thesis deliberately explores the 
relatively neglected influence of religion. Only in this quasi-experimental fashion is it 
possible to appreciate fully the impact of religion on education and, thereby, to 
understand the distinctive trajectory of Iranian society in the post-revolutionary' era. 
Weberian Themes in the Sociology of Religion 
The following discussion is confined to a selection of concepts which were central to 
Weber's analysis of processes feeding into what many social scientists came to call 
`modernisation', although this particular term did not occur frequently in Weber's 
own writings. The aim is not, however, to debate the strengths and weaknesses of the 
concept of modernisation. It is merely to clarify the reasons that Weber had for giving 
priority to certain concepts in his understanding of the direction of social change 
mainly in North America and Western Europe. In most cases priority was given to 
concepts highlighting the contrast between `tradition' and `modernity'. Despite the 
massive social changes that have occurred since Weber's day, it still remains helpful 
to approach the study of developments in Iranian society from this point of view, 
although later Chapters will show that modifications of some concepts are now 
required. In particular, the simultaneous interplay between aspects of tradition and 
aspects of modernity will be emphasised in Iranian education today. 
1. Tradition and Modernity 
(a) Patriarchalism and Patrimonialism versus Capitalism 
One of the threads running through Max Weber's work in history, economics, 
politics, sociology and the study of religion concerns relations between systems of 
political power, systems of economic exploitation, and religious institutions. He was 
especially interested in the elective affinities which held together these parts of social 
structure at different historical periods. Without assigning causal priority to any one 
of them, Weber analysed the logic of their internal relations in various circumstances. 
As far as the broad contrast between tradition and modernity was concerned, it 
seemed that patriarchalism and patrimonialism were incompatible with the kind of 
rational capitalism which developed at various locations in the West and at different 
rates from the fifteenth century C. E. onwards. 
Patrimonialism, to Weber (1978a: 237-41), is any form of political dominion 
based on personal and bureaucratic power exercised by a ruling family. Its most 
important difference from other sorts of political power is, firstly, that patrimonial 
power is based on arbitrary criteria and, secondly, that its administration is controlled 
directly by the ruler. Traditionalism, in this policy, obstructs the path of rational 
economic development, because it lacks two requirements for the rationalisation of 
economic activity: a basis for the calculability of obligations, and sufficient freedom 
to permit private business. According to Weber, only certain sorts of capitalism can 
be developed under the dominance of patrimonial policy, because patrimonialism and 
patriarchalism tend inherently to regulate economic activity in terms of profitable, 
welfare or absolute values. They are: capitalist trading, capitalist tax farming, rent 
and sale of offices, capitalist administration of supplies, and capitalist plantations, in 
some conditions. 
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Closely related to the economic and political implications of patrimonialism 
are limitations on the scope for developments in religion which lay outside the control 
of institutions guarding tradition. For it was usually in the interests of their leaders to 
ensure that the dominant institutions of politics, economics and religion continued to 
observe traditional values, hierarchies and social practices. As will become clear later 
in this thesis, tensions between remnants of patrimonialism and various modernising 
forces have been at the centre of debates about social development in Iran throughout 
the twentieth century. 
(b) Disenchantment of the World 
Max Weber's account of the processes of modernisation is particularly distinctive for 
the primacy that it accords to the declining influence of religious, spiritual and 
philosophical currents of thought. Pride of place is given to the process of 
disenchantment which has allegedly helped to transform the ideal-typical world view 
of the West. 
The Christian definition of the world and, as a consequence, the tension 
between this world and the concept of the other world helped to shape Weber's work, 
particularly his analysis of Protestantism and religion in general (Albrow 1990: 120- 
3). This tension stems from the New Testament: `And he said unto them, Ye are from 
beneath; I am from above: ye are of this world; I am not of this world. I say 
therefore unto you that ye shall die in your sins: for if ye believe not that I am he, ye 
shall die in your sins' (John 8: 23,24). The world is the everyday life of earthly 
existence, where people are born, marry, obey or disobey, sin and die. This outward, 
temporal, routine and untidy world should be replaced, according to the Christian 
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Gospels, by the hope of a hereafter, and the kingdom of men has to be succeeded by 
the kingdom of God. Weber took these distinctions for granted in his works and 
constructed an image of the world of modernity as a time and place where the 
distinction between this world and an other world was becoming blurred. The ideals 
of modernity offered the prospect of a world where mystery, magic, luck and fate 
would be ousted by the forces of science, calculation and reason. 
Analysis of the changes introduced into the Islamic educational system after 
1979 will show, in later Chapters, that the disenchantment of the world may not be 
inevitable, indiscriminate or irreversible. Instead, it will become clear that Isalmicist 
ideology has sought to promote certain forms of `modem' knowledge without 
expelling all elements of religion and spirituality in their popular or formal guises. 
(c) Rationalisation 
The disenchantment of the world owes much, according to Weber, to one particular 
intellectual force for change, namely, the process of rationalisation. This is another 
example of the priority accorded by Weber to the capacity of ideational forces to 
shape the development of the material conditions of life and of social structures. 
Rationalisation is the result of the scientific specialisation and technical 
expertise which were originally peculiar to western civilisation. Weber defined it as 
an attempt at refinement which tends to elaborate the conduct of life in a creative way 
and to increase domination over the external world. He does not equate increasing 
rationalisation with progress in the usual sense of the word, because it never 
guarantees a better understanding of our way of living. He wrote: 
`The increasing intellectualisation and rationalisation do not, therefore, 
indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under 
which one lives. It means something else, namely, the knowledge or 
belief that if one but wished one could learn it at any time. Hence it 
means that there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into 
play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by 
calculation. ' (Gerth and Mills 1991: 139) 
Weber's concept of rationalisation is not unproblematic (Brubaker 1984) but it 
helps to explain some of the tensions and ironies affecting the development of 
education in Iran after 1979. It will become clear in later Chapters that attempts to 
rationalise aspects of education have met with mixed results, some of them distinctly 
non-rational. 
(d) The routinisation of charisma 
Given the very high public profile enjoyed in Iran by the Ayatollah Khomeini and 
other leading Muslim clerics before and after the 1979 revolution, this thesis will have 
to assess the impact of charismatic leadership on social change. Again, Max Weber's 
pioneering analyses of charisma and of other bases of authority and power will 
provide the basic resources for interpretation. 
According to Weber (1978b: 1121-3), charismatic authority thrives in unusual 
political or economic situations or when supernatural phenomena seem to occur. It 
proceeds from public enthusiasm generated by abnormal events and from recognition 
of heroism in a leader who displays exceptional powers or gifts. Faith in the leader 
himself and in his charismatic powers is often believed to be eternal, and he can be 
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regarded as a person who has been sent to the people to accomplish a divine mission. 
But this situation is unstable, because when the extraordinary enthusiasm subsides and 
the disciples have to return to their usual routines, at least the pure form of charismatic 
authority will diminish and may be transformed into an institution. Then it is either 
routinised or invisibly replaced by other structures, or combined with them so that it 
becomes only one aspect of a concrete historical structure. 
A further refinement of the notion of charisma was sketched by Weber in his 
treatment of `charisma of office'. This refers to the probability that commands will be 
obeyed if they emanate from people who occupy institutional offices with which 
exceptional powers and gifts have become associated. In this case, charisma is not, 
strictly speaking, attributed to individuals but to the offices that they occupy. This 
distinction has special relevance to Shi'ite Islam by virtue of the roles played by its 
clerics -- unlike the situation in Sunni traditions. `Charisma of office' has a direct 
bearing on attempts to explain the mechanisms and processes whereby particular 
interpretations of Islam have been deployed throughout Iranian society in the period 
since 1979. 
(e) Bureaucratisation 
Max Weber's ideal-type of `modem western rational bureaucracy' serves as a useful 
yardstick by which to assess the extent to which, and the manner in which, post- 
revolutionary Iran's public institutions have been rationalised. From the point of view 
of this thesis, the interesting question is not whether bureaucratisation has taken place 
but how it has occurred. It is especially important to discover how Islamic ideology 
has affected bureaucratic developments in theory and in practice. The field of 
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education provides a good opportunity for investigating the form and the outcome of 
bureaucratisation processes in an Islamic context. 
The clearest example of rational-legal dominion (`Herrschaft' in German), in 
Weber's opinion, is modem Western rational bureaucracy. Contrary to 
patrimonialism it is characterised by: 
1- special services and a clear division of obligations and decision-making powers 
based on the application of definite regulations or law. 
2- support for officials in meeting their obligations under special regulations. 
3- hierarchical establishment of duties. 
4- employment of officials on the basis of qualification through examination or 
diplomas. 
5- organisation of regular salaries during employment and afterwards. 
6- the right of people with higher authority to monitor the work of their inferiors. 
7- the possibility of promotion for officials on the basis of objective standards. 
8- definite separation between officials and their official jobs. (Freund 1968: 234-5) 
There is a lengthy and unresolved debate among sociologists about the relation 
between bureaucratisation and democracy. Weber himself, as well as his 
contemporary, Roberto Michels, recognised the practical benefits of modern Western 
rational bureaucracy for a democratic ordering of political life (Beetham 1974). At 
the same time, Michels was especially impressed by the capacity of bureaucracies to 
stultify the democratic spirit and to circumvent democratic processes in the long-term. 
These concerns are reproduced in present-day concerns about the role of `experts' and 
`professionals' in bureaucratic organisations. For this reason, it is essential to 
investigate the character of the bureaucratic structures and processes that were 
introduced into Iranian educational institutions after 1979 to discover how far they 
reflect the prevailing political ideologies. The impact of Islamic ideologies will be 
investigated in detail. 
2. Salvation and Religious Ethics 
A recurrent theme in Weber's writings about modernisation deals with the impact of 
religiously-informed ethics on everyday social action. It is not just a matter of 
identifying the formal religious beliefs which directly inform action; it is also, and 
more importantly, a matter of teasing out the subtle and elusive connections between 
religious ways of thinking and feeling and pre-dispositions to live in certain ways. 
Reflecting Weber's interest in the influence of religiously-informed economic ethics, 
this thesis will try to probe the effects on educational policy and practice of the 
Islamic ideology propagated in Iran after 1979. 
(a) This worldly and other worldly asceticism 
Weber (1978a: 541-4) interprets asceticism as the disciplined and methodical pursuit 
of salvation. But the meaning of asceticism varies with the contents of different 
religions which represent different notions of salvation and the world. If the actual 
search for salvation involves withdrawal from the world including, for example, loss 
of attachment to family, worldly goods, and economic, political and artistic interests, 
Weber called it `worldly-rejecting asceticism' ('weltablehnende Askese'). On the 
other hand, if salvation requires humans to concentrate on participation in the 
institutions of the world whilst remaining detached from them, to become one of 
God's elect, this is called `inner-worldly asceticism' (`innerweltliche Askese'). This 
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latter type of asceticism influenced Weber's thinking about ascetic Protestantism's 
status as a cultural factor needed for the spirit of capitalism in ideal-typical form. For 
he took for granted that this-worldly asceticism was a rational way of rejecting 
everything that is irrational, esthetic or that relies on man's own emotional reactions 
to the world. 
It is not the aim of this thesis to decide whether anything functionally 
equivalent to inner-worldly asceticism can be detected in post-1979 Iranian education, 
but Weber's research into asceticism and salvation at least poses the question of how 
individuals relate their religious convictions to their everyday life. The impact of 
Islamic ideologies on Iranian schoolteachers' professional views and practices since 
1979 is therefore of central interest to Chapter 8. 
(b) Religious ethics and economic ethics 
Weber investigated ethics in order to know the psychological and empirical factors 
which influence the practical motives behind human activities, particularly economic 
activities. According to Weber, it is a mistake to reduce all factors to a single one if 
the complexity of human life is to be appreciated. So, economic morality does not 
rely merely on the forms of economic institutions; nor can it be restricted easily to the 
impact of religious organisations alone. It is the same with religious morality. This 
means that economics cannot be explained solely by religion, nor can religion be 
explained solely by economics. This is how Weber analysed Chinese, Indian or 
Ancient Jewish religious sentiments. He studied all the detailed material conditions of 
life - financial organisation, the urban or rural situation and the position of social 
strata - in order to understand the sociological aspect of religions (Freund 1968: 209- 
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17). This thesis will try to perform the same kind of analysis on the ways in which 
teachers in Iran perceive and negotiate relations between their religious ethics and 
their economic ethics. 
3. Relations Between Religious and Socio-economic Development 
One of Max Weber's most significant contributions towards the sociology of religion 
was to argue that the application of religious ideas can produce unexpected and ironic 
consequences. For example, his argument about the long-term effects of economic 
ethics inspired by varieties of Protestantism is justly famous for highlighting the 
ironic effects of this-worldly asceticism on the development of a capitalistic spirit. In 
a similar fashion, this thesis is also interested in studying the outcome of deliberate 
attempts to apply a particular form of Islamic ethics to Iranian society and culture. 
This is why it is necessary briefly to clarify the terms of Weber's reasoning. 
Weber (1971: 183) responded in a deliberately one-sided fashion to those who 
interpreted culture and history in a one-sided, materialistic fashion by writing the most 
famous work in the sociology of religion, namely, the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism. Weber, in investigating the conditions in which western capitalism 
emerged, emphasised the importance of an element which other civilisations such as 
Babylon, Rome, China and India had lacked. As a result, they failed to develop 
capitalism. It was, according to him, the Protestant ethic which indirectly and 
ironically led to the rationalisation of economics and which was involved in the 
formation of the `spirit of capitalism'. However, this was not the only cause, `but one 
of the causes of certain aspects of capitalism'. In his view, there was a specific 
relationship in Protestantism between faithful Protestants and their God who had 
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determined their fate even before they had been created. They should devote their life 
to Him in the hope that they would receive at best a sign of their election. On the one 
hand, therefore, Protestants should also work as much as they could and should not 
waste their time. On the other, they must not spend money beyond what was 
necessary for living a simple life, because religion required them to avoid enjoying 
idle things and the temptations of the flesh. As a result, this style of life inadvertently 
and ironically fostered sobriety, efficiency and prosperity which, in turn, fed into an 
ethos which helped to cultivate conditions conducive to the spirit of capitalism. 
4. Religious Professionals 
Given Max Weber's preoccupation with processes of rationalisation and 
bureaucratisation, it follows that questions about the role of professionals in religious 
organisations were also of interest to him (Beckford 1973). Indeed, many sections of 
his writings about the sociology of religion analyse these topics in considerable detail. 
His analyses are not confined to Christianity but are applied to all the world's major 
faith traditions. In doing so, Weber refined many concepts specific to particular 
traditions as well as those of wider applicability. Yet, at the centre of these 
conceptual discussions is a recurrent theme, namely, the dynamic between (a) 
innovation in religious thought and experience (b) the status of specialists who clarify 
and conserve religious traditions, and (c) the form of religious organisations. 
Relations between these three factors have taken very different forms at different 
times in different cultural traditions. One of Weber's great achievements was to 
identify some broad patterns in these relationships. 
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The tension between priests and magicians was one such pattern. Paralleling 
Durkheim's claim that there was no `church of magic', Weber stressed the logical 
connection between a priest's ritual and sacramental functions and the rule-governed, 
formal character of church-type institutions. This is not easily applicable to the Shi'ite 
clergy of Iran, but this thesis will consider how changes in Iranian education have 
permitted the clergy to play a novel role in relation to schools. 
The scattered fragments of Weber's writings on Islam imply that the notion of 
priest did not fit easily into this particular faith tradition because it tended to lack 
church-type organisations controlling the training, appointment and disciplining of 
priests. This is especially noticeable in Weber's discussion of the kind of judicial 
system in which the `kadi' administers the shari'a in a much less legal-rational way 
than was characteristic of western judicial systems. It will become apparent in this 
thesis that the institutions of Shi'a Islam enable members of the clergy to perform a 
number of professional tasks comparable with those of priests in, for example, 
Christian Churches. This sociological fact about Iranian clergy helps to explain 
aspects of recent educational change in Iran. 
Weber's Characterisation of Islam 
Some of the Weberian theoretical perspectives and concepts which are likely to have a 
useful bearing on the study of education in post-revolutionary Iran have been outlined 
above. In most cases they need adaptation to the specific character of Islam in 
different places and times. In a few cases their relevance is questionable. Before 
entering into the detail of the argument about education in Iran, therefore, it is 
necessary to take stock of Weber's account of Islam in general. At various points this 
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thesis will indicate the strengths and weaknesses of this account whilst maintaining 
that Weber's insistence on studying sociological patterns from the viewpoint of the 
meanings that actors bring to situations remains valid. 
Weber (1978a: 623-7) characterised Islam less as a salvation religion and 
more as a religion with all the characteristics of feudalism. He thought that Islam 
increased its political power by extorting tribute (iizyah) from other religions' 
believers. So, it was a religion of the masters. In addition, wealth and the 
significance of what he considered to be luxuries, such as clothing, perfume and 
beard-coiffure all reflected the feudalistic character of Islam and its contrast to 
Puritanism. However, according to Weber, Islam contained a modicum of asceticism 
in the form of fasting, begging and penitential suffering. Furthermore, the original 
Islamic notion of sin corresponded with a feudal model as well, because sin was 
perceived as disobedience to the positive orders of the Prophet. Other vestiges of 
feudalism in Islam, according to Weber, included: the acceptance of slavery, serfdom, 
and polygamy; patriarchal dominion over women; the substantially ritualistic feature 
of religious duties; and the simplicity of religious and ethical requirements, which 
prepared the way for the dervish religion to be influential in Islam as a residue of an 
irrational and traditional identity. 
The political significance of Islam in Weber's view was that it had succeeded 
in quelling personal feuds to increase the community's power against its enemies. 
Further, it rejected illicit sexual intercourse, supporting the legitimate form of 
reproduction in accordance with patriarchalism. Opposition to usury, the imposition 
of war taxes, and the official orders to support the poor, were its other political 
characteristics. In addition, there were political frameworks within which religious 
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responsibilities required in dogma could be honoured: belief that God is one and that 
Mohammad is his Prophet; pilgrimage to Mecca; fasting; prayers; special clothing; 
and the avoidance of particular unclean foods and gambling. 
In sum, the image that Weber created of Islam is dominated by feudal, 
patriarchal considerations reflecting the religion's historical origins and its 
incompatibility with the conditions required for capitalist development. In Bryan 
Turner's words: 
`[T]he main point of Weber's analysis of Islam is not that the early 
warrior ethic precluded capitalism but that the political and economic 
conditions of Oriental society were hostile to capitalist pre-requisites... 
When Weber came to analyse Islam, he focused on the political, 
military and economic nature of Islamic society as a patrimonial form 
of domination. ' (Turner 1974: 16,20-21) 
Moreover, Weber appeared to be largely unaware of the changes that had 
occurred in Islam and among the social circumstances of Muslims by the early 
twentieth century. And his sensitivity to the distinctiveness of Shi'ism seemed low. 
However, the reason for reviewing his characterisation of Islam is not to re-write 
Weber's work. The more modest aim is merely to sketch the conceptual framework 
within which Weber depicted Islam as a highly distinctive socio-religious, political 
and cultural system. Many of the following observations about Shi'ism in Iran will be 
incompatible with this particular way of depicting Islam. Nevertheless, it remains 
valid to make use of Weber's methodological principles of interpretative sociology to 
this study of the changes that have taken place in school-level education in one part of 
rural Iran in the present-day under the influence of revolutionary Islam. 
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The main reason for trying to isolate the influence of Islam in this thesis is 
that, as many commentators on Iran have agreed, it is a country in which religion 
occupies a position of virtual hegemony. For example, the leading French scholar of 
Iran, Yann Richard (1990: 109-10), claimed that any political regime based on 
revolutionary militancy would need to consolidate its power by means of ideology but 
that Iran was different in so far as it placed religion alone at the centre of its ideology. 
Moreover, as the next Chapter will show, religion has been close to the centre of most 
political events in Iran for various reasons throughout the twentieth century. Unlike 
that of some commentators, however, Richard's work is unusual for the emphasis that 
it places on the role of state schools as conduits through which Iran's revolutionary 
ideological currents have passed. He regards schools as the fulcrum of Islamist 
attempts to topple the Pahlavi monarchy and to re-islamise the entire Iranian society. 
In his view, schools were systematically used for the purpose of creating a new 
political culture and structure under the Islamic Republic (Richard 1990: 105). 
This thesis will test the validity of Richard's argument and will explore in 
depth the intended and unintended consequences of educational change in Iran since 
1979. 
ENDNOTES 
This is a short-hand term for designating the period following the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, beginning in 1979. 
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Chapter Two 
PATHS TO REVOLUTION 
In order to appreciate the distinctiveness of the religious influences exercised on 
school-level education in Iran following the 1979 revolution, it is essential to 
understand the political and ideological currents and events leading up to, and leading 
out of, the revolution. The main aim of this Chapter is to examine the significance of 
what can be considered, with the benefit of hindsight, to be the episodes which had 
the most formative effect on the revolution and its aftermath. They include the 
Tobacco Regie episode of 1890-92; the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11; the 
nationalist movements of 1951 to 1953; and the uprising of 1963. Where appropriate, 
special attention will be given to the variable extent to which Shi'ite clergy were 
willing or able to shape political developments. The ideological underpinnings of the 
revolution and of the Islamic Republic will be the focus of Chapter Three. 
Before the analysis can begin, however, some definitions of two key terms are 
required. The aim is not to legislate for the use of terms but merely to give a general 
indication of the meanings attributed to them in this thesis. 
Firstly, in defining `revolution' and in consideration of its `Islamic' nature, the 
social and cultural movement of 1979 included both a `return to the point of origin', 
as Copernicus had conceptualised the revolution of stars in astronomy in the mid- 
sixteenth century (Milani 1994: 8), and a liberating process, according to which 
`Islam' became a philosophy which ought to change the world, not just interpret it. 
Change would be implemented through revolution; but not as an inherent necessity 
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caused by the motor of history, as Marx interpreted revolution in the nineteenth 
century. 
The former conceptualisation of revolution as `reversion' is best understood as 
`the return to pure Muhammadan Islamn', which has been a constant theme of various 
Islamic authorities of Iran. The latter definition, as a concept of progressive social 
and political change, seems to have been adopted under the influence of both Western 
and Eastern revolutionary historiography, particularly analysis of the French 
Revolution of 1789 and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia. This 
corresponds with the idea that the term `revolution' had been `neither sought nor 
discussed by most Iranian reformers' (Milani 1994: 8) until the 1920s, because 
monarchy had been viewed as a religiously authoritative institution. 
According to this view, even the Constitutional Movement of 1905-1911 was 
never called a `revolution' by the reformers themselves, but it was described as such 
by Iranian historians years later. Regardless of its controversial name', whether it 
deserves to be called `revolution' or not, it was a social and cultural movement, apart 
from its political aspects, in which Islamic ideology played an important role and 
which had marked similarities with the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
Secondly, there are many different ways of understanding `ideology', but for 
present purposes a very general definition will be adequate. The term will be taken to 
mean `any system of ideas underlying and informing social and political action' (Jary 
1991: 295). This sense of the term differentiates it from that which underlies the 
Marxist theory of ideology, which is connected to ideas in relation to social classes. 
In other words, `ideology' in the current work means the translation of ideas into 
action. 
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The following analysis of four episodes leading to the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution of 1978-79 will take no account of the fact that the significance attributed 
by different scholars to these episodes reflects the scholars' ideological sympathies. 
The aim here is simply to indicate the events and situations which, according to 
scholars of widely differing ideological sympathies, helped to lay the foundations, 
positively and negatively, for the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
The Tobacco Regie 
The Tobacco Regie episode (1890-1892) was the first major occasion on which 
Islamic ideology demonstrated its unique power against both a Qajar king and a 
Western company. For the first time, people experienced success in reversing a 
Shah's decision by turning to the clergy (ulama) and Islamic ideology. It was also a 
manifestation of unity between the clergy, the guilds (asnaJ) and merchants against 
the Great Powers and the Qajar kings. The rebellion started when the people who 
were involved in tobacco production protested against the concession of 1890, 
according to which a British company had been offered the monopoly of the 
production, distribution, sale, and export of tobacco at a very cheap price by Naser ad- 
Din Shah. A Grand Ayatollah, Haj Hassan Shirazi, encouraged by Seyyed Jamal ad- 
Din Asadabadi and the merchants, issued a letter (fatva) `enjoining on the people the 
complete abandonment of tobacco until the Concession should be repealed' (Browne 
1966: 52). Therefore, the Shah cancelled the treaty in 1892 and had to pay a penalty 
of £500,000 to the British company. Although it is hardly possible to interpret such a 
rebellion as an ideological uprising against foreign powers and autocratic kings, the 
episode demonstrated the power of Islamic ideology to unite the concerned groups in 
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their pursuit of desirable objectives. In fact the episode neither reduced the influence 
of Russia and Britain over the country nor caused considerable subsequent change in 
the Shah's autocracy. Four years later, Naser ad-Din Shah was shot dead by a 
member of the clergy, Mirza Mohammad Riza of Kirman, who was one of the 
followers of Seyyed Jamal ad-Din Asadabadi. 
At this time, there was also a small group of secular reformers who had some 
familiarity with Western modernisation and who wished to repeat the same process in 
their own country. Among them were Persian diplomats in the embassies abroad; 
some graduates of Dar al-Fonun, the first modern school in the country; some leading 
bureaucrats and a few Western-educated graduates. The idea of creating a written 
code of law and of modernising Persia from the top, copying Western styles, had 
brought them together (Milani 1994: 27). Utilising the experience of success 
acquired in the Tobbaco Regie episode, in which the clergy and the merchants or 
guilds (asnaf} had been allies in attempts to have the concession annulled, they 
accepted an alliance with the clergy, who had connections with all segments of the 
people, in a scheme to modernise Iran in the Western style. This provided an 
appropriate background for the subsequent appearance of a stronger movement, i. e. 
the Constitutional Revolution. 
The Constitutional Revolution 
The Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) was a reaction to the disastrous events 
that had happened in the late nineteenth century, and expressed the dissatisfactions of 
reformers who wanted to discontinue the lawlessness, foreign domination and 
economic failure of the king Mozaffaru'd-Din Shah's autocracy, by creating a written 
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constitution and a national consultative assembly. The reformist group consisted of 
secular reformers, who presented ideological direction; the merchants and guilds, who 
supported the urban movement financially; and the clergy, who provided legitimacy 
for the uprising. 
The revolution began in late 1905, when two sugar merchants were thrashed 
after being accused of financial corruption by the governor of Tehran, Aynu'd- 
Dawleh. This event led to demonstrations by the merchants and the people around 
them, and the death of several people, including clergymen. The Constitutional 
movement was strengthened when the merchants' objections were supported by the 
clergy, who were intolerant of a foreign Christiane managing an Islamic country's 
customs affairs, especially when a photograph appeared showing him dressed as a 
member of the clergy (Browne 1966: 112)3. 
All these events created resentment in a large number of clergy and merchants. 
They took sanctuary (bast) in a holy shrine and insisted on the dismissal of Aynu'd- 
Dawla; the creation of a house of justice (adalat-khaneh or majlis-i ma'dilat), and the 
invitation of the clerical leaders from Qom. Although agreeing to the first and the last 
demands, the Shah failed to deal with the establishment of a house of justice, the 
functions of which were never clearly explained. But the angry people, mistrustful of 
the state, now asked Mozaffaru'd-Din Shah to draft a constitution and establish a 
national consultative assembly, Majles. These demands were finally accepted by him 
in 1906. The term `constitution', mashrutiyyat, was now heard for the first time by 
some reformists (Keddie & Amanat 1991: 202-4). 
The Persian constitution was finally drafted on the model of the Belgian 
constitution, but with the stipulation of a `clerical committee', five of whom enjoyed 
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the power of veto over all parliament's approvals which might be contrary to Islamic 
law (shari'a). Although the reformers agreed in the matter of investing real power in 
the Majlis and ministers rather than the king, the alliance between the secular 
reformers and the clergy became fragile when trying to draft the constitution. It failed 
to satisfy the conflicting ideas of the two groups. For instance, while it contained 
some of the pluralistic ideas of the secular reformers, it also included Article Two, 
which restricted peoples' sovereignty through the vetoing powers of the `clerical 
committee'. However, neither of these contradictory reforms were considered by the 
later autocrat kings. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Revolution, in practice, resulted 
in an almost wholly Western-style secular constitution and government. By contrast, 
the Revolution of 1978-9 was a movement of a different kind which led to a 
constitution highly inspired by Islam. Moreover, the nature of the revolutionaries and 
the perceived enemies were ideologically different on the two occasions (see Keddie 
1983). 
The Constitutional Movement witnessed divisions not only between the clergy 
and the secular reformers, but also among the clergy themselves. The majority of the 
clergy approved of constitutionalism and the insertion of many Articles, including the 
approval of Shi'ism and the official state religion in Article one, yet a small group of 
the clergy disagreed with the constitution. 
The issue of conflict among the clergy never really arose before the victory of 
the Revolution of 1978-9 -- and almost all the clergy supported the Islamic 
Revolution. Furthermore, the clergy leaders adopted a new political ideology in the 
Revolution of 1978-9, distinguishing it from all the previous movements including the 
Constitutional Revolution. 
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Finally, the existence of disagreements between the clergy themselves as well 
as those between clergy and the secular reformers and the lack of ideological 
compatibility between different groups of the alliance in general contributed to the 
weakness of the movement and, as a result, the re-appearance of despotism during the 
Constitutional Revolution. In 1908 the Parliament was bombarded on the order of 
Mohammad Ali Shah (Mozaffaru'd-Din Shah's successor), the press was silenced, 
and public gatherings were prohibited. It is particularly worth remembering that 
democracy was not universally popular among the masses. 
In 1925 the Prime Minister, Reza Khan, put an end to the Qajar dynasty and 
established a Pahlavi one (1925-79), whose title was drawn from the language of the 
Pre-Islamic period, and also changed the name of country from Persia to Iran stressing 
Iran's Ari'yan origin. Iranian nationalism emphasising the expansiveness of pre- 
Islamic Persia became the ideological basis of the Pahlavis' action. Under the Pahlavi 
regime, Iran experienced accelerated modernisation, centralisation, and secularisation. 
Under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah (Reza Shah's son), the USA gradually 
replaced the UK and the Soviet Union as the main external influence on Iranian 
internal affairs. 
Oil, nationalism, and a coup d'etat 
In the last years of the second world war and into the post-war period, American 
interests concerning Iranian oil resources and the old policy of `negative equilibrium' 
of Iranian politicians strengthened the bases of American intervention in Iranian 
internal affairs. Accordingly, the USA sought to reduce British imperialism over Iran 
and enforce an `open door' policy (Ghods 1989). The USA also maintained its 
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influence over Iran by several agreements on military and economic development 
programmes after 1947 (Keddie 1981: 122-132). 
Similarly, Britain was interested in keeping its concerns in Iranian oil 
resources from both the Americans and the Russians. The British attempted to allow 
neither country to make any oil concession with Iran, through supporting the very 
conservative agenda of Seyyed Zia's National Will Party. At the same time the Soviet 
Union, being rather indifferent about the conflict between the United States and 
Britain over Iranian oil, was also bidding for an oil concession in the North of Iran. 
But the Russian request was initially declined by the Iranian state of that time. In fact, 
the political situation was so unstable in Tehran that several governments fell in 
quick succession until 1951, when Dr M Musaddiq became prime minister. Such 
instability in the capital had encouraged riots in different parts of Iran, mainly in 
Azarbaijan and Kurdistan, and also Khorasan, Khuzistan, Fars and elsewhere (see 
Fawcett 1992; Keddie 1981: 119-121; and Ghods 1989: 138-178). Stability was 
further affected because post-war Iran faced new and different social and economic 
conditions from those of the War period. A group of people who had profited from 
the War and accumulated money now became interested in investing in private 
industry as a new middle class after the War. Some of them, as well as parts of the 
bazaar middle classes, favoured a nationalist bourgeoisie in order to decrease foreign 
influence and obtain political and economic independence to control the Iranian 
economy. 
Yet there were some other bazaar groups, the lower-middle-class, who, 
although having benefited from the war economy to some extent, lacked enough 
capital to invest in productive industry. The lower-middle-class became a very 
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powerful group when it was allied to the religious class, which had already been 
alienated by Reza Shah's despotism and his anti-clerical policies. Taking advantage 
of the new opportunity, the clergy wanted to re-express their Islamic concerns and 
regain at least some of their previous status. Some clergy demanded Islamic law in 
more areas. They also criticised the control and influence imposed by foreigners over 
the country. The majority of clergy, however, including the Grand Ayatollah Husain 
Borujerdi, were not interested in being involved with politics. 
Moreover, the Iranian students and young intellectuals, who had suffered from 
restrictions on developing their talents and gaining proper employment, identified 
their problems with the masses. Industrial workers were another discontented group. 
Although they were a small group, their importance grew during the post-war period 
when they formed several trade unions, the majority of which were led by the Tudeh 
party. They sought social reform and joined many strikes, the most important of 
which was the strike of 1951 by the oil workers against the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (AIOC). 
However, there were some groups who were satisfied with the status quo. 
These were mainly the top bureaucrats, large landlords, some traders and even some 
people from the middle classes who enjoyed benefits from foreign relations or the 
underdeveloped distribution system, or through patronage from the high-ranking 
officers in the army, and so forth (Keddie 1981: 119-132). 
Consequently, growing social and economic troubles appeared alongside the 
dispute about foreign influence and control during the second half of the 1940s. This 
led to the formation of many active political organisations with different ideologies: 
Marxism, nationalism and Islamism, but the issue of the AIOC was so important that 
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all social groups, even the landlord-dominated parliament, were preoccupied by it. 
Despite the increasing price and profits made from oil, the AIOC had reduced the 
fixed payment, which had been agreed in the concession of 1933 between AIOC and 
Iran (Keddie 1981: 133). 
It is clear that the AIOC was considered as an instrument of British control 
and influence over Iran in terms of its economy and politics. This inflamed Iranian 
nationalist and radical sentiments. 
After the parliamentary election in 1950, which focused on the oil issue, a 
coalition of groups from different ideologies of Marxists, pan-Iranists, and pan- 
Islamists, led by the nationalist party of the National Front, favoured the idea of the 
nationalisation of oil. Thus, Dr M Musaddiq and his party gained great popularity in 
the country. Finally, under a lot of pressure from the parliament, the Shah selected 
Musaddiq as the Prime Minister in April 1951. In brief, the oil industry was 
nationalised and the National Iranian Oil Company replaced the AIOC during 
Mussaddiq's twenty-eight-month rule (until August 1953). Forcing the Shah to reign 
instead of rule, Dr Musaddiq asked him and the administration to follow the 
constitution. Thus, democracy became remarkably developed in his short period of 
rule, and different political organisations became much more active. But his 
government was confronted by many social, political and economic -difficulties 
from 
both inside and outside Iran. 
This became more obvious in the election for the Seventeenth Majlis which 
convinced the premier that the survival of his government depended on gaining 
control of the military forces (Ghods 1989: 185-6). When Musaddiq's application for 
controlling the Ministry of War was refused by the Shah on July 1952, he submitted 
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his resignation to the Shah, and Ahmad Qavam became the Prime Minster. But his 
five-day government faced afatva issued by the Ayatollah Kashani, which made 
Iranian Muslims suspicious of the army, so Musaddiq replaced Qavam with a new 
cabinet. 
Musaddiq's problems increased from August 1952 onwards, when the 
relationship between Iran and Britain ended. Domestically, he confronted the 
difficulties of. internal splits within the National Front; the problematic role of the 
Tudeh Party; economic difficulties imposed by the Western powers through sanctions 
and an oil boycott (see Homa Katouzian 1988: 57 and Millani 1994: 40). In foreign 
matters, the US not only refused the financial aid demanded by Dr Musaddiq but also 
intervened directly and covertly to weaken his government. Finally, Musaddiq's 
government collapsed, and the Shah returned to power on August 19,1953. Thus 
democracy was buried once more, and the parties involved in this matter were left 
with permanent shame. 
The years between late 1953 and 1960 were those in which most opposition 
groups went underground in reaction to persecution and arrests. Also, in foreign 
policy, Musaddiq's insistence on, and his subsequent failure in getting, financial aid 
from the US ironically intensified the desire of post-Musaddiq governments, under the 
Shah's rule, for two things. The first was to rely as much as possible on foreign debts 
and direct finances from the US; the second was to settle the issue of oil controversies 
to the benefit of backers of the coup in order to promote economic development. 
With regard to the oil dispute, the American oil companies enjoyed the same 
share as BP (as the AIOC was renamed) in the agreed consortium of August, 1954 
(Keddie 1981: 147). Thus the bases of a long-term dependence on the West, 
io 
particularly the US, were established in this period. As a result, the country suffered 
from both economic and political instability in the late 1950s and 1960s. On the one 
hand, political groups asked for free elections for the Parliament which were 
scheduled to take place in January 1961. On the other hand, inflation and corruption 
increased because an economic boom had led to popular discontent. The Prime 
Minister, Sharif-Emami, who was to be re-appointed to this post in the crisis of 1978, 
admitted the bad economic situation of Iran and announced a serious stabilisation 
programme, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). But these 
policies not only failed to reduce the problems; they also caused bankruptcy among 
merchants and led to more discontent among the popular and middle classes who 
drew support from their old allies, the clergy. 
The relaxed relationship between the Shah and the clergy between 1953 and 
1960 had already been damaged by a land reform bill which was introduced in the late 
1950s. However, the Shah had postponed its enactment due to Ayatollah Borujerdi's 
protest, who, until his death in March 1961, had interpreted it as an infringement of 
the Islamic right of land-ownership (Milani 1994: 48). Other factors may also have 
intensified tensions between the nation and clergy, on the one hand, and the Shah, on 
the other. For instance, the long-term depression caused by the coup of 1953, and the 
dissatisfaction with the Shah felt by those clergy who had already suffered from the 
conciliatory relationship of Ayatollah Borujerdi with the Shah, paved the way for 
growing tension between the government and the nation, particularly the clergy. 
It was out of opposition to the land reform programme and the Local Elections 
Bill that Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as a very `radical' political actor. As a result, 
the famous uprising of 5th June 1963 came about. 
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The Significance of the Uprising of 1963 
Because the demonstration of 5th June 1963 played a significant role in the creation of 
the revolution of 1979, in the eyes of both insiders and outsiders, it would be worth 
attempting to present a detailed report about the contents of, and the reasons for, the 
demonstrations in 1962-63. However, I agree with writers like Keddie (1981: 290) 
and Tabari (1983: 66) that there is such ambiguity and `confusion' that `more 
research is needed' in this regard. 
Nevertheless, writers have generally talked about four issues regarding the 
ideology of these demonstrations: land reform; the election bill of 1962; the 
referendum of January 1963; and the Shah's "capitulation" to the US. But there are 
disagreements between such analysts about each of the above-mentioned issues in 
terms of the details of the events, particularly how much of a role Ayatollah Khomeini 
played (beside his colleagues) and why he did so, in all demonstrations except the last 
one. However, all the writers agree that the demonstrations were the results of the 
tensions between the clergy and the state which appeared in the early 1960s. 
Moreover, while some writers seek to discover the religious origins of the 
demonstrations and try to analyse the clergy's opposition in the light of religion, 
others look for the demonstrations' political causes. 
1. Land reform 
Despite the paucity of views concerning the issue of land reform, the majority of 
writers, as far as I know, believe that it had not been a matter of great tension between 
Ayatollah Khomeini and the Shah. This is because the first problematic tension 
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between the Ayatollah and the government appeared in 1962, after the approval of 
new laws governing elections to local and provincial councils on 7th October, while 
the land reform programme had already been announced by the Amini government in 
1961. 
The land reform bill had already been designed and introduced, originally by 
Arsanjani, the Amini-appointed radical minister of agriculture, in 1959. But due to 
Ayatollah Borujerdi's protest against it in 1960, which was clearly stated through a 
letter to a member of parliament, Ja'far Behbehani, it had been postponed until after 
1961, when the Ayatollah died. It should be noted that the original land reform bill, 
designed by Arsanjani, had some differences with the land reform bill subsequently 
approved by the land-lord dominated parliament and introduced by the Shah, now not 
as the `land reform' programme but, as the `White Revolution' in which he called for 
a national referendum in early 1963. Denying the involvement of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in the clergy's opposition to the land reform programme, Azar Tabari 
(1983: 66) remarks: 
`One common misconception has been that Khomeini's opposition to 
the Shah was an outgrowth of resistance to agrarian reforms which 
were seen to threaten `vagf [charity] lands as well as landowner 
kinsmen of the clergy. Although several Ayatollahs opposed land 
reform, in relation to Khomeini, this oft-repeated claim has little or no 
factual basis. .. The first demonstrations and petitions of Khomeini 
and his followers ... only began in October 1962, and were directed, 
not against the agrarian reform (already in progress for over nine 
months), but against the new local election bill that the Cabinet had 
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passed on 7 October 1962.. Several ulama agitated against the 1962 
reform, but Khomeini did not come out against the land-distribution 
programmes. ' 
The absence of involvement by Ayatollah Khomeini is also emphasised by 
Ervand Abrahamian (1993: 10): 'Khomeini's attack ... focused not on land 
distribution, the reform's central piece, but .... One prominent cleric has recently 
revealed that in the discussions preceding these protests, Khomeini insisted that the 
clergy stay clear of land reform on the grounds that if they denounced it the Shah 
would be able to label them pro-landlord mullahs. ' Other writers like Nikki Keddie 
(1981: 157-8), Shahrough Akhavi (1980: 95), Mohsen M. Milani (1994: 49), M. 
Reza Ghods (1989: 194) either deny explicitly or implicitly his opposition to land 
distribution or mention generally "the clergy's opposition" without expressing 
Ayatollah Khomeini's name as a focus of opposition. 
Regardless of Ayatollah Khomeini's possible involvement in the matter, the 
ideology behind the clergy's opposition to land reform developed mainly on the basis 
of two issues: firstly, its probable impact on the vaqf lands controlled in some way 
by the clergy; secondly, the holiness of private ownership according to Islam. 
Although some writers consider the former as the most material threat against the 
clergy, land reform law did not necessarily mean an instrument to deprive the wealthy 
clergy of their own lands. However, this might have happened in some specific cases 
in the country, because the income obtained through the vagf lands was mainly spent 
on meeting various religious needs: religious schools (madrasahs); religious teachers 
(the clergy) and students' (tollab) stipends; professional benefits; pensions; mosques; 
religious ceremonies and so forth (see Akhavi 1980: 95). 
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The inclusion of all the vaqf lands in the land distribution law would have led 
to the clergy's serious confrontation with economic hardships and, as a result, the 
reduction of their influence and status in the country, especially in rural areas. 
Unfortunately there is no detailed information available about the extent to which vaqf 
lands were under the clergy's administration at that time, although S. Akhavi (1980: 
96-7) tries to give some data about the major landholders in the Isfahan area (in which 
the clergy had considerable priority over other classes) in 1946. The confiscation of 
some vaqf lands in the early stages of the land reform programme certainly injured the 
clergy and caused their resentment against the state to increase further. 
2. Electoral reform 
The issue of approving new laws for elections to local and provincial councils on 7 
October 1962 is the issue on which commentators, as far as I know, agree that 
Ayatollah Khomeini attracted the attention of the population for the first time -- due to 
the widespread objection against such a bill. However, the ideology of such 
opposition by Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers is not a matter of agreement 
between analysts. As parliament had already been dissolved by the Shah during the 
approval time of the bill by Alam's cabinet, the bill had raised complexities and 
confusion concerning whether Ayatollah Khomeini really opposed the 
enfranchisement of women, promised by the law inherently and religiously, but later 
changed his view during the revolution of 1978-79; or whether he always distrusted 
the government's real intention of offering voting rights to women and, therefore, did 
not consider it to be fundamentally a matter hostile to religion. 
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Some analysts have favoured the former, explicitly or implicitly, (for example: 
Tabari 1983: 66-7; Abrahamian 1993: 10; and to some extents Milani 1994: 49; 
and Akhavi 1980: 101). According to Tabari's and Milani's accounts, apart from the 
issue of women's suffrage in the related bill, there was another one which had resulted 
in the resentment of clergy, including that of Ayatollah Khomeini: the replacement of 
the term `my holy book' instead of `Qur'an' in swearing ceremonials. This, in fact, 
would lead to the recognition that other religions possessed holy books. This has not 
been discussed and argued frequently by such writers. It seems that the issue of 
women's rights has been more significant in discussions than the replacement of this 
term. 
In Tabari's (1983: 66-7) view, the issues of the local election bill in general, 
and that of women in particular, were linked more easily to the defence of Islam for 
the clergy than the programme of land reform. This is because the former was based 
on populist interests unlike the latter, which might be considered to be pervaded with 
religious class interests. For this reason, in Tabari's view, `the clergy reacted with 
great sharpness against proposals concerning women's rights and suffrage', rather 
than the land distribution issue. Attributed to the clergy, probably Ayatollah 
Khomeini, she claimed: "women's participation in social affairs is prohibited and 
must be prevented, since such participation involves many forbidden [haram] and 
corrupting interactions". According to this view, the issue of the local election bill 
was purely religious for the clergy, considering its anti-Islamic contents, and it faced 
total defeat under the pressure exerted by the clergy. But the struggle against the state 
never ended. 
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There are also writers who study the contents of the bill apart from the major 
points which were in vogue inside and outside the country (for example: Keddie 
1981: 157-8; Algar 1988: 282; and Ghods 1989: 193). For Hamid Algar, `the issue 
[the local election bill] was trivial in itself, but it provided the point of departure for a 
movement against the Pahlavi state that, moving through a series of finely calibrated 
stages, attained its triumph in February 1979. ' Moreover, Nikki Keddie believes that 
the clergy's opposition, like that of other political groups, was formed under the 
economic and political crisis which had led to open opposition to both the Shah's 
autocracy and his backer, the West: 
`As on many questions in many periods, it is wrong to characterise the 
outlook of the ulama leadership at this time either as purely 
"reactionary", as did the regime and most of the foreign press, or as 
"progressive", as did some Iranian students abroad. ' (Keddie 1981: 
157-8) 
In the eyes of Nikki Keddie, issues such as the role of the United States and 
Israel, and the removal of the Shah (as an American puppet), not that of the 
Constitutional regime, were much more important for Ayatollah Khomeini and his 
followers than those of women's rights, land reform etc. For Keddie, it is interesting 
that even during the violent attack of the Shah's army on his religious school 
(Feiziyeh) on 3 June 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini introduced `himself as a defender of 
the (monarchical) constitution: "the constitution has been bought with the blood of 
our fathers, and we will not permit it to be violated. "' (Keddie 1981: 158) 
For Ghods, the issue of women's voting rights under the autocratic rule of the 
Shah is meaningless: `the former move [the vote for women] was purely symbolic, 
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since in Iran it was rare for anybody to participate in an honest election. ' This is also 
implied by Mohsen M. Milani (1994: 49) when he attributes this view to the clergy: 
`In a country where men do not enjoy the freedom to elect their representatives, they 
[the clergy] insisted, the granting of suffrage to women was not more than a recipe for 
increasing corruption and decadence. ' 
3. The 1963 referendum 
The third issue which has been discussed as a matter of tension between the clergy, 
directed by Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Shah was the national referendum of January 
1963 for the six-point reform programme of the Shah's `White Revolution', which 
was later called `The Shah-People Revolution', with specific reference to the word 
`Shah'. It included land reform; women's right to vote; the nationalisation of forests 
and pastures; sale of the state factories to finance the programme of land reform; 
workers' profit-sharing plan; and the creation of a Literacy Corps, mainly for teaching 
in rural areas. Other points were added to it later. 
Nearly all analysts who wrote about the issue of referendum believed that 
Ayatollah Khomeini and his colleagues did not oppose the government because of the 
contents of the six-point programme; rather, he opposed `the whole project' and the 
referendum itself besides the other general political issues like the Shah's autocracy, 
foreign control of certain economic and political issues and so forth (Abrahamian 
1993: 10; Tabari 1983: 68-9; Milani 1994: 50; and Keddie 1981: 156). In the 
eyes of Akhavi (1980: 97-8), however, all of the above were `equally' important as 
the contents of the six-point reform plan for Ayatollah Khomeini and his associates. 
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A referendum, in the clergy's view, was an improper reaction by the 
government to the clergy's demand for more influence in the state. They felt the 
government was trying to place an implicit restriction on the clergy's attempts to step 
outside their religious limits, through the referendum. This interpretation by the 
clergy was accompanied by the regime's insistence that this time, unlike with the local 
election bill, it would not withdraw from its position. Furthermore, the referendum, 
with its overwhelming tendency to favour the government, meant for the clergy that 
the regime was intending to strengthen its illegal bases by deceiving the `naive 
people' and establishing public support for the Shah, and hurting the clergy's mass 
base as a result. Disappointed by its attempts to influence the government, the clergy 
decided upon face-to-face confrontation with the regime, and called for the people to 
boycott the referendum. According to Tabari and Milani, Ayatollah Khomeini 
questioned the illegal, illogical, and unconstitutional nature of such a referendum, on 
the one hand, and presented his `own global alternative "Islamic" programme', on the 
other. 
Yet the referendum was conducted, and support for Ayatollah Khomeini 
increased among the clergy , 
including the grand Ayatollahs Shariatmadari and 
Golpayegani, in Qom. This led to continuous bloody clashes between religious 
students and the army until June 3,1963, the day of Ashura (the martyrdom 
anniversary of the third Imam, Husain), when Ayatollah Khomeini announced war 
against the person of the Shah in his speech, and asked the army to join him. Milani 
(1994: 50) reports his speech: 
`Let me give you some advice, Mr. Shah! Dear Mr. Shah... Maybe 
those people [advisors and the government in power] want to present 
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you as a Jew so that I will denounce you as an unbeliever and they can 
expel you from Iran and put an end to you! Don't you know that if one 
day some uproar occurs and that tables are turned, none of these people 
around you will be your friends. They are friends of the dollars; they 
have no religion, no loyalty. ' 
His open attack on the person of the Shah led to the Ayatollah's arrest, which was 
followed by anti-state riots and demonstrations in some main cities, including Tehran, 
for a week. The demonstration in Tehran was important because students from the 
University of Tehran (the National Front branch), alongside the National Front and 
bazaar, joined the protest for the first time. Under the command of a new general in 
Tehran, Ne'matollah Nassiri - who was later executed by the revolutionaries in the 
early days of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 - many people were killed and injured in 
Tehran, and in other major cities. Unfortunately, there are no exact records of the 
people who were killed and injured in these demonstrations. While the officials 
estimated the number of dead at 20 and injuries at 1000, the opposition put the 
numbers in thousands. But Milani. (1994: 51-3) provides information about the 
occupational backgrounds of five hundred and eighty-eight and about the average age 
of two hundred and forty-four individuals who had been injured or arrested by the 
regime, which illustrates similarities between the uprising of June, 1963 and the 
revolution of 1977-79. 
In attempts to exculpate itself, the government labelled the clergy as `black 
reactionaries' who favoured the landlords and wished to reverse the country's 
progress through their opposition to the progressive ideas of the White Revolution. It 
also accused Ayatollah Khomeini of having some connections with the President of 
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Egypt, Jamal Abdo'l Naser. Ironically, this increased his popularity in society. 
Following the protest of influential clergy, Ayatollah Khomeini left jail after six 
weeks, but without having permission to come back to Qom, so he stayed in Tehran 
under house arrest. Following a change in government from Asadollah Alam to 
Hassan Ali Mansur, the new Prime Minister allowed the Ayatollah to return to Qom 
hoping to improve the relationship with the clergy. 
Ayatollah Khomeini, as a highly popular grand Ayatollah, enjoyed a very 
warm welcome in Qom in January 1964. After his arrival in Qom, his associates sent 
a ten-point proposal to the government. Due to the significance of these points in Iran 
today, I would like to quote here a part of the proposal which has been mentioned by 
Milani (1994: 51-2) in order to show how similar post-1979 Iran was to the uprising 
of 1963-4: 
`Among other things, it included a demand for the implementation of 
the 1906 Constitution, especially Article 2 of the Supplementary Laws, 
which gave the ulama veto power over Majles legislation. It called for 
annulling all un-Islamic decrees, ending the influence of colonialism 
and Zionism in Iran, cleansing television and radio programmes of 
corrupt content, and preventing production and consumption of 
alcoholic beverages. ' 
It can be seen that the proposal contains issues which also became important after the 
revolution of 1979. 
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4. Relations with the USA 
The fourth issue, which finally led to the fifteen-year exile of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
was his protest against Mansur's proposal, which included two bills. The first 
contained the government's request for granting diplomatic immunity (capitulatory 
rights) to American advisors and military personnel. The second included the 
government's demand for a loan of $200 million from the US in order to buy military 
equipment. The proposal was approved by parliament in October 1964. This was 
publicly denounced by Ayatollah Khomeini who considered it a sign of bondage to 
the USA. He was subsequently exiled to Turkey in 1964, went to Najaf in Iraq in 
1965 and stayed there until 1978. 
As can be seen, apart from the land reform issue, it was Ayatollah Khomeini, 
among the other grand Ayatollahs, who was most strongly involved in radical political 
affairs. But the reactions of other clergy can be classified into four types, according to 
Akhavi (1980: 100-3). 
First, the `radical' clergy were led mainly by Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini, 
and Ayatollah Mahallati Shirazi, Ayatollah Sadiq Ruhani, Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmud 
Taliqani of Tehran, and, probably, Hojjato'l-Islam Hossein Ali Montazeri of Qom. 
Second, the `social reformers' were more involved in educational and social 
issues in the religious institutions than in open political activities. This group, 
according to Akhavi, was directed by Ayatollah Mortaza Motahhari, the chief 
ideologue of the Islamic revolution who was assassinated by the Forqan in April 
1979. Other members of this group included Ayatollah Dr Mohammad Beheshti, 
Mohammad Ibrahim Ayati and Dr Ali Shariati. 
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Third, the `conservative' clergy, who were mainly aligned with the grand 
Ayatollah Borujerdi, enjoyed the highest authority through having specific and 
extensive relations with the preachers, voa'az, throughout the country, and 
accommodation with the grand Ayatollahs (marja'-e Taqlid), who had been 
nominated as successors of Ayatollah Borujerdi in Iran after his death. 
The final group, as classified by Akhavi, was the clergy who were interested in 
co-operating with the Court. In his view, this group included the Imam Jum'ah of 
Tehran, Ayatollah Mahdavi, Allameh Vahidi, Mohammad Taqi Qomi, director of the 
Daro'I Taqrib in Cairo, Abbas Mohajerani, an officer in the Endowments Department, 
and possibly Mohammad Reza Behbehani. 
The uprising of 1963 and the invaluable lessons which the clergy learned 
through their defeat, on the one hand, and the `White Revolution' and its harmful 
effects on society in the following years, on the other, can best be seen as seeds sown 
in this period, which came to fruition in 1978-79. Disappointed with the possibility of 
peaceful coexistence with the regime, the opposition in general - and the radical 
clergy in particular - considered utilising the experiences acquired during the 1963 
events. Some of them even considered resorting to an armed challenge to the Shah. 
Moreover, the uprising of 1963, during which the military forces and police had 
violently attacked the clergy and the religious school of Faiziyeh and after which 
Ayatollah Khomeini subsequently declared war (jihad) against the Shah, 
automatically politicised the clerical generation of that time. In fact, Ayatollah 
Khomeini's exile left a legacy in most of the religious schools throughout the country, 
especially Qom, which were in direct contact with the masses through the mosques. 
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In addition, their defeat and the Ayatollah's exile created further co-operation among 
the clergy and especially among his own students. 
Furthermore, the formation of new Islamic organisations, mostly underground 
ones, was another outcome of the uprising. One of them was the United Islamic 
Societies -- a conglomeration of three small Islamic groups based on Ayatollah 
Khomeini's order. Islamic Societies were also formed in some institutions, inside and 
even outside of Iran. 
The clearest and most important result of the demonstrations of 1963 was the 
identification by the nation of Ayatollah Khomeini as a powerful and unique religio- 
political leader. His ideals were so comprehensive by this time that they enabled him 
to gather people from different backgrounds of class, education, occupation, and so on 
around himself. Each group found some common themes with him. For example, his 
themes of anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism; anti-Zionism; anti-totalitarianism; 
his emphasis on considering the nation's prestige and interests, and, more 
significantly, his stress on Islam were interesting respectively for leftists, Islamists, 
liberals, intellectuals, nationalists, and the masses. In this way he created strong bases 
among different groups of the society, to such an extent that even the secularists and 
intellectuals - those who had little belief and practice in Islam - respected him. 
The Shah, for his part, had little to show to the nation's millions, in the way of 
material fruits of his `White Revolution' in the post-1963 era. The programme of land 
reform led the country to succumb to the despotism of the sole, but highly powerful, 
master, by the removal of landlords as intermediaries between the peasants and the 
government. Their removal, in fact, undercut the absolute authority of landlords to 
the benefit of the central government. The way to this was paved through the creation 
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of various institutions in rural areas, such as the Literacy Corps; the Development 
Corps; the Health Corps; the Village Society (Anjoman-e Deh); and the House of 
Justice (Khaneh-ye Ensaf). 
Moreover, the land distribution programme which culminated in the 
elimination of landlords led to the creation of a new and large class of petty- 
landowners. About 90% of the sharecroppers, the number of whom was estimated at 
more than 2.1 million in 1961, owned the lands on which they worked as 
sharecroppers during the first decade after the land distribution programme (Milani 
1994: 47). Taking into account the members of their families, it can be appreciated 
what a huge percentage of the population this new class formed in the early 1970s. 
Yet, although the peasants, as the new land owners, had acquired land, they 
lacked other necessary support to manage it. This led to a dramatic decline in 
agricultural products, and, as a result, further dependence of Iran on the West in order 
to meet import needs. It also created instability in both rural and urban communities 
as a result of the migration of peasants to the cities. 
Disappointed peasants now had no choice other than migration to the cities, in 
which they sought to work in industries and other urban projects. But the industrial 
labour market, construction projects, and the urban employment market in general 
were too slow to keep pace with the shift. Vast slums (halabi-abad ha) were 
appearing increasingly rapidly around the cities, especially Tehran (South), the 
population of which increased from one to five million between the land distribution 
programme and the revolution of 1979 (Tabari 1983: 70). The gap between rich and 
poor was also dramatically increasing in the urban areas, particularly in 1975-77, 
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during which period the country suffered from thirty per cent inflation and 
unemployment among one million people. 
Mosques were perhaps the only popular social organisations in the cities to 
bring the uprooted, discontented, and dispossessed peasants together. They were in 
fact attracted by the clergy who fostered acrimony against the regime, for the reasons 
mentioned previously. The religious themes of Islamic justice, the obligation on the 
rich to help the poor, and the generosity of voluntary redistributions of wealth 
impelled the huge class of urban paupers to seek their salvation in Islam. The creation 
of private, small `Islamic Banks' in some cities by the traditional petty bourgeoisie, 
for the purpose of helping the very poor in the Islamic tradition in the form of loans 
without interest, as well as `Islamic co-operative shops' -- in which the clergy became 
increasingly involved -- encouraged the urban poor to think of Islam as a possible way 
to a desirable future. 
The traditional urban petty bourgeoisie were also unhappy with the situation. 
A huge segment of this class resented the damage which they had suffered from the 
increasing centralisation of distribution and the regime's support of capitalism and 
mass-produced consumer goods. Therefore, the worse their situation became, the 
more they thought of acting against global capitalism and both its foreign and 
domestic associates. 
Furthermore, the Shah's policies, like those of his father, had culminated in the 
continual enlargement of a new non-manual middle class. Although the new petty 
bourgeoisie, which included the low-ranking officials of various bureaucratic 
positions, enjoyed prosperity to some extent (according to some writers), the regime 
failed to establish proper political institutions through which they could manage their 
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desired political activities. All these desperate strata of the urban populace, in fact, 
provided the main support for the formation of the Islamic Republic in the late 1970s. 
Conclusion 
One of the key points to have emerged from the above analysis is that, although the 
clergy played a crucial role in many of the incidents and upheavals prior to the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979, their contribution was mainly towards voicing and amplifying 
popular discontent rather than causing or fomenting it in the first place. To borrow a 
Weberian image, the clergy served as `vehicles' of ideas and sentiments critical of 
government policies. By framing their criticisms in religious terms the Iranian clergy 
were able to give a relatively coherent focus to feelings of frustration, tension and 
dissent, the impact of which might otherwise have been reduced by the differences 
and rivalry between political factions. In the years following 1979 Islamic ideology 
emerged as the guiding thread of official policies for all areas of life and was 
particularly salient in the field of education. 
Another central point of this Chapter concerns the capacity of the Iranian 
clergy to frame their ideological discourse in such a way that it made a favourable 
impression on people in widely differing circumstances. Of course, there was 
opposition to clerical ideas in some sections of Iranian society, especially among 
Western-oriented intellectuals and left-wing political groups; but the grievances felt 
by people in different regions, age categories, occupational groups and social classes 
seemed eventually to find an echo in clerical denunciations of successive governments 
and of the Shah's regime. It would be an exaggeration to claim that religion came to 
transcend all social differences, but the clergy's appeal to an overarching Islamic 
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framework of values and policies certainly helped to overcome many social divisions. 
The next Chapter will try to explain the ideological currents in Islamic ideology which 
facilitated popular support for the Revolution. 
ENDNOTES 
' Against some views, like Milani's, which reject the application of `revolution' to the 
social movement of 1906-1911, there are other views which favour the application 
(see Keddie, N. 1988. p. 298). 
'A Belgian, whose name was Naus, had already been appointed as the Minister of the 
Customs Administration by the shah to improve the state revenues. (see Brown 1966) 
3 There is a similarity between the Constitutional and the Islamic Revolutions in this 
regard, since the Islamic Revolution nearly began in early 1978 when a newspaper 
Ettelaat (January 7,1978) printed an article in which Ayatollah Khomeini was 
attacked as an agent of colonialism and a traitor. 
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Chapter Three 
THEORIES OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION 
AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL CURRENTS 
`Given the continued growth of government power, and the expansion 
of the army, the bureaucracy, and of secular education, even in the 
villages, it appears probable that the political power of the ulama will 
continue to decline as it has in the past half century. Although leaders 
of the ulama in Iran retain more independent influence on political 
questions than those in most other Muslim countries, they now appear 
at most able to modify or delay certain government policies and not 
strongly to influence their basic thrust and direction. Despite the 
ulama's economic and social conservatism, however, the issues they 
raise continue to strike a responsive chord among many Iranians. ' 
(Keddie 1972: 229) 
This is a prediction of Iran's future made in 1972 by the scholar Nikki R. Keddie, who 
did a great deal of work on both pre- and post-revolutionary Iran. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that she was `shocked' by the Iranian Islamic Revolution `and set in motion 
a search for [its] causes' later (Keddie 1983: 579). 
In the late 1970s the world witnessed rapid and violent social change in a 
country which was not accustomed to such upheavals. The events and their outcome 
became known as `the Islamic Revolution of Iran'. Social scientists, both outsiders 
and insiders, were surprised by the revolution: its Islamic identity, opposed to having 
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had a long experience of secularism; complete public agreement on the abdication of 
the Shah from power, in spite of the existence of many ethnic, religious, and cultural 
discrepancies among the nation; the country's characterisation as `an island of peace' 
mobilised to a very advanced military standard; and the rapidity of its process with 
which the revolution unfolded -- all these factors made the revolution surprising and 
unpredicted. The number of works written about the features of this revolutionary 
upheaval is large, and it is not necessary to replay the events of 1979-80 here (but see 
Keddie 1981,1983, and 1988; Abrahamian 1982 and 1988; Akhavi 1980; Arjomand 
1980,1982,1984,1985 and 1988; Dabashi 1993; Ghods 1989; Milani 1994; Moaddel 
1993; Parsa 1989; Rahnema 1990; and Tabari 1983). However, most of the published 
accounts of the Iranian revolution are strictly political interpretations of the affair. 
Relatively few accounts deal with its ideological aspects. The aim of this Chapter is 
therefore to remedy these two shortcomings, by summarising some of the factors 
which led to such a revolutionary upheaval and then by analysing the role of the 
Islamic ideology advocated by supporters of the revolution. 
The Iranian Revolution can be viewed from at least four theoretical 
perspectives, each emphasising one main factor: individuals; organisations; social 
classes; and ideology as episodic discourse. Although most of the existing theories 
overlap to some extent and have all paid attention to the four above-mentioned issues, 
to varying degrees they differ from each other in their identification of which of the 
four factors is a basis for the others. The following discussion of each perspective in 
turn is intended merely to indicate the range of theoretical ideas and their specific 
differences. In this sense, these theoretical perspectives provide part of the 
background understanding of social change in Iran against which later chapters will 
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highlight the significance of development in school-level education in a rural area of 
the country. 
(i) Individuals 
According to the individualistic interpretation of revolution, a social movement is 
originally a matter of individuals acting against some or all authorities because of 
problematic tensions resulting from too rapid structural change in a society. In this 
view revolution is initially subordinated to tensions created primarily in individuals. 
When the authorities are too weak to maintain social order, tensions are manifested 
beyond individual attitudes, in the guise of collective revolutionary behaviour. 
Tensions are caused by the collapse of social ties between individuals, due to the lack 
or loss of balance in the social system. Disorientated individuals result from the 
removal of intermediate connecting organisations between individuals and the 
political system, leading to the isolation of individuals and social groups. Alienation 
is caused by the great anger which growing expectations engender, and by 
disjunctions following excessively rapid modernisation which requires 
institutionalisation (Moaddel 1993: 3). 
In the case of alternative ideologies, the discontented and disoriented 
individuals, each of whom bears one or more grievances, begin to react against their 
undesirable situation, because their mind is psychologically suggestible and they are 
prepared to act dangerously in the direction of mass movement. The term 
`Convergence Theory' is sometimes used to characterise this type of explanation. The 
term implies that, in the face of a common stimulus or grievance, individuals choose 
to converge on the same kind of response. By resorting to the new value system, 
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tensions are released, solidarity is re-established and community is re-established. 
The new ideology proposes a new hierarchy of values and beliefs. The extent to 
which the new beliefs and values determine an individual's action depends on the 
degree of their internalisation by such an individual. Therefore, ideology, according 
to the individualistic theory of revolution, operates to unite the members of the 
community, specify the final aim and ratify social unanimity by proposing limits' to 
consciousness and action, hierarchical and generalised beliefs, and mental and cultural 
states resulting from past experiences or suppressed desires. In this view, then, 
ideology and action are correlated with each other in a very subjectivist and 
psychological way. Such a subjectivist perspective faces unresolved methodological 
problems, such as how mental conditions of individuals can be directly measured, or 
how ideology plays a role in shaping individuals' psychological conditions, and so 
forth. 
Tilly's (1975: 487) concept of revolution in his paper of `Revolution and 
Collective Violence' is mentioned as a core one for the individualistic theory. Other 
writers such as Algar (1969: 2), Savory (1979), Arjomand (1988: 4-5; 1984: 201-2), 
and Abrahamian (1982: 6) have also followed the individualistic model for 
interpretation of the Iranian Revolution's roots. 
(ii) Organisation 
By contrast, organisational theories of revolution question the validity of relating 
revolutionary ideology and collective behaviour to disoriented individuals alone. In 
fact, no collective action follows from the mere presence of an alternative ideology. 
However, resource mobilisation and potent organisation are needed to spread the 
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alternative ideology among interested audiences (dissatisfied individuals) and to co- 
ordinate them, without which no revolutionary movement would happen (see, for 
example, McCarthy & Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983). Resource mobilisation requires the 
production of ideas and values and some publications, gathering the interested groups 
in specific places, stimulating their grievances, and the wide dissemination of values 
among the members of a community or society. All these are collective actions. Thus 
the success of a revolutionary movement is contingent on that of the collective 
attempts whereby interested groups or individuals co-ordinate their actions with each 
other, following common purposes. Communication between these groups and 
individuals often proceeds through pre-existing social networks. 
Comparing the two theories with each other, the individualistic theory is 
interested in considering the significance of the state's action towards individuals and 
individuals' reaction to the state, whereas the organisational theory tends to look at the 
revolutionary movement from the perspective of political conflict. Moreover, while 
the psychological condition of the individual is considered as the proper location for 
developing a revolutionary ideology according to individualistic theorists, the 
development of alternative values (ideological change) is conceptualised in a special 
manner in which the new ideologues clarify how to respond to the question of the 
state, in the eyes of the organisational theorists. 
Hegland (1987: 194-6), Oberschall (1973: 33), Tilly (1978), Fulbrook (1983: 
16), Zaret (1985: 5), Wuthnow (1985), Stepan (1985: 338), and Neuhouser (1989) 
are all concerned with organisational aspects of social protest and upheavals. They all 
explain how organisation affects ideological shifts in revolutionary movements in 
different circumstances. Keddie (1972: 223) also draws on this theory implicitly in 
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her doctrine of Shi'ite institutional change from the Akhbari to the Usuli school in the 
late eighteenth century, but a more careful explanation of the Iranian Revolution that 
incorporates both individual and organisational analysis of revolution is presented by 
Tabari (1983). 
(iii) Social class 
Unlike the individualistic and organisational theories of revolution, class theories call 
for the significance of audiences. In fact, Marx's concept of revolution corresponds 
with the class theories. Revolution, for Marx, is a social conflict between the ruling 
class which controls the existing social order and the new class (the revolutionary 
class) which results from economic changes. Economic development and 
transformation in productive apparatus, therefore, cause increasing shifts in social 
relations of production and widen the division between proponents of the old and the 
new productive forces. Revolution is, in fact, the conflict between the two. During 
such a conflict, the ruling class, its related apparatus and its ideological superstructure 
are doomed, replaced by an alternative class which has revolutionary consciousness 
(Marx 1962: 363). There is widespread agreement among Marxists on this general 
point, but Marxist theories of class struggles are varied. Some expect revolution to 
follow automatically from class conflict; others make revolution conditional on the 
spread of class consciousness; and still others make revolution dependent on the 
activities of a `vanguard party'. 
For the explanation of the Iranian Revolution, Keddie (1983: 591) and, to 
some extent, Parsa (1989: 29-30) are concerned in some way with class theories of 
revolution -- particularly Keddie (1983: 591), who analyses both the Constitutional 
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Revolution of 1905-11 and the Islamic Revolution of 1977-79 in terms of Marx's 
conflict theory. 
The class interpretation of revolution, like many other theories, is also a result 
of an interpreter's ideal type approach to research, as Weber claimed about Marx's 
theory of class conflict. This is particularly noticeable with Keddie, who presented 
various ideas on the explanation of the Iranian Revolution, in her many works on the 
topic. However, the impact of economic transformations in the last pre-Revolutionary 
decade on the revolution cannot be ignored. 
(iv) Ideology 
Under the influence of postmodernist thinking, Moaddel (1993) provides a fourth 
model for the interpretation of the Iranian Revolution, which he called `Ideology as 
Episodic Discourse'. He thinks that to explain the roots of a revolution all the 
aforementioned theories, firstly, are involved in reductionism and, secondly, ignore 
the causal role of ideology independently of people's interests and values. In other 
words, according to Moaddel, such theories fail to transcend the mental functions of 
dissatisfied individuals, the dynamics of struggle in terms of organised disorientation 
or social class, and the restriction of seeing ideology as simply a prisoner of 
individuals' beliefs or works. Thirdly, such theories are allegedly unable to 
distinguish the two different and major aspects of each revolution: `revolution as 
content' and `revolution as mode'. 
`Ideology', for Moaddel, `operates through discursive practices inscribed in 
matrices of nondiscursive practices. Ideology is therefore conceptualised as a 
discourse, consisting of a set of general principles and concepts, symbols and rituals, 
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that human actors use in addressing the problems they face in a particular historical 
episode. ' (Moaddel 1993: 16) Inspired by the definition of `discourse' made by 
Foucault (Sarup 1993: 32-89; Craib 1992: 177-196), Moaddel seeks the causes and 
processes of revolution in a set of theories and texts by which people form `their 
strategies of action', explain their interests, raise specific questions while disregarding 
others, define a legal type of coalition, and seek intellectual bases for their actions. 
Determination of the nature of such a discourse must be sought in its specific 
historical context. 
In his book entitled Class, Politics and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, 
Moaddel interprets the roots and consequences of the Iranian Revolution in terms of 
the interaction between these three factors, specifically in the post-1953 period. In 
this period, he believed, due to the disappearance of secular schools of thought like 
national-liberalism and communism, in addition to the political and economic policies 
exerted by the Shah, the revolutionary movement of 1977 to 79 with its Shi'ite content 
was formed. Yet, according to Moaddel, neither the economic problems nor the social 
dissatisfactions of the 1970s are able to explain the cause of the movement. But they 
can only be meaningful and effective in terms of Shi'ite revolutionary discourse. 
Moaddel denies that such discourse was originally part of the "political theory of 
pristine Shi'ism" and "institutional development of Shi'i ulama" beginning in the 
nineteenth century. He even rejects the argument that "the Shi'i ideology and 
religious institutions constituted pre-existing organisations that were utilised by the 
revolutionary actors". But, he claims, `the ideology of Islamic opposition was 
produced by diverse intellectuals' (1993: 24). 
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For present purposes, the value of Moaddel's theory lies less in its specific 
insistence on the autonomy of ideological rhetoric as a force in Iranian society and 
more in its capacity to bring out the diffuse importance of religious ideologies as one 
factor among others. Indeed, there has been no shortage of ideologies and ideologues 
in Iran in recent decades, most of them allied to radical versions of Islam. The 
following section will review the most significant contributions to these ideological 
positions. The remainder of the chapter will then identify the essence of three deep 
currents of ideology which fed into the 1979 revolution and have continued to flow 
out of it in modified forms. Their influence on educational policies and practices 
cannot be exaggerated. 
The Sources of Revolutionary Ideology 
Despite their differences, the existing theories of the Iranian Revolution confirm the 
significant role of Islamic ideology in both pre- and post-revolutionary Iran. The 
ideology which was created, according to some theorists like Moaddel, and 
propagated among both new and old middle classes during mainly the last two 
decades of the Pahlavi regime, was employed in a specific form by the post- 
revolutionary governments. A number of ideologues played significant roles in 
forging this ideology: Jalal Ale-Ahmad, Dr. Ali Shariati, Morteza Motahhari, Seyyed 
Mahmud Taleqani, Allameh Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabaei, Engineer Mehdi 
Bazargan, and Ayatollah Khomeini. 
In the eyes of most theorists (Moaddel 1993: 148; Dabashi 1993: 39-101; 
Milani 1994: 80; Abrahamian 1993: 23; Ghods 1989: 195; and Richard 1995: 82), 
the dawn of Islamic ideology begins with the rhetoric of Ale-Ahmad (1923-69). 
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Converted from Marxism, Ale-Ahmad rethought the reasons for Iran's 
underdevelopment and its domination by imperialism. He saw Islam as the most 
appropriate way to reach his goals in the Middle East. He wrote about forty-five 
works in his short life, three of which were of great significance in the presentation of 
Islamic ideology as a real saviour from imperialism: Seh Maqaleh-ye Digar (Three 
More Essays), Gharb-zadegi (Westoxication, or Plagued by the West) (1962), and 
Dar Khedmat va Khianat-e Roushan-fekran (Concerning the Service and Betrayal of 
the Intellectuals). 
Shari'ati (1933-77), as an Islamic ideologue par excellence, starts wherever 
Ale-Ahmad leaves off, on most issues. This Sorbonne-educated intellectual was 
under the influence of Louis Massignon, Frantz Fanon, and Jean-Paul Sartre, as he 
himself notes. However, some great Shi'ite men like Ali, Husain, Abu Zarr Ghefari, 
1-Iorr were counted as heroes by him (Keddie 1981: 215-7). In his numerous works, 
Shari'ati attempts to paint the "true" face of Islam which is different from the 
historically received one. His Islam challenges the imperialism and the cultural 
domination of the West; he even challenges Frantz Fanon's idea of religion and 
revolution. But, in Shari'ati's view, in order to challenge the West, the nations of the 
Third World must re-identify and re-think their own religious roots (Abrahamian 
1988: 291). His conception of Shi'a is against Zar (wealth), Zur (force), and Tazvir 
(hypocrisy). His conception of religion also opposes qasetin (despotic rulers), 
Mareqin (the unconsciously religious- biased faithful), and Nakethin (intellectual 
traitors). 
Against Shari'ati's refusal to consider Islamic philosophical issues as a proper 
means to confront irreligiosity, Morteza Motahhari (1920-79), as a chief ideologue in 
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this context, favoured Islamic philosophy as the most effective weapon. However, 
both of them tried hard to conceal this discrepancy. In Motahhari's view, the Islamic 
philosophical tradition was first among all sorts of knowledge to be dealt with amidst 
fast-propagating secularism. In fact, his various works were his philosophical 
attempts to react to secular issues during the pre-revolutionary period, among which 
there are: Nezam-e Hoquq-e Zan dar Islam (The Structure of Women's Rights in 
Islam) (1966-7), khadamat-e Motaqabel-e Islam va Iran (The Mutual Services of 
Islam and Iran) (1967), Elal-e Gerayesh beh Maddi-gari: (beh Zamimeh ye) 
Materialism dar Iran (Causes of Attraction to Materialism: Materialism in Iran) 
(1969). Such works contain strong attacks on the Iranian secular intellectuals. He had 
a very close relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini in the post-1963 period; indeed, 
the Ayatollah called him "his life's fruit" (hasel-e omr) following his assassination on 
the May 2nd, 1979. The anniversary of his assassination has been celebrated as 
"Teachers' Day" at schools every year since the revolution. 
In addition to the rhetorical intimation and propagation of the Islamic 
ideology, which were accomplished by Ale-Ahmad and Dr Ali Shari'ati, and also its 
doctrinal legitimisation, which was established by Motahhari, the ideology then 
needed a Qur'anic justification. This was supplied by Ayatollah Taleqani (1910-79), 
who centralised the Qur'an in Islamic political discourse. The latter two functions 
attributed to the Islamic ideology were philosophically, textually (in terms of Qur'anic 
commentary), and gnostically completed by Allameh Seyyed Mohammad Hossein 
Tabatabaei (1903-81), a philosopher par excellence. However, this task was most 
likely performed unwittingly. Motahhari attended Tabatabaei's philosophy seminary 
in Qom, which was generally opposed by high legal authorities. Mainly through S. H. 
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Nasr and Dariush Shaygan, Tabatabaei also had significant discussions with Henri 
Corbin, the French Islamicist, which are said to have led to his apparent conversion to 
Shi'ism. 
Mehdi Bazargan (1907-1995), a lay French-educated engineer, addressed 
mostly middle classes, merchants, and lower bureaucrats- unlike Shari'ati, who was 
an ideologue of young intellectuals. As an engineer and professor, Bazargan 
portrayed Islam as a complete religion which was compatible with scientific and 
technical progress. He, Ayatollah Taleqani and Dr Shari'ati were very close, 
especially in Hosseyniyyeh-ye Ershad, a religious institution in Tehran preferred by 
many religiously minded young intellectuals. 
The significance of Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini's (1902-89) 
discourse, in the appearance of the Islamic ideology, is so evident that some doubt 
whether the `Islamic Revolution' could have happened without him. In his work 
Kashfo'1 Asrar (Unveiling the Secrets), written in 1942, he attacked in part secularism 
and anti-clerical ideas mainly developed by Ahmad Kasravi, who was later 
assassinated by the radical group of Fadaeian-e Islam in 1946, and mostly the 
tyrannical conditions brought about by Reza Shah. Among his works the book 
entitled Hokumal-e Islami (Islamic Government), written in 1970 and now known as 
Velayat-e Faqih (Authority of the Jurist), played the most significant role in Ayatollah 
Khomeini's Islamic ideological statement. In it he theoretically assumed a political 
guardianship for the clergy, without explicit or implicit identification of the 
clergyman who should personally take that position. However, his declarations and 
letters during the post-1963 period performed a probably more important role in terms 
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of the creation of the collective Shi'ite mind and action than the mere theory of 
Velayat-e Fagih. 2 
The theological, philosophical and political ideas that have just been reviewed 
are far from being the only sources of influence on Iranian education. It is clear that 
many ideas from other countries and cultures, for example, have also affected 
education in Iran. The important point here, though, is that the general orientation of 
schools has been subjected to highly distinctive forms of Islamic ideology since the 
early 1980s, some of which can trace their origins back to the thinkers discussed 
above. The main currents running through Islamic ideology in Iran include populism, 
nationalism and islamism. Each of them is a fairly inclusive category, so the purpose 
of the next section is not to examine them in minute detail but rather to establish their 
broad outlines, so that later discussions of school curricula and social practices can be 
related back to their influence. The three currents are merely distillations of the many 
ideas, sometimes contradictory, which have been in play for almost twenty years. 
Together, they serve as a framework which helps to make sense of otherwise 
confusing events and arguments. They have all been contested, but their direct and 
indirect effects on the policy and practice of education in Iran have rarely been in 
doubt. Later Chapters will examine these effects on Iranian education in greater 
detail. 
Three Main Currents of Ideology 
(a) Populism (mardomi) 
In a broad context, populism is defined as `support for the preferences of ordinary 
people' (McLean 1996: 392). In this view, `a specific set of populist beliefs' is 
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identified and utilised in the `defence of the (supposed) traditions of "the little man" 
against change seen as imposed by powerful outsiders, which might variously be 
governments, businesses, or trade unions. These beliefs are disproportionately 
prevalent among the petite bourgeoisie. ' (McLean 1996: 392) Moreover, Peter 
Worsley (1993: 730) remarks: 
`Populist movements claim to represent the people as a whole [hameh 
ba ham]: sometimes the entire nation, sometimes the majority of the 
people. Radical versions of populism that seek to represent and 
mobilise the poor or the underprivileged masses have therefore often 
begun as movements of protest and ended as parties. ' 
By populism, in other words, we mean here a movement in Iran through which 
the urban lower classes, in particular, are mobilised against a political regime, 
imperialism and foreign capitalism. To achieve this mobilisation, charismatic 
language, metaphor, and symbol, which exist potentially in the value system of the 
masses, are needed. In populist movements, `ordinary people' are promised better 
living standards and the complete independence of their country from outsiders. 
Although the radical resentment rhetoric of the populist movement is targeted against 
capitalism and the upper classes, it actually supports the petty bourgeoisie and the 
doctrine of private property. Nevertheless, populist movements tend to stress the 
significance of political, national and cultural restoration rather than socio-economic 
restoration. Moreover, such movements resist ideologically elite and expert 
knowledge, and, in contrast, promote `ordinary people'. 3 
There are various ideas about the origins of populism in Iran, but it seems that 
Ayatollah Khomeini lacked such ideas before the 1970s. 4 Abrahamian assumes that 
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the infiltration of populism into Ayatollah Khomeini's views was probably influenced 
directly or indirectly by intellectuals like the ex-Tudeh Ale-Ahmad, who had already 
given his book Gharbzadegi (Westoxication) to Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf; Ali 
Shari'ati; and some political groups like the Confederation of Iranian Students in 
Exile - all of these intellectuals' ideas had been effectively under the influence of 
Marxism, particularly Maoism and Castroism, as Abrahamian (1993: 23) emphasised. 
For Abrahamian (1988: 295), Shari'ati was so much under the influence of populism 
that he distinguishes his Islam from the traditional and conservative clerical one: 
`It is not enough to say we must return to Islam. We must specify 
which Islam: that of Abu Zarr or that of Marvan the Ruler. Both are 
called Islamic, but there is a huge difference between them. One is the 
Islam of the caliphate, of the palace, and of the rulers. The other is the 
Islam of the people, of the exploited, and of the poor. Moreover, it is 
not good enough to say that one should be "concerned" about the poor. 
The corrupt caliphs said the same. True Islam is more than 
"concerned". It instructs the believer to fight for justice, equality, and 
elimination of poverty. ' Abrahamian (1988: 295) 
This, to be sure, is not the only place that Dr Shari'ati shows his strong 
resentment against capitalists (saheban-e zar va zivar or ashab-e kenz) and favours the 
poor and ordinary people. All his works indicate implicitly or explicitly his populist 
ideas, and this is why he choose Abuzar as his `hero' and calls his Islam the `Islam of 
Abuzar'. Abuzar, known as `Abuzar-e Ghefari', was a Negro from Sahara, the fifth 
person to believe in Islam and the Prophet. For Shari'ati (1978: 308), Abuzar was a 
symbol of socialism, justice (edalat), and simplicity (sadegi): `Who is Abuzar? -A 
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great revolutionary: anti-aristocracy, anti-despotism, anti-capitalism, anti-poverty, 
and anti-discrimination. The person who talks better than Produm. ' 
Abrahamian (1993: 23) suggests that even Ayatollah Khomeini had 
unwittingly recognised the role already accomplished by the intellectuals and the 
university students, when he criticised his colleagues that they were still `asleep': 
"`We cannot remain silent, " he [Ayatollah Khomeini] stressed, "until 
college students force us to carry out our duty. " One [Ayatollah] 
Khomeini disciple later admitted that the student guerrilla movement 
"left a deep impression on the Iranian people" and prompted the imam 
to increase his correspondence with the confederation in order to stem 
the influence of Marxism. ' 
Ironically, in view of the Ayatollah Khomeini's opposition to 
Marxist ideas, he nevertheless based his populism on an analysis of 
conflicts between social classes. For example, it was in the 1970s that 
Ayatollah Khomeini split Iranian society into two conflicting classes in 
his works: on the one hand there were the oppressors (mostakberin), 
the rich (servatinandan), the upper class (tabaqeh-ye bala), the 
aristocratic class (tabaqeh-ye a 'yan), the palace dwellers (kakh 
neshinan), and the Satan's state (hokumat-e sheytan); and, on the other 
hand, there were the oppressed (mostaz'afin), the poor (foqara), the 
lower class (tabaqeh-ye payin), the needy class (tabaqeh-ye 
mostamandan), the slum dwellers ( kukh neshinan or zagte neshinan), 
and the oppressed nation (mellat-e mostazaf ). Such terms had hardly 
been used in his early writings (Abrahamian 1993: 26-7). In order to 
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make an acceptable and popular challenge to the Shah, Ayatollah 
Khomeini targeted the socio-economic problems of the country rather 
than theoretical and doctrinal issues, like the principle of the velayat-e 
faqih. 
Inspired by such populist ideas, demonstrators' slogans, coined during the 
revolution against the pre-revolutionary regime, also contained in part the concepts in 
which populism and Islamism interrelated interestingly: 
`Islam belongs to the oppressed, not to the oppressors. 
Islam is for equality and social justice. 
Islam represents the slum dwellers, not the palace dwellers. 
We are for Islam, not for capitalism and feudalism. 
Islam originates from the masses, not from the rich. 
The duty of the clergy is to liberate the hungry from the clutches of the 
rich. 
Islam is not the opiate of the masses. 
The poor were for the Prophet; the rich were against him. 
The poor died for the Islamic Revolution; the rich plotted against it. 
Oppressed of the world, unite. 
(All slogans are quoted by Abrahamian 1993: 31) 
After the collapse of the Pahlavi regime, Ayatollah Khomeini declared that, 
through the establishment of an Islamic Republic, a real Islamic society would be 
constructed in which there would be no sign of hunger, inequality, unemployment, 
illiteracy, slums, crime, prostitution, corruption, alcoholism, drugs, foreign dominion, 
and so forth. He, who had been titled as Imam, (which Ithna-Ashari `Twelver' Shi'ite 
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Muslims reserve principally for the twelve Imams) translated the early religious 
history of the prophets, including the Prophet Mohammad and the Imams, into 
populist notions. Apart from the attributions of `mardom' (people) and `mellat' 
(nation), which had originally been a religious term6, to the Iranians, they were now 
also called `ummat', i. e. those who unquestionably follow their Imam. But in terms of 
social class and status, the imams and the prophets, on the one hand, and the ummats 
who believed them, on the other hand, have always been of the same origin, as it was 
reinterpreted. 
Throughout his post-revolutionary life, Ayatollah Khomeini continued his 
support of the poor and `ordinary people'. Addressing the deputies of the Parliament, 
he emphasised that all MPs should continue to come from the `middle class and the 
deprived population'. They should not be from the `capitalists, land-grabbers, and the 
upper class, who lust in pleasure and know nothing about hunger, poverty, and 
barefootedness. ' He also continuously reminded the post-revolutionary cabinets and 
high bureaucrats that their government and the revolution were the result of the 
sacrifice and serious participation of the `deprived classes'. Therefore, they should be 
in their service. 
In all the aforementioned characteristics of populism, Abrahamian sees 
similarities between Iran, in spite of its religious aspects, and parts of Latin America. 
In his view, they both invited the people to return to their `native roots'; they both 
chose a `third way' between communism and capitalism; they both had strong 
resentment against the `comprador bourgeoisie' and the external powers, and their 
movements belonged originally to the middle classes. Above all, `they turned out to 
be more interested in changing cultural and educational institutions than in 
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overthrowing the modes of production and distribution' (Abrahamian 1993: 38), the 
aspect which this present project is committed to explore about [ran. 
Specific emphasis and insistence on `ordinary people' was never confined to 
disregarding the rich and comprador capitalists- elite, intellectuals and expert 
knowledge were also resisted. The various post-revolutionary socio-political conflicts 
between the majority of the clergy and populace, on the one hand, and intellectuals, 
even religious intellectuals, on the other hand, illustrate the populist characteristics of 
the revolution. The early years of the post-revolutionary period, in particular, 
witnessed arguments about the primacy of religion (in the different names of 
commitment [ta'ahhod] and devotion to the doctrine of Islam [maktabi]) over 
expertise and technocracy (takhassos). Those who favoured such a sovereignty 
reasoned that if someone enjoys religiosity, he will automatically benefit from science 
and expertise, but science and technology were not in a position that would 
necessarily guide the elite to faith in God and taking responsibility towards Him. 
The main characteristics of populism in Iran include not only the argument 
that the powerful have oppressed the weak and that the situation must be changed in 
favour of the latter, but also the more distinctive claim that foreign corruption is to 
blame for injustice and that Islam offers the only viable solution, as well as 
resentment, xenophobia and a `generalised belief' (Smelser 1962) in the once-and-for- 
all capacity of radical Islam to restore the current balance between the powerful and 
the virtuous in Iran. 
(b) Nationalism 
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`Nationalism', different from patriotism, `turns devotion to the nation into principles 
or programmes. ' (McLean 1996: 334) Although its appearance has varied in 
different times and places, nationalism's general feature `is an assertion of the 
primacy of national identity over the claims of class, religion, or humanity in general. ' 
(McLean 1996: 334) In other words it is defined as an ideology which unites people 
in the name of a nation, based on the existing `common historical, linguistic and 
perhaps "racial" or religious ties ... with a particular territory' 
(Jary & Jary 1991: 
417), which is distinctive from others. 
Although nationalism does not amount to a great system of ideas, unlike 
Marxism and liberalism, its impact on politics has never been less than their's, if we 
consider the events of the past two centuries. For an individual, nationalism is 
confined to a `belief, or feeling of belonging to, a people' (Jary & Jary 1991: 416) 
with some common characteristics. In an ideological form, however, it goes beyond 
biological and psychological aspects and, 
`... is usually seen [in philosophy and sociology] as a system of ideas, 
different from `knowledge' or `science' because it is not `true', and 
because it contains a great deal of special pleading. Nationalism is an 
ideology which builds on the idea of the nation and makes it the basis 
for action. This action can be political or non-political. ' (Kellas 1991: 
21) 
Nationalism explicitly represents idealism, for it displays the idea of the nation 
and the ideology of nationalism which conveys specific interests to be improved, 
regardless of the nature of the interests. `So nationalist ideology is a justification for 
the pursuit of self-interest. ' (Kellas 1991: 24) 
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Iran experienced a progressive form of nationalism (reform nationalism), as 
did China, Egypt and Turkey, in the early decades of the twentieth century. However, 
there were huge differences between these movements in terms of the nature and the 
degree of their achievements. Moves towards economic development, release from 
foreign control and protection of national identity were the principal characteristics of 
such an ideology. (Kellas 1991: 75) 
Reform nationalism in Iran was first experienced in the era of the 
Constitutional Revolution (1906-11), during which there was an attempt to attain 
political and economic independence by emulating Western models of modernity. In 
terms of reform nationalism's contents, in fact, both the Constitutional and the Islamic 
Revolutions were concerned in some way with changing the existing Iranian state's 
relationship with the West. But, while the former movement followed a kind of 
liberal nationalism during its revolutionary discourse, the latter aimed to achieve 
cultural independence by stressing an indigenous and genuinely Islamic model of 
modernity, i. e. cultural nationalism. 
Of course, in terms of the nature of nationalism and its relation with religion, 
we have to distinguish the largely secular nationalism conducted during the 
Constitutional Revolution from the events which occurred later; for example, under 
the official nationalist reign of Reza Shah, in the first half of the century. In the light 
of the liberal nationalism of the Constitutional movement, although some clergy, like 
Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri', opposed women's education, others, like Ayatollah 
Tabatabaei, permitted their daughters to attend modern schools. 
After the Constitutional Revolution, even into the second half of the century, 
Iran did not abandon `official nationalism' or `nation-building's (However, during 
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the first half of the twentieth century, all forms of nationalism remained almost purely 
secular. ) 
Liberal nationalism re-appeared in Iran after the second world war, as in many 
other countries, particularly under the short-lived premiership of Dr. M. Musaddiq, 
during which all nationalist forces united in the demand for independence and 
democracy. Although a short period of co-existence between religion and nationalism 
became possible in 1951-2, it failed to continue during the rest of the 1950s. With the 
growth of `cultural nationalism' and Islamic modernism since the 1950s, both religion 
and nationalism have thrived together. According to Ayatollah Khomeini: 
`May your lives be hallowed [declared Khomeini on March 22,1982 to 
encourage Iranian volunteers at the time of the recapture of 
Khorramshahr], brave fighters and soldiers in the path of God who 
have safeguarded the honour of Islam, made the Iranian nation 
illustrious and raised the heads of those committed to the way of God. 
The great Iranian nation [mellat-e bozorg-e Iran] and the children of 
Islam are proud of you, who have placed your homeland [mihan-e 
khodJ on the wings of angels and raised it aloft among all the nations 
of the world [melal-ejahan]. ' (quoted in Richard 1995: 211) 
Similar co-existence existed even in the pre-revolutionary period, such as 
when Ayatollah Khomeini called the Iranian army to join him for the `salvation of 
Islam and Iran' during both the revolution of 1977-9 and the uprising of 1963, which 
led to his arrest. (Milani 1994: 50) 
Moreover, the power of religion to guide loyalties, besides the exertion of 
4 officia! G56 
70 
nationalism' seen particularly in the post-revolutionary period, gives a supranational 
force which prevents the rise of ethnic nationalism throughout the country. This was 
especially so in the mid-1970s. (Kellas 1991: 120-1) The post-revolutionary system 
of education has made some attempts to conceal the existing ethnic differences in the 
country and, in fact, to prevent the growth of ethnic nationalism by inserting Qur'anic 
verses, which emphasise the insignificance of ethnic issues vis-ä-vis the importance of 
purity and faith in God, into Religious Education textbooks. For example: `0 you 
men! surely We have created you of a male and a female, and made you tribes and 
families that you may know each other; surely the most honourable of you with Allah 
is the one among you most careful (of his duty); surely Allah is knowing, Aware. ' 
(49: 13) 
Cultural nationalism, in the sense of claims about the superiority of Iranian 
nation based on ideas of traditional culture, has taken at least three forms in post- 
revolutionary Iran, in general, and in the works of some Islamic ideologues before the 
revolution, in particular. 
(i) Firstly, nationalism appears in the guise of an ideology which is anti-West, 
anti-imperialism, and anti-Zionism. The aforementioned pre-revolutionary functions 
of foreign interference, particularly the West, in Iran led to the anti-Western nature of 
the revolution of 1979 and post-revolutionary events. On the one hand, Western 
interests were threatened by the possibility of penetration of the Iranian revolution 
into other Islamic countries, especially in the Middle East. On the other hand, the 
Islamic Republic was interested in enlarging the contradictions between Iran and the 
West in terms of culture and ideology. 
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The anti-imperialistic face of Iranian nationalism's new form became clear 
when the US and the Shah were `translated' into the symbol of Yazid, and Ayatollah 
Khomeini became that of Husain. ' (see Halliday 1986: 88) Thus anti-imperialism 
became one of the major features of Iranian post-revolutionary nationalism. The 
Soviets, who had previously described the movement of 1963 as `radically 
reactionary' (erteja'a-e siah), now praised the clergy's reputation for being anti- 
imperialist: `In the hands of Ayatollah Khomeini, "the dogma and traditions of 
Shi'ite Islam ... [became] an offensive weapon against 
the tyrant-Shah and 
Westernisation, in the defence of Muslim spiritual values and social order, which 
would serve the interests of ... the oppressed majority". 
Thus, "among all the 
Muslim clergy the Shi'ite clergy is distinguished by its socio-political activism, " 
while "the Sunni clergy occupies more moderate and conservative positions, " usually 
supporting the government of the state in which it lives. ' (Atkin 1986: 288) 
The anti-imperialistic position of post-revolutionary Iran reached in its peak 
when the US embassy, interpreted as `jasus-khaneh' (spy-house), was occupied in 
November 1979 (see Hooglund 1990). Although the hostage issue was theoretically 
connected to the misuse of the embassy in the past, and was, therefore, a challenge to 
the US, it was used, practically, to attract international attention and establish a 
network of contacts in the Muslim world. As Ayatollah Khomeini commented: 
`We hope that all Muslim nations may join in this struggle between 
infidels and Islam. This is not a struggle between ourselves and 
America; it is between Islam and the infidels. ... I call on all 
Muslim 
nationals, all Muslims, all Muslim armies, all Islamic security forces 
and all Muslim countries' presidents to co-operate with our nation; the 
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Muslims must rise in this struggle between infidels and Islam. ' 
(Halliday 1986: 101) 
Of course, the anti-Zionist aspect of the revolution could also be analysed in 
this context. The Iranian nation is still identified as strongly anti-Zionist, despite the 
numerous social and political shifts which have occurred, particularly in the second 
half of the 1990s. Although Iranians never identify themselves with Arab nations, and 
they have paid a huge price for being a neighbour of an Arab country (Iraq) during 
both pre- and post-revolutionary periods, the post-revolutionary stress on the necessity 
of a united challenge against Israel is an attempt towards Islamic internationalism and 
solidarity. `Cultural nationalism', in this context, is distinguished from both 
`territorial nationalism' (ivatani) and `ethnic nationalism' (gaumi), because, in this 
view, these latter are ways by which the West can divide the whole Muslim world into 
separate nations, in order to dominate them more easily. This interpretation is not 
confined to Iran; other nations with various Islamist entities, from the Atlantic to the 
Indus and beyond, share this outlook with their Iranian counterparts. (Matthee 1986: 
247-74) 
(ii) Secondly, nationalism appears as an ideology which emphasises the 
distinctiveness of Iranian nationality, despite its similarities to that of, say, Japan, 
India, and parts of Latin America. Such distinctiveness was manifested in the slogan 
of `Neither the East nor the West, but the Islamic Republic' (na shargi, na gharbi, 
jomhouri-e Islami), which became the basis of post-revolutionary foreign policy in 
Iran. As Keddie (1981: 217) implies, Muslim nations with diverse populations, in 
fact, distrusted both the West and the East. This is because, according to Keddie, they 
suffered from the paralysis of Western ideologies of capitalist liberalism which 
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brought little fruit for them. Nor did they trust Marxist or socialist ideologies, which 
have lost their authority and dynamism due to their `antihumanist and antireligious 
levelling'. Therefore, the only way out was for Islamic humanism to save Iran and 
other oppressed nations, according to the Islamic intellectuals in the Islamic world. 
This became one of the features of Iranian `cultural nationalism' in the post- 
revolutionary period. According to Moaddel (1993: 154), various themes became 
important following the socio-economic and political shifts in this period: 
`(1) the idea that underdevelopment and economic inequality is 
connected to Western cultural domination; (2) the idea that religion and 
politics are inseparable and that Islam is a revolutionary and anti- 
imperialist ideology; (3) the anti-Islamic nature of the institution of 
monarchy; and (4) the rejection of the political systems of both the 
West and East. ' 
(iii) The third aspect of Iranian post-revolutionary `cultural nationalism' is a 
specific stress on the need to segregate the sexes as a means of imposing moral purity, 
particularly on women. This stress is related to nationalism because of its reaction 
against the Western values portrayed in modern models of gender policy. 
Imperialism was believed to have penetrated Iranian values, thinking and culture as 
well as to have appropriated Iran's material resources. It was thought that only a 
return to the genuine values and traditions of Iranian culture, in the post-revolutionary 
value-system, could guarantee independence and salvation in this world and the next. 
The nation must start from its pure traditions in order to attain its desired status. 
Over-attention towards outward appearances is understandable in such a context, 
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such as paying more attention to traditional ways of life, the further enjoyment of 
religious purity, and the promotion of national and anti-Western values. 
Although both genders were requested to consider religious requirements 
regarding the issue of purity and modesty, there has been special emphasis on women 
in this regard since the revolution. This is probably the result of ideological notions, 
the most important of which is that women perform two very different and sensitive 
roles. One is the positive role of wife and mother, whereas the second is that of a 
seductive temptress. 
On one side, raising children and doing domestic duties are considered to be 
women's major roles. However, these do not prevent women from achieving their 
social functions, the fulfilment of which should not interfere with their principal tasks. 
A woman can enjoy a clerical job, as the prophets did. If a woman is corrupt, the 
world will become spoiled, and vice-versa. It is probably worth noting part of 
Ayatollah Khomeini's (1982: 101) speech on this subject, on the occasion of Hazrat- 
e Fatimah (the Prophet's daughter)'s birthday, first announced as Women's Day on 
19 May, 1979: 
`... Woman is the instructor of the society. From the lap of woman 
human beings emerge. The first stage of being true men and women is 
the lap of the woman. The happiness and wealth of the country 
depends on woman... Woman is the origin of all goodness. You saw, 
we saw, what women did in this movement.... We owe the 
movement to women. ' 
On the negative side, women could also be considered ironically as the source 
of corruption. This is allegedly because they naturally enjoy a different role from 
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men in terms of love and sexuality. This is clear from the quotations attributed to 
Ayatollah Motahhari by Haleh Afshar (1994: 28-9): 
`Men are enslaved by their sexual passions and women by their love 
for men ... men wish to possess the 
body of women and to control her 
person, women wish to capture the heart of men and hold them 
through love. Men wish to rule women by their head; women wish to 
influence men through their heart. 
Woman with her natural cleverness ... has noticed the weak point that 
nature has given to men and has made him the seeker of love and the 
pursuer and has made woman the sought one and the pursued. ... 
when woman realised this situation and her position where men are 
concerned and recognised his weak point, she resorted to make up and 
ornaments and luxury to help her capture the man's heart and at the 
same time, she distanced herself from man in the knowledge that she 
must not give herself for nothing, but must inflame his desire and 
passion and thus raise her own status. ' 
Considering the above statements from the post-revolutionary leaders of Iran, 
we can easily understand why purity and modesty were seen as important in stopping 
corruption in society, and why the struggle against corruption started with controlling 
women. In this view, a mixture of males and females, being side by side with each 
other, is not seen as progressiveness, like `going to cinemas and dancing' (Khomeini 
1982: 98); but dealing with modesty and chastity is progressiveness: 
`Women, like men, will participate in building the future Islamic 
society. They will have the right to vote and to be elected. Women 
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have contributed to the recent struggles in Iran alongside men. We will 
give all kinds of freedom to women. But, of course, we will put a stop 
to corruption. ... You [women] will 
be free to do correct things, to go 
to universities, and the like; everyone is free to do these things. But if 
anyone wants to do something against chastity, or harmful to the 
nation, a stop will be put to that. And this is progressive. 10' 
Thus the establishment of purity and the necessity of its observation through 
compulsory veiling and sex-segregation became an important social policy in post- 
revolutionary Iran. One of the most effective ways of meeting such a requirement was 
education: bans on co-education (21 May, 1979); sex-segregated classes at the School 
of Divinity in Mashad University (26 Sep., 1979); abolition of all co-educational 
schools, and teaching segregation: women teachers for girls' schools and male 
teachers for boys' schools (22 July, 1980)1'; announcement of special uniforms to be 
worn by all female students (29 July, 1980); and by all female teachers (18 Aug., 
1980). '2 
Of course, men were also required to meet purification processes and 
principles such as the avoidance of wearing of T-shirts or short-sleeve shirts, ties, and 
clothes with fashionable colours and styles, as well as shaving their faces or having 
fashionable hair styles. They were not asked to do so by formal state decrees; such 
things were dealt with by informal means, like the power of public opinion. It should 
not be surprising now to see why the West is blamed `for a breakdown in morality via 
its free social practices'. (Cole and Keddie 1986: 26) 
In short, Iranian nationalism of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary 
periods bears some similarity to that of other nation-states in developing countries. 
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But its intimate association with Islam and with notions of the cultural superiority of 
vaguely `traditional' ways of life in Iran makes Iranian nationalism highly distinctive 
and potent as a strand of ideology. This nationalism has had many repercussions for 
Iran's educational system. 
(c) Islamism 
`Islamism', in this context, means that Islam is fervently believed to be the foundation 
of a good society, and that the whole of society should be based on Islamic values. 
The separation of nationalism and Islamism from each other in Iran is so 
ambiguous and confusing that even the chief ideologues and the leaders of the Islamic 
revolution could hardly make such a distinction. Shi'ism in Iran is, in fact, a 
manifestation of the combination of Islam with the special cultural elements of Iranian 
society. Ayatollah Motahhari, whose works have always been recommended as the 
most authoritative Islamic references by the Iranian leaders, was proud of being an 
Iranian and expressed his enjoyment of `the finest language of Persian'. However, he 
was strongly against Iranian particularism and nationalism in the support of Islamism 
and devotion to Arabic language. (Dabashi 1993: 195) Also Hojjato'1-islam Hashemi 
Rafsanjani admitted in an interview that `in fact, eighty per cent of what we now do 
has no precedent in Islamic history' (Abrahamian 1993: 15), despite all the 
proclamations made for Iran as the only real Islamic country. His suggestion was 
never publicised. We can also sometimes witness this ambiguity in the personality of 
Ayatollah Khomeini. Although he never stopped his attempt to build society on the 
basis of pure Islam (Islam-e nab) during his leadership, he prevented Jalalo'l din 
Farsi, whose father was originally from Afghanistan, from being a candidate in the 
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first presidential election. Farsi had, however, been supported by the Islamic 
Republican Party. 
Nevertheless, Iran has been an Islamic country for a very long time, and, in the 
eyes of post-revolutionary leaders, no patriotism should be supported at the expense 
of Islam. Almost ten years after the revolution, in 1987, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the 
speaker of the Islamic Parliament, made the following comment about the philosophy 
of the establishment of the IRP (Islamic Republican Party) shortly after the victory of 
the revolution in February 1979: `in the beginning the mission of the party was to 
combat those who opposed the Islamisation of the country. Gradually as the 
opposition faded away, so did the mission of the IRP'. (Rahnema and Nomani 1990: 
216) Although it had never been a real party, as its clerical founders13 played, and are 
still playing, crucial roles in the life of the Islamic Republic of Iran it is important to 
give a brief account of the ideology of the IRP, which had been published as `Our 
Positions' (mavaze-e ma) in March 1981. This document reveals, in a condensed 
form, the `theory' behind an idealised version of Iranian society. 
The text begins with a definition of man but develops into a full justification 
of a Shi'ite way of life. Richard (1995: 186-87) has summarised it in the following 
terms: 
`According to Islam, man, who is more than mere matter, endowed 
with the knowledge of good and evil, responsible toward his natural 
environment which he must use without becoming its slave, is also 
responsible toward himself, destined for salvation thanks to the gifts of 
God, and toward society in which he must blossom forth by 
overcoming hostile historical and social currents. There follows a 
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theoretical exposition of the revelation, the role of the prophets in 
telling us of salvation, the justification for the authority of the Prophet 
Mohammad and his heirs, the Imams: as it is the divine doctrine that 
saves us, we need the authority of those to whom the doctrine has been 
passed on. And today the specialists in the application of the Law are 
the heirs of the Prophet and the Imams, they have the knowledge and 
understanding (feqh) to reply, in the light of Islam, to the questions 
facing men in every era, whence their name foqaha (plural offaqih). 
Moreover, this is what the Islamic constitution has stipulated in its fifth 
article: the velayat-efaqih (governorship of the jurist-theologian) 
allows the assurance of Islamic doctrine over all social strata, as both 
Sunnis and Shi'ites have to submit to it in the name of reason, in order 
to achieve the "oneness" of society (towhidi); "doctrinal politics" 
(siyasat-e maktabi) causes society to progress towards the "rule of 
God", putting a check on the colonialist argument for the separation of 
the political and the religious. ' 
According to the IRP text, Iran was a democratic country, because the major 
institutions of the country had been chosen by the popular suffrage. `But as only the 
authority of the doctrine guarantees man the power to be the master of his own 
destiny, there must be no yielding to demagogy and, without rushing things of course, 
the desires of the people that would not be in keeping with Islamic doctrine must be 
resisted. ' (Richard 1995: 187) Moreover, the Islamic Republic was constructed on 
the bases of "councils" (shuraha). But `the clergy will play a special role in the 
councils, as they are a protection and refuge for the people against dictatorship .... It 
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is the duty of the ulama to be present wherever their theoretical or practical 
qualifications predestine them for public service. But that does not give them any 
special privilege' (quoted in Richard 1995: 187). 
Favouring the whole programme of the `Cultural Revolution', the text 
considered its purpose to be destroying the effects of `an anti-religious and hegemonic 
Western culture' which had diverted Muslims from their Islamic identity. According 
to the text, `in all instances, technical specialisation must not be the sole criterion for 
the recruitment of the country's executives: favour should even be shown to those 
who, although less educated in their field, are Islam's fervent militants. ' (Richard 
1995: 188) 
The judicial programme of the IRP, which included the penal code of an eye 
for an eye (qisas), and was approved by the Islamic parliament in broad outline, had 
few points in common with Western models of justice. But its emphasis `is placed on 
the dissuasive effect of the principles literally set out in the Qur'an and in classical 
Islamic jurisprudence'. (Richard 1995: 188) `The bill also assumes that the 
testimony of women, as in Islamic tradition, is worth only half that of men. ' (Richard 
1995: 188) 
IRP's proposal for the economy avoided extremist ideas. But, in accordance 
with modem Islamist ideologues, it denied an absolute right of property ownership, 
for it belonged solely to God. The distribution of wealth had always been the main 
concern of its main member, Ayatollah Dr Mohammad Beheshti. The IRP `clearly 
assumes the class character of the petite bourgeoisie of the bazaars, whose ideal of a 
liberal and protected economy it shares. ' (Richard 1995: 189) 
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As regards foreign policy, the programme formalised the slogan "Neither East 
nor West, (but) Islamic Republic" whilst putting aside the historical context of the 
Islamic revolutionary ideology. `Furthermore, Iran is named in the text only when 
followed by the paraphrase "liberated part of the country of Islam" (gesmat-e azad- 
shoda-ye mamlekat-e eslam). ' (Richard 1995: 189) The selection of the `Islamic 
Parliamentary Assembly (majles-e shoura-ye eslami) was, in fact, the result of such a 
perception. This title excluded the so-called `un-believers' and the members of non- 
Muslim minorities of Iranian nationality. 
Besides the protection of nationalist interests against the West, Islamism 
desires and is also required to fight the Western values which have targeted Iranian 
pure religious culture, according to the post-revolutionary authority. In this view, the 
West contains all anti-Islamic elements: AIDS, homosexuality, violence, corruption, 
permissiveness, rape, impurity, prostitution, adultery, disasters in families and in the 
upbringing of the children, and so forth. All such catastrophes are the results of 
neglect of both religion and love of God. Following the solutions provided by Islam, 
however, the Islamic nation of Iran allegedly lacks such disasters. This public idea is 
a major difference between the West and Islam's own community in terms of culture. 
Most Iranian authorities, like Hojjato'l-eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani (Richard 1995: 
192), have made inquiries into the sexuality and moral corruption of the West. Of 
course, `Without obvious transition, one can pass from sexual morality to the political 
domain, to the need to uphold the government's efforts, to protect Islam, all the 
concomitants of the aspiration toward security and purity. ' (Richard 1995: 192) 
Finally, Iran has been a Muslim country during both pre- and post- 
revolutionary periods, but the definition of Islam is not the same in both periods. In 
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the wake of the Islamic revolution, Islam was not `the preservation of a heritage of 
dogmas' anymore, but `an active application of beliefs' i. e. Islam as ideology, the 
meaning which had been popularised by Dr Shari'ati. By the weapon of ideology, 
militant Islam is capable of combating all opposition and political doctrines and 
groups: Marxism, nationalism, imperialism, liberalism, and so forth. The 
construction and dissemination of ideology based on Islam have been actively pursued 
by the Islamic leaders of Iran since 1979. In fact, Richard (1990: 29, in translation) 
claims that an entirely new form of ideological discourse has developed in Iran 
alongside traditional theological discourse: `A new category of discourse about 
society has been officially given the name of "ideology" with manuals edited by 
clerical ideologues in official positions'. It is most apparent in public sermons but has 
also been propagated through all state institutions, particularly education (Richard 
1995). Evidence about the use of state schools as conduits for Islamist ideology will 
be examined in later Chapters. 
Conclusion 
The fact that the Iranian revolution of 1979 has given rise to so many different types 
of explanation is not surprising. The meaning of events that are now regarded as 
paving the way for revolution was by no means clear at the time; numerous interest 
groups supported the overthrow of Mohammed Reza Shah's regime, although their 
interests were not necessarily compatible with each other; and it took several years 
for the situation to settle down into a relatively stable pattern. Yet, running through 
all the confusions, chaos and ambiguity were several resilient strands of ideological 
thinking which strongly shaped the character of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 
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1980s and 1990s. Each strand is a combination of political, philosophical and 
theological elements, some of which have echoes in the radical ideologies of other 
countries. But in their Iranian context these ideological strands are highly distinctive 
and pervasive. As later Chapters will show, however, this does not mean that 
ideology has necessarily been successful in making the Iranian school system fit the 
mould created for it by ideologues (see Omid 1994). Some of the practical outcomes 
are actually ironic, as indeed Max Weber would probably have expected. 
ENDNOTES 
' In modern Iran this is known as `khati-e ghermez' or red line. 
z See Dabashi 1993 for further information about the above-mentioned ideologues. 
3 Given a different definition of `populism' related to the charismatic abilities of a 
leader to attract to a certain extent of the populace around him- or herself, Alamdari 
(1998) believes that the period of `populism' in Iran came to end with the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. This was because, in his view, Ayatollah Khomeini's 
replacement did not enjoy such a charismatic power as his predecessor. Therefore, 
according to Alamdari, `populism' was replaced by `clientelism' in Iran in post-1989. 
4 According to Bayat (1997: 43), `the term "mustaz'afin" entered [Ayatollah] 
Khomeini's discourse only during the height of the revolution (Aban 1357) [about 
November 1978], when he used it merely to repudiate the Communists'. He also adds 
that Ayatollah Khomeini addressed `lower-class people' only eight times in the 
eighty-eight messages, letters and sermons issued during the fifteen years leading up 
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to the revolution, compared with fifty references made to students, educated people 
and universities. 
'The Prophet Abraham was also called an imam in the Qur'an. 
6 The followers of the Prophet Abraham are called 'inellat' in the Qur'an. 
' He believed that `if we allow girls and handsome boys to go to school, corruption 
will spread in society like a plague'. For more information on this, see Paidar 1996: 
53. 
8 The definition of `official nationalism' is given in Kellas 1991: 73. 
9 Husain was the grandson of the Prophet Mohammad and the Third Shi'ite Imam, and 
was martyred by the order of Yazid, the Umayyad monarch, in 680 at the battle of 
Karbala, a city in present-day Iraq. 
1° Ayatollah Khomeini's interview with Iranian reporters in Paris on January 23,1979 
(about twenty days before the victory of the revolution). For more information, see 
Khomeini 1982: 98. 
" Of course, due to the lack of female teachers for teaching female students in most 
parts of the country, it was practically applied in only a few major cities. 
12 For more information, see Tabari and Yeganeh 1982: 231-9. Sex-segregation 
policy was not confined to the first two years after the revolution, either in education 
or other parts of society. 
13 The clerical founders were the u/ama who had been the students of Ayatollah 
Khomeini at Qom: Ayatollahs and Hojjato'l-eslams Mohammad Beheshti (president 
of High Court of Justice), Abdo'l Karim Musavi Ardabili ( who succeeded Beheshti 
after his assassination in 1981, and now one of the influential clergy in Qom), Ali 
Khamanei (the president of the Islamic Republic from 1981 to 1989 and the present 
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Islamic leader of Iran), Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani (the speaker of the Islamic 
parliament until 1989, then the president of the Islamic Republic until 1997, and now 
chairman of the Expediency Council), and Mohammad-Javad Ba-Honar (Prime 
Minister, assassinated in 1981). 
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Chapter Four 
HISTORY OF IRANIAN EDUCATION BEFORE 1979 
Now that the political and ideological forces shaping the emergence of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran have been outlined, it is possible to begin the analysis of concomitant 
changes in the country's school-level education system. It is appropriate, therefore, to 
begin with a brief account of the system's historical evolution in the period leading up 
to 1979, with special emphasis on the educational policies of governments under the 
Pahlavi dynasty. The gradual separation of religion from state-controlled education in 
this period will be contrasted, in the following Chapters, to the post-1979 policies 
designed to infuse education with Islamic values. 
Education Under the Qajars 
The Qajar dynasty (1794-1925) governed Iran before the Pahlavi regime (1925-1979). 
The most respected government of this dynasty belonged to Mirza Taghi Khan Amir 
Kabir (1848-52), the first prime minister of Nasirruddin Shah (1848-96), under whose 
government educational reforms and other forms of modernisation took place in Iran 
for the first time. According to Goldschmidt (1991: 162), Nasiruddin Shah had been 
ordered by foreign imperialism to run a programme of modernisation including 
mines, banks, railroads, and public services. In reaction to foreign imperialism, a 
Persian nationalist movement developed between 1870 and 1914. Ironically, it 
developed through the spread of telegraphs, roads, railroads, and both public and 
private schools whose engineering or models had been assisted by foreigners 
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(Goldschmidt 1991: 176). Therefore, modernisation was introduced as a gift of 
Western imperialism, accompanied by Westernisation which was incompatible with 
the Islamic ideals of the people. 
Not until the mid-19th century did modem schools like Dar'ol-Fonun School, 
including the first technical schools, begin to replace the schools in Tehran and the 
larger cities, which had been traditionally held at neighbourhood mosques like the 
Qur'an classes, maktab, taught by clergymen who were called `mullahs'. Maktab was 
a pre-Islamic Arab educational institution which had penetrated into Iran during the 
Arab invasions (see Safavi-Hemami 1980: 13). Education in such schools had been 
strictly traditional and Islamic. Reading, writing, and the memorising of parts of 
Qur'an had been the schools' main concern at the lower levels; concentration on 
Arabic literature and Islamic sciences had been their objectives at higher levels. 
(Keddie 1991: 178) 
Of course, the Islamic educational institutions were not confined to maktabs in 
this period; `Khaneghah' and `MMladrasah' were others where both adults and 
adolescents were involved. In `Khaneghah', founded by the Sufis, students learned 
how to liberate their "self' from material and mundane goods. `Madrasah' was a 
religious college for higher learning, which had been founded in Baghdad in 1065, 
and subsequently spread through different parts of Iran (see Safavi-Hemami 1980: 
14). 
Theoretically, Islam not only encourages Muslims to learn but it also regards 
learning as a duty of any Muslim, both men and women. For example, the first verse 
which was revealed to the Prophet of Islam, started with "read"; "learning is the duty 
of every Muslim, men and women"; Muslims "should seek learning from the cradle to 
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the grave"; Muslims "should seek learning, even if it is available in China, (because it 
was far away from Arabia)"; and so on. In practice, however, the religious centres of 
Islam in Iran not only did not pay attention to non-Islamic knowledge but they also 
restricted Islam to the teaching and learning of nothing but Islamic jurisprudence. The 
study of science was not recommended and was, at least, not practised. 
According to Rashedi (1984: 82-4), the preliminary steps for establishing 
modem schools in Iran were taken by Western Christian missionaries in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. The first modem school for boys was opened in Tabriz, 
north-west Iran, by the Basel Missionary Society in 1833. By 1851 the American 
Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions alone had 45 schools with 871 
enrolments. However, missionary schools were only for Christian children, and few 
Muslim pupils attended them. 
Apart from the missionary schools, modern education in Iran began in 
principle with higher education, when the country came under the influence of the 
West. To begin with, there were colleges but no elementary schools. In 1851, Amir 
Kabir, who had been educated in Russia and Turkey, proposed to the Shah the 
foundation of a college, Daro'l-Fonun, to train administrative officials needed for the 
country, and this was later approved by the Shah. The subjects studied in Dar al- 
Fonun were: artillery, chemistry, cavalry, infantry, mathematics, mineralogy, 
medicine, military engineering (because of Iran's involvement in the war with Russia 
at that time), and physics. The students also had to study literature and foreign 
languages (English, Russian, and French) during their six-year period of study. The 
students who attended this college mainly belonged to the upper class and the 
aristocracy. 
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Later on, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Education, and Justice 
started to establish their own colleges, in 1901,1902,1911, and 1921 respectively. 
Finally, in 1934 under the Pahlavi regime, all six different colleges (of Arts and 
Science or Education, Law, Medicine, Theology, War, and Veterinary Medicine) 
which were located in Tehran, as well as the College of Agriculture which was located 
in nearby Karaj, came together to share the same administration under the name of 
Tehran University (see Fallahi 1993: 42-5). By the turn of the century, Iranians were 
also becoming familiar with formal education at the elementary and secondary levels. 
The first elementary school in Iran was established in Tabriz in 1867, when 
Iran was gradually experiencing urbanisation for the first time. Elementary education, 
therefore, had to correspond to the urban needs of society. Pupils attended for six 
years, and the subjects were: the Persian language, history, religious teachings, 
arithmetic, ethics, geometry, and arts. By 1901 seven elementary schools existed in 
Tehran, and one school in each city of Tabriz, Shiraz, Mashad, Rasht, and Bushehr. 
They were all public schools which were not sponsored by the government. By 1910, 
113 elementary schools existed in Iran, one third of which were for girls, with 10,531 
pupils, according to Furter (1973: 9). The main growth at elementary level took place 
between 1906 and 1922, when elementary schools expanded to some villages and 
some private schools were also set up. 
At the turn of the century, private secondary schools were also being 
established. Madresseh Elmieh, a private secondary school, was established in Tehran 
in 1898. Then the "Nezam" (Army) High school was instituted in Tehran to fill the 
needs of the army for educated personnel. Elmieh's initial curriculum included 
history, Arabic, French, Persian, and Mathematics. Under the Constitutional 
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government, a fundamental law of 1911 required the Ministry of Education to deal 
with the creation of public schools. 
Under the Qajar dynasty in Iran, the French model of education was adopted 
for both elementary and secondary levels. The duration of each level was six years in 
imitation the French system. The curriculum of Year-seven included world history, 
Arabic, and hygiene, and these were added to the routine programme of grammar, 
literature, geography, history, composition, and mathematics. The eighth and ninth 
years' curriculum involved physics, chemistry, biology, geology, algebra, and 
mechanical drawing, apart from the regular programme. High school pupils also 
studied elementary economics, zoology, solid geometry and trigonometry during their 
last three years of secondary level. 
Thus, although Iran was confronted by foreign imperialism under the Qajar 
dynasty, it also experienced some manifestations of modernity, including modem 
education. Both elementary and secondary schools built on French models were 
introduced into the country; and some enrolment of pupils, although a very low 
proportion of the population, took place. 
Educational Policies under Reza Shah's Reign 
Under the Pahlavi dynasty, modernisation, further Westernisation and secularisation 
all took place on a massive scale. The West influenced not only the social, political 
and economic spheres of Iran, but also brought about major changes in the culture 
through education. Weakening the norms and traditional mechanisms of control 
based on Muslim tradition, Reza Shah attempted to replace the Islamic lifestyle with a 
Western one. For example, Western-style schools with imported Western curricula 
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replaced the traditional "maktab" and "madrasah" which had been inherited from the 
Qajar dynasty. 
Therefore, both maktab, which taught literacy through Islamic teachings, and 
madraseh, which taught traditional Islamic education, such as the Qur'an, theology, 
Muslim history, religious jurisprudence, and the Arabic language, were gradually 
transformed into a new style of school where the westernised system of education was 
to be taught: European languages and other subjects irrelevant to the culture of native 
people, in the eyes of commentators such as Mehran (1988: 172-3). 
Nevertheless, as Hambley (1991: 232) indicates, during his drive towards 
secularisation, Reza Shah did not assault Islam and the clergy as much as Ataturk did 
in neighbouring Turkey, despite frequent claims to the contrary. Unlike Ataturk's 
plan to increase literacy in Turkey by changing the language from Arabic script to 
Roman letters, Reza Shah employed an army corps of teachers who were obliged to 
teach in villages where they did not belong. Maboudian (1995: 75) thinks `this may 
have negatively affected the success of the programme'. For example, Iran's literacy 
rate for men was only fifteen per cent in 1956 (Furter 1973: 11), although people were 
using the same model of alphabet as they had before. 
During Reza Shah's reign, France continued to be consider a proper example 
for Iranian cultural institutions, to the extent that a lot of French vocabulary was 
introduced into the Persian language. By this means, Iranians made the acquaintance 
of the French Revolution, the experience of which as a model of successful social 
change was probably not without effect in helping to create the Iranian Revolution of 
1979. 
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Reza Shah welcomed French models for Iran in both the macro- and micro- 
structure of educational policies. In terms of the macro-level, he centralised the 
educational system by establishing uniformity of curriculum and a central bureau in 
Tehran for administrative affairs. In accordance with this policy, the Ministry of 
Education took responsibility for textbooks, and the French model of subjects and 
textbooks was adopted again in 1928 (Fallahi 1993: 55) . In the same year, the 
Ministry of Education was ordered, by law, to send one hundred students abroad each 
year in order to make Iranian society familiar with Western values. The countries in 
which most students chose to study, at their universities, were: France, Britain, 
Belgium, Switzerland and Germany. After returning home, most of the graduates 
occupied key university chairs in agriculture, medicine, education and law, all of 
which were needed for building a modern Iran. 
Centralised state education was, in fact, instituted by the Pahlavi Shah in order 
to carry out his "top-down" revolution, in the language of Skocpol (1979): 
modernisation; training manpower for the needs of government and recently 
established industries; and development of pre-Islamic nationalism to present the 
image of a unified Persian nation. There were similarities, on this issue, between 
Reza Shah and Napoleon's attitude to education in France in the early nineteenth 
century (Archer 1979: 153). But, unlike Reza Shah, Napoleon allowed the Church to 
control elementary education and supported Churches financially in return for 
receiving the benefit of political socialisation by the Church. 
Although the educational model of Iran was based on the French system, there 
was a major difference between them in terms of the transition to modern public 
education. Unlike the French system, which gradually weaned people off the 
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teachings of the Church, Reza Shah wanted rapidly to create a centrally controlled 
state education system through which he could promote ideology and nationalism, and 
socialise every student into a modem Iranian citizen. Although in France, the Church 
retained control of elementary schools for a while in parallel with the expansion of 
state controlled schools, Reza Shah did not allow Iranian families to make a choice 
between state schools or maktabs. In general, he ignored the important role of Islam 
in Iranian history and everyday life. 
In the new model of schooling, there was no teaching of the Qur'an, the sacred 
book which Iranians had respected for nearly 1400 years, as there had been in the 
maktab and madrasah. Religious prayers were also eliminated from the curriculum 
and in practice from schools. Yet religion still played an important role in people's 
everyday life. Therefore, although pupils were alienated from religion at schools, they 
had a close relationship with it within families. As a result, the Muslim nation did not 
welcome the new model of education, which they viewed as a Western institution. 
Most children were kept back from school, particularly outside Tehran and in villages, 
and the illiteracy rate rose day by day. This was the opposite of what Napoleon had 
achieved in France in dealing with the Church. 
The new educational system, at the individual level, was also adopted from 
France. Before Reza Shah's reform, attendance at maktabs and madrasahs was 
mostly for boys and men, but schools were opened to both males and females for 
elementary education under his reforms. Now girls could also go to schools albeit in a 
new style of clothing which was absolutely different from that currently worn by 
ordinary people. Not only did they not have to wear the veil, but they were also 
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expected to wear a smock, trousers, and scarf. There was also severe punishment for 
the students who disregarded the regulations regarding study, uniforms and behaviour. 
In 1939, the six-year high school programme was divided into two periods of 
three years. During the first three years, pupils learned general subjects like general 
sciences, mathematics, Persian and a foreign language, religious teachings and some 
non-curricular activities. For the second period, pupils had first of all to select an area 
of study which interested them, from mathematics, natural sciences, literature, or 
home economics for girls. Their selection of each area determined their future area of 
study in higher education. For example, the pupils who acquired a diploma in 
mathematics, natural sciences and literature, could pursue, respectively, engineering, 
medicine and law for their study in higher education. 
Higher education institutions also underwent development. Apart from the 
integration of existing schools into the faculties of the University of Tehran, two other 
Normal schools were converted to the faculties of Science and Arts as Teachers' 
Colleges in 1928. The growth of the teacher training colleges in these years affected 
the development of Normal schools in the country. In 1933, new departments of 
Scouting and Physical Education were also established due to Reza Shah's special 
interest in such areas. 
Within the emerging area of technology, the expansion of postal services, 
telegraph and railroads persuaded the authorities to open technical schools to fulfil the 
needs of imported technology. The Abadan Technical School was the major one, 
which later became a university. According to Fallahi (1993: 56), during Reza Shah's 
period, thirty-six Normal schools were instituted in total. Fallabi (1993: 56) also 
notes that girls could enter universities for the first time in the 1930s. 
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Stress on secularisation in addition to the use of the country's military force 
for his own concerns, like seizure of lands for himself, finally led to unrest among 
people and eventually the exile of Reza Shah from Iran in 1941. Emphasising the 
long line of Persian dynasties, Reza Shah had wanted to legitimise his position as a 
king of Iran through the enforcement of mandatory schooling and the school 
curriculum. But he never succeeded, for in spite of his educational reforms, Iran still 
suffered from 95 per cent illiteracy in 1948 (see Baldwin 1967: 143-4). 
Mohammad Reza Shah's educational policies 
In 1941, Reza Shah's son, Mohammad Reza, who was then twenty-one years old, 
replaced his father. During his reign, the US strengthened its interests in Iran and 
supported the young king. On the other hand, because of the oil industry's situation, 
the Shah was not interested in developing relations with Britain. The growing 
relationship with the US resulted in a shifting of the educational system from the 
French model to the American style. 
Educational policy in Iran during the reign of the last Shah can be followed 
through the five Development Plans conducted from 1949 onwards. Although during 
the first and second Development Plans, which occurred between 1949 and 1955, and 
between 1956 and 1962, the place of education was not evident in the Plans, there was 
a growth in the number of students during these years, as indicated in the table 
below: ' 
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Table 1: Growth in the Number of Students, the Percentage of each level of Education, and the 
Population of Iran between 1940 and 1962 
Year Primary Secondary University Total Population 
1940 287,245 (90.09%) 28,196 (8.84%) 3,395 (1.07%) 318,836 12,653,338 
1945 287,905 (89.64%) 29,047 (9.04%) 4,218 (1.32%) 321,170 13,875,820 
1951 650,355 (87.96%) 83,507 (11.3%) 5,502 (0.74%) 739,364 16,237,000 
1955 769,166 (86.24%) 112,675 (12.63%) 10,097 (1.13%) 891,938 18,095,062 
1962 1,719,353 (83.03%) 326,856 (15.79%) 24,456 (1.18°/x) 2,070,665 23,042,867 
It can be seen that there is little growth in the number of students between 
1940, the penultimate year of the first Pahlavi's reign (1925-4 1), and 1945, four years 
after the beginning of the second Pahlavi's reign (1941-1979). But, compared with 
the growth of the population (about 117%), there is a huge growth in students' 
enrolments between 1945 and 1951 (about 226% at the primary level, 287% at the 
secondary level -- which is very considerable -- and 130% at the university levels), 
probably influenced by the First Development Plan (1949-1955). The growth of 
children's participation in education also continues between 1951 and 1955, 
particularly in secondary (135%) and university (about 184%) education. 
During the first Development Plan, the US began to influence the Iranian 
educational system, since they had already had a great deal of influence through the 
US Embassy in Tehran. Therefore, in this period, Iranian education shifted towards 
the American style of education. A group of American consultants were used to 
review Iranian educational policy and make proposals for change in 1948. According 
to their recommendations, although the duration of all elementary and secondary 
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levels and the three different fields of study at secondary level were left intact in the 
new system, curriculum and textbooks were altered. 
During the second Development Plan (1956-1962), there was no change in the 
quality of education. However, as shown by the above table, the quantitative growth 
is remarkable (about 224% at the primary level, 290% at the secondary level, and 
242% at the university levels compared with 127% growth of the population). During 
this period, two important events happened in education: the foundation of private 
schools due to the financial inability of the Ministry of Education to respond to 
growth in enrolment; and the establishment of vocational schools during the last years 
of the Plan. 
The place of education was considered for the first time during the Third 
Development Plan (1963-1967). In view of its important role in solving economic 
and social problems, education occupied nine per cent of the total plan budget. 
However, the educational plan went further than the Third Development Plan and 
became a long-term twenty-year plan announced as the `White Revolution' in January 
1962. As discussed in Chapter Two, the `White Revolution' was considered to be a 
programme hoping to achieve social, economic and political reforms. For Watson 
(1976: 27), its major purpose had originally been to destroy feudalism completely; 
create equal rights for women; increase the living standards of the majority of the 
populace; adjust the bureaucratic and judicial policy of the country; remove inequality 
in the distribution of wealth; and provide education for all people. The extent to 
which the programme succeeded in dealing with the above-mentioned issues is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. But since all the Third, Fourth and Fifth 
Development Plans were influenced by the long-term programme of the `White 
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Revolution', this chapter intends to pay special attention to the impact of the `White 
Revolution' on education in pre-revolutionary years. 
The Shah's White Revolution affected education greatly. According to Hiro 
(1985: 53-4), the size of the educational system tripled between 1963 and 1977. 
Secondary schools expanded to twice their previous size, mostly in technical and 
vocational aspects. The numbers of students in teacher training colleges and 
universities rose from 14,240 to 227,500 and from 24,885 to 154,215 respectively; 
and enrolment at foreign universities increased from 18,000 to 80,000 (Hiro 1985: 
53-4). Moreover, the monopoly of males and wealthy citizens over education ended. 
Despite such progressive changes in education, the ideology of Western superiority 
over Iranians as well as the low status of villagers (which was not so clear but inherent 
in the new system of education) had not been completely removed from the minds of 
the populace, especially villagers. 
One of the major characteristics of the `White Revolution' was the creation of 
the Literacy Corps. Ironically, its creation, as the most dramatic manpower 
programme of this period, had not been a result of the Third Plan (Baldwin 1967: 
147). During the Third Development Plan, 35,000 corps members were sent to about 
34,000 villagers, according to Fallahi (1993: 66). They were supposed, according to 
Furter (1973: 11), to take responsibility for the teaching of 386,765 pupils in 11,942 
classes and 72,530 adults in 3973 classes, even in the most isolated areas of Iran. But, 
in practice, only about 270,000 children became literate through this project (see 
Fallahi 1993: 66), so that the Iranian literacy rate had still not exceeded sixty per cent 
of the population by 1978, according to the World Almanac 1982 (see Maboudian 
1996: 99). 
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Undoubtedly, disempowerment of villagers was a major factor which affected 
both literacy and public education. Although lands were taken from the landlords and 
distributed among peasants through the so-called `Land-Reform' programme of 1962, 
as inserted in the `White Revolution', the peasants were virtually deserted on their 
distributed lands. They needed equipment and other facilities for farming, but they 
were too expensive for the poor villagers to buy. As a result, they either sold the land 
or even left it and moved to the cities to seek jobs as ordinary workers in factories or 
the construction industry. 
Yet disempowerment of peasants was only one of the factors which led to the 
failure of the plan. The Literacy Corps project contained other weaknesses, despite 
having been planned to educate all people. 
Firstly, the teachers who were sent to teach the villagers had undergone no 
training course relevant to this difficult job. After completing high school, the boys 
who failed in college entrance examination, had to go to garrisons to complete a two- 
year period of military service. They were trained to prepare for a possible war. But 
after the White Revolution of 1963, these same boys, as well as girls, went to 
garrisons for just six months training. For the remaining one-and-a-half years, they 
were sent to far-off villages or small towns to teach children at elementary level in the 
mornings and then adults in the evenings. To teach nomads, teachers were selected 
among them and trained, and the nomads' own tents were used as the school facilities. 
This programme was called "The White Tent" and was performed with the assistance 
of American educational experts. 
Secondly, there was no continuity or stability in the teaching process in a 
village - after teaching for about one year and acquiring some experience, the military 
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conscripts (Literacy Corps) who had been drafted into teaching were replaced by new 
conscripts. After completing their two-year military service, a quarter of the Literacy 
Corps members were recruited by the Ministry of Education to be teachers at 
elementary level. The villagers were still deprived of an adequate teaching service by 
Literacy Corps people who were recruited later, for these were now serving in urban 
areas: not rural regions any more. 
Thirdly, the corps often lacked any motivation for teaching the villagers 
enthusiastically, because they just considered themselves to be completing the two- 
year mandatory military service. Moreover, they were students who had failed the 
college competition exam to continue their study in higher education, so they lacked 
the spirit for doing other work, and the enthusiasm for teaching. 
Fourthly, they were not generally sent to areas where they wanted to go or had 
been familiar with. As soldiers, they were sent to remote villages where the living 
conditions were quite hard, having come from urban areas. The situation was worse 
when they could not even speak the native languages, as occasionally happened. 
Fifthly, the amount of work expected of a corp member was frequently 
unrealistic. A corp member who normally taught several year groups (chand-payeh) 
during day-time, which would be quite tiring, also had to teach adults at night-time. 
Certainly, he or she would not enjoy his or her job in this case, and could not deal 
properly with either public or literacy education. 
Finally, since in Iranian culture, particularly in rural areas, adults enjoyed 
special respect from youths, it was not an easy job for the corp members, who were 
normally teenagers, to gain the respect of village adults as their teachers. 
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Apart from the aforementioned problems, there were other difficulties which 
the Third Development Plan confronted (see Mashari, 1980). For example, the budget 
allocated to this educational development was not adequate, and teachers' salaries 
were too low to deal with such huge changes (sec Baldwin: 1967). However, the 
programme represented a new role in the educational system of Iran: the training of 
manpower for assembly-line work and the services sector as well as the inculcation of 
proper attitudes and action towards the new economic system. 
The educational system remained the same into the 1960s. Namely, the 
duration of both elementary and secondary levels was six years each. The secondary 
level was divided into two periods (cycles) of three years. The pupils went to school 
for five and a half days, from Saturday morning until midday Thursday. By this time, 
the country at large had become familiar with the process of industrialisation and 
modernisation, but there was no reflection of this in the curriculum and textbooks; and 
the schools lacked the ability to prepare the pupils in parallel with that process. 
Therefore, in the 1960s, the need was felt for changing the educational curriculum in 
response to modernisation. In other words, in order to achieve the new economy, 
which the Shah was promising people, new attitudes, values and life styles were 
required. This led to noticeable attention to revision of the educational system 
through the Fourth Development Plan, which appeared at the same time. The new 
system of education was approved in 1966, and was put into effect in 1971, according 
to which curricula, textbooks, teachers and schools in general had to play a very 
important role in the new economy. 
In the new system of education, the duration of the elementary level was 
reduced from six to five years; the first three-year cycle of the secondary level 
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remained the same, but changed its title to "the guidance level", and the duration of 
the second cycle increased to four years. Pupils were intended to learn theoretical 
issues as well as practical training during the guidance level. They had also to be 
recognised and measured according to their strengths and weaknesses for their 
position at the next level and future jobs. For this purpose, Guidance and Counselling 
Headquarters (hasteh-haye moshavereh va rahnemaei) were established in guidance 
schools in 1971. The counsellors were graduates in counselling from the Teacher 
Training Colleges. Another feature of the new system of education at that time was 
the establishment of `Vocational Schools' (honarestan). Attendance here followed 
completion of the guidance level, rather than going to high school. 
After graduating from high school, in the new system, students who failed the 
college entrance exam had another option which was participation in another exam for 
admission to Teacher Training Colleges for guidance schools. The duration of these 
colleges was two years, and, after graduation, students acquired a Higher Diploma 
(Fovgh-Diplom) degree (between the first degree and A-level) in the special subject 
they had studied. Unfortunately, this new system also failed to meet the goals of 
establishing the `Guidance and Counselling Headquarters' and of training manpower 
for meeting the needs of industries. There were still weaknesses and shortages in the 
fields of technology, science, teaching, and engineering. However, there had been a 
dramatic increase in the number of students in higher education during the Fourth 
Development Plan, from 60,000 students at the beginning of the plan to 115,311 at the 
end (Fallahi 1993: 70). 
Mehran (1988) attributes this failure to the `dependent' state of Iranian 
government at that time in all aspects of politics, economy, culture, and education. 
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Indeed, she explains all social and educational changes in Iran in that period as the 
result of the Shah's personal dependency on the USA. In her view, the dependent 
political and economic system required a dependent educational system which was 
not capable of meeting the needs of people and independent modernisation. But her 
explanation can be criticised for interpreting `dependency' in mainly personal terms, 
thereby omitting more structural notions of dependency in the world-system of nation 
states. 
For Mehran, the new Iranian educational system was not responsible for 
training a high-level skilled labour force for dependent industry, but training of 
middle-level industrial manpower was good enough. Indeed, skilled labour required 
for the imported assembly industry was also acquired by importing skilled 
technicians. Moreover, the services sector, which was going to have a massive share 
of the new economy, directly affected education, particularly higher education, 
because, according to Mehran (1988), 35.1 per cent of students were enrolled in the 
humanities and social sciences, in comparison with 22.3 per cent in engineering, 12.4 
per cent in medical sciences, and 4.4 percent in agriculture in 1976. 
During the Fifth Development Plan (1973-1978), oil prices increased and this 
caused an economic improvement in the country which had positive effects on 
education. Providing free education for all became one of the major aims of the 
authorities. The vocational education curriculum was expanded, and was supported 
financially by the Ministry of Labour. Moreover, the number of students increased at 
all levels. In brief, as Rashedi (1984: 210-11) points out, Iranian education enjoyed 
more than ten-fold growth between 1953 and 1977. However, he describes this as a 
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result of the huge oil income of Iran at that time, rather than the Shah's `dynamic 
character of leadership'. 
Ideologically, the second Pahlavi Shah played on the Iranian national character 
for the development of Iran, as his father had done before. Nonetheless, Mohammad 
Reza Shah, unlike his father, had to confront a different ideology, the empowerment 
of the people, during the premiership of Dr Mohammad Mosaddiq. This ideology was 
similar to the spirit behind 1890 Tobacco Boycott, the Constitutional Revolution of 
1906 and the later Revolution of 1979. Not surprisingly, there is no sign of the 
people's empowerment ideology in textbooks of the Shah's reign, as Maboudian 
(1996: 87-8) claims. Instead, the school textbooks and curriculum represented the 
legitimisation of the Shah's government as the shadow of God and the father of the 
nation, and aimed to make the readers believe in the rebuilding of the Persian Empire. 
After sketching the impacts of the `White Revolution' on education, Maboudian 
(1996: 110) concludes as follows: `... the nation was not unified by the Shah's 
educational reform within his White Revolution. Instead, it made the idea of an 
Islamic Republic of Iran as an autonomous nation, which rejected the 'Vest and valued 
its own culture as superior in morality, a welcome change. ' 
Mohsenpour (1988), who was director of the Bureau of Research on 
International Educational Systems of the Ministry of Education in Iran, also criticises 
some of the ideological aspects of the pre-revolutionary educational system. He 
(1988: 77-9) claims that `weakening the religious beliefs and spreading atheism and 
polytheistic teachings' had been a common ideological aim of both the Shah and the 
leftists. In his view, this was done through the curriculum and teaching programme, 
mostly social science textbooks. In order to prove this, he (1988: 78) quotes from a 
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second-grade sociology textbook of the secondary level, published in 1975, to the 
effect that religion `is imposed on human beings'. Mohsenpour (1988: 78-9) also 
claimed that `Marxism formed the cornerstone of the social science textbooks of the 
guidance cycle as well as of secondary schools. It can be concluded that atheistic 
ideology was taught more in schools than in universities during the reign of the Shah. ' 
Yet, ironically, Mohsenpour (1988: 80) also describes education as "a vehicle 
for transmitting the principles of capitalism to Iranian students" through the textbooks 
for such subjects as mathematics. 
In Mohsenpour's opinion, the textbooks were not the only means of 
inculcating the ideology of capitalism through education; the establishment of `private 
schools', special orders and programmes had also been designed to favour the 
capitalistic way of life and Western culture. He (1988: 77) cites the main purpose of 
establishing private schools as `to plant elitism'. 
Preventing female students and teachers from wearing the veil and `modest 
Islamic dress' (hijab) in schools, according to Mohsenpour (1988: 76), had also been 
designed to allow Western culture to infiltrate Iran: `A decree abolishing the Islamic 
modest dress was passed by Reza Shah in 1938 and was seriously implemented in the 
schools. Stories, tales, activities, games, and even toys and dolls that were used in 
kindergartens and schools belonged to Western culture. ' 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the policies underlying successive attempts to build an 
effective education system in Iran have all reflected prevailing ideologies and power 
relations. The close association forged by Mohammad Reza Shah between Iran and 
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the USA was particularly important in so far as it helped to create the conditions in 
which the development of education could be framed in overwhelmingly secular 
terms. As Chapter Three argued, resistance to, and resentment against, this form of 
secularisation eventually fed into the forces which deposed the Shah and paved the 
way for revolution in 1979. The following Chapters will trace the revolution's impact 
on the policy and practice of school-level education in the past nineteen years. 
ENDNOTE 
' Original data for primary, secondary, and university students have been adapted 
from Fallahi (1993: 61-2), and the numbers of the population for the indicated years 
have been calculated approximately by the author of this thesis by referring to 
`Islamic Republic of Iran' (1998: 33). 
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Chapter Five 
POST-1979 RE-ORGANISATION OF EDUCATION IN IRAN 
Institutional Changes 
The Islamic Revolution, as a cultural movement, has shown special consideration 
towards educational changes since the early days of its establishment. Not 
surprisingly, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the first institution whose 
changes were regarded as a major force for abolishing dependency on the West was 
the educational system. Even before the victory of the revolution, education had 
engaged the leader's attention as an instrument for making huge changes in all aspects 
of society. Therefore, Ayatollah Khomeini, condemning the Pahlavi kings' crime, 
announced in his first speech, in Tehran's cemetery, after returning home: `We will 
replace all prisons with schools' (see Fallahi 1993: 30). In another speech, in the 
early years of the revolution, addressing the members of the Council of Cultural 
Revolution, he asserted: `One of the very important problems is the fundamental 
changes in programmes especially those related to the educational system' (sec 
Fallahi 1993: 30). 
The struggle by the regime to change the educational system was intensified in 
April 1980, when the universities were closed in order to rid higher education of the 
influence of the East and the West, and to bring out the Islamisation of the 
universities. According to Sobhe (1987), the great stress on post-graduate studies in 
the Cultural Revolution of 1980 was the basic difference between the Iranian 
revolution and those of China and the Soviet Union. 
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After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iranian universities became 
centres for the open discussion of ideas between various political groups, according to 
Maleki' (1997). Such groups are classified by the author of the present thesis 
according to their identified ideologies, i. e. Islamism, Marxism and neo-Islamism. 
(i) Islamists were those who unquestioningly favoured all of Ayatollah 
Khomeini's ideas (khatt-e Imam) and the authority of the clergy (rahbariyat-e 
ruhaniyat). Their ideal style of regime had been `the Islamic Republic' (and nothing 
else 'faqatjomhuri-e eslami- na yek kalameh kam va na yek kalameh ziyad'), which 
was approved during the referendum of 1 April, 1979. Among students, they were 
usually went under the title of `the Islamic Society of Students' (anjoman-e eslami-e 
daneshjouyan). 
(ii) The ideal of Leftists had been the establishment of a "People's 
Democratic Republic" in Iran. Various examples of leftist world governments were 
favoured by different leftist groups: the regimes of Soviet Union, China, Albania, 
Cuba, etc. as well as all ideologies of Marxism, Maoism, Leninism, Islamic Marxism, 
etc. Some leftist organisations of students in the universities were: "daneshjouyan-e 
democrat" (Democrat Students), supporters of "hezb-e tudeh" (Mass Party); 
"daneshjouyan-e pishgam" (Forerunner Students), supporters of "sazman-e cherik- 
hayefedaei-e khalq-e Iran" (Organisation for Iranian People's Devotee Guerrillas). 
(iii) Neo-Islamists were identified as `a third path' (khatt-e sevvom). Contrary 
to Islamists, their preferred form of Islam could not be found in the traditional 
religious schools (hovzeh), and the body of the clergy (rcrhaniyat) was not accepted as 
a real example of `dynamic Islam' (islam-e puya), already defined by "Nakhshab- 
Taliqani-Shari'ati". The `Islamic Democratic Republic' had been an ideal system of 
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goverment for all the neo-Islamic political groups. Such ideas were supported in 
universities by partisans of various student organisations such as ` jonbesh-e 
daneshjouyan-e mosalman" (the Movement of Muslim Students), who were in fact 
supporters of ` jonbesh-e mosalmanan-e mobarez" (the Movement of Champion 
Muslims). 
In that period there was no parity between universities and the rest of the 
society in terms of the percentage of the population who supported the Islamic 
government. An interview with a witness of the events of that time made clear that 
the first group (Islamist students) had only acquired about twenty per cent of votes in 
a free election for representatives of students in the `University Council' (shora-ye 
daneshgah). In addition, while the Islamist students were engaged in some marginal 
political activities outside the universities, the Marxist and neo-Islamist groups took 
advantage of the universities as the most important bases for anti-regime propaganda 
and the recruitment of new members. 
Such developments were not desirable for the Islamic authorities, their 
supporters in the universities, i. e. the members of `the Islamic Society of Students' 
(anjoman-ha ye eslami-e daneshjouyan) or the masses, therefore the policy of `closing 
universities' for the purposes of `cultural revolution' was adopted. While the Islamist 
students supported the idea of `closing universities', the leftist students were 
absolutely opposed to it. On the other hand, the neo-Islamist students, rejecting the 
closure of universities, instead favoured a `shift' (tahavvol) in the educational system 
of Iran, which should meet national, not capitalist, interests and needs. Despite 
resistance, the evacuation of universities began on April 22nd 1980. The activities of 
all the opposition political groups were terminated, and all universities were formally 
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closed on 5 June 1980 for the purpose of a `cultural revolution' for about three years. 
They were gradually re-opened after changes were made in the principles of university 
management, students' selection and employment of academics, to the benefit of the 
ruling Islamic ideology. 
The shifts which occurred in higher education, in the manner explained above, 
never happened in general education. The necessity of rapid institutional change in 
higher education was urgently identified because of the activities of the political 
opposition, directed by their strong headquarters in the universities. In schools, 
however, there were no headquarters for the opposition and, as a result, no resistance 
to the ruling Islamic authorities. When the universities were closed, a council was 
directly appointed by the Islamic leader of Iran to review the educational system and 
propose the desired changes. This council was called "the Council of the Cultural 
Revolution" and concentrated mainly on Islamisation of the universities. Under the 
leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, the above-mentioned council appointed another 
council to review the elementary and secondary levels of education and recommended 
the required changes. The latter was called "the Council for Fundamental Changes in 
the Educational System". The final proposals of this council were published in the 
spring of 1989. 
Institutional changes in line with the Islamic ideology occurred very smoothly 
in most schools. The most influential revolutionary agency in general education, in 
both Local Education Authorities (LEA) and schools, was `Moral Education' (omur-c 
tarbiati). It caused other offices in educational departments to realign their activities 
with the required Islamic demands. For instance, members would attend `collective 
prayers' (namaz-e jama'at) which had been instituted in state departments after the 
revolution. The Office of `Moral Education' in the LEAs was also in charge of the 
identification of appropriate teachers, among existing teachers of any subject, to send 
to schools. Firstly, they were to teach the curriculum of `Islamic Education' and 
Qur'an; and, secondly, they were to control ideologically the daily affairs of schools. 
According to Mohsenpour (1988: 81), `more than 18,000 committed instructors 
[Moral Teachers] who [we]re duty bound to Islamic principles and teachings 
supervise[d] extracurricular activities to help the students purify themselves morally. ' 
The conduct of `collective prayers' for secondary school pupils was one of 
their duties. In girls' secondary schools, the implementation of sex-segregation 
policies between male teachers and students was another important task for them. 
Furthermore, since the enrolment of supporters for the opposition political groups 
mostly took place among the pupils or students of secondary schools and colleges, 
moral education teachers were expected to identify these supporters in schools and 
advise them to adopt beliefs and values in accordance with Islamic ideology. The 
members of the `Islamic Society of Students', established after the revolution in 
secondary schools, helped `moral teachers' to achieve their moral and ideological 
purposes. 
Because teachers were to play a core role, as the Prophets did, in guiding 
(hedayat) individuals in the post-revolutionary educational policy of Iran, the criteria 
of their selection (gozinesh) had to be of an even higher standard than that of 
universities, in terms of ideology. All pre-revolutionary teacher training colleges, 
`danesh-sara', were immediately dissolved after the revolution. Some other teacher 
training colleges, now called "marakez-e tarbiat-e mo'allem", were later established 
in greater numbers than before and with new criteria of selection. 
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As a result, any shift in the educational system, whether higher education or 
general education, was intended to help youths and children to resocialise culturally 
and politically. Special attention to `moral education' was a very effective policy and 
was employed at all levels of both higher and general education. In general education, 
courses on morality and ethics were added to the official curriculum. Also in higher 
education, students in every field of study had to pass some courses in morality and 
Islamic beliefs when the universities were re-opened. 
In terms of gender policies, Moghissi (1997: 135) believes that women's 
presence in education was reduced, and their functions were restricted to specific jobs, 
like `wifely and motherly roles and their domestic responsibilities' in the rewritten 
textbooks. In Moghissi's view, the institution of annual competitions for reciting the 
Qur'an and of female militia (basij) in schools were other ways of socialising females 
according to Islamic ideology. With regard to higher education, women were also 
banned or restricted from studying some subjects of study in universities and colleges 
by 1985. 
One thing which the Council of the Cultural Revolution was concerned to 
review was the curriculum. The Council divided the areas of study into five sections: 
1) humanities and social sciences; 2) agriculture; 3) engineering and technology; 4) 
medicine; and 5) basic and applied sciences. Not surprisingly, the field which was 
most heavily criticised by the members of the Council and subsequently re-designed 
was that of humanities and social sciences, as it was believed to be the most 
influenced by Western values. Of course, some Islamic courses were also added to 
fields of study in the universities in order to impress Islamic ideology upon students, 
to protect the future of society. 
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Economic Situations 
The economic situation of Iran was weakened by the following factors, which 
occurred either before, during or after the 1979 revolution: strikes at many 
institutions, worker riots, withdrawal of investments by foreign countries, 
nationalisation of private companies, the handing-over of management from 
experienced technocrats to young new employees, and a prolonged war between Iraq 
and Iran. This affected not only the poorly-paid teachers' economic situation, but also 
the situation of all white-collar workers and the average-income middle classes. 
However, as Bahari (1989: 1) says, the number of beggars in the streets had declined 
and, as many revolutionaries believed, the people still enjoyed a better life than they 
had before the Revolution. This happened despite the above factors, in addition to the 
doubling of the pre-revolutionary population, a rise in the rate of unemployment, the 
dramatic decline of oil prices after the Revolution and increasing inflation. This 
shows that the new revolutionary authorities were concerned with the improvement of 
people's living conditions, at least those of the lower classes, but whether they 
succeeded in fulfilling their wishes is another matter. 
In these economic conditions, the life of Iranian teachers gradually worsened 
to such an extent that during the fieldwork conducted by the present author (in 1995- 
6) criticism of their situation had become commonplace. Even the official radio 
station of Iran described the teachers' survival as a miracle (mo'ajezeh) in its satirical 
programmes like `Nightline' (rah-e shab). The teachers themselves agreed with this 
description because their normal expenditure exceeded the salaries they received from 
the LEA. 
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It therefore followed that most teachers, and even other white-collar workers, 
had to supplement their income by moonlighting. This was very noticeable when the 
present author attempted to conduct or continue interviews with teachers out of school 
time. Of course, such moonlighting could not have been confined to the years 1995-6, 
when the present author conducted his fieldwork, and this there had been discussed in 
the literature. According to Simpson, quoted in Bahari (1989: 2): 
`The real victims of the revolution have been the average-income 
middle class: the office-workers and teachers and civil servants. ... a 
single job is often insufficient to provide enough money to cope with 
the naggingly high inflation. I have met teachers who are taxi drivers 
in their spare time, and taxi drivers who double as night porters, and 
night porters who are training as teachers. ' 
According to Bahari (1989), there was still high demand for educated 
employees in the open market. Professionals including teachers, especially in some 
subjects, were likely to be attracted to the market and to have a good chance of selling 
their knowledge in business, agriculture, industry and private institutions rather than 
in state schools. 
Most of these moonlighters usually sought a second job, or more, to meet their 
basic needs in the face of rising living costs, or financial security against the costs of 
both unpredictable events, like serious illnesses and funerals, and predictable issues, 
like studying expenses and wedding costs of a member of family. Employers were 
normally expected not to encourage moonlighting among their employees, to the 
extent that some managers even may forbade working outside their institution. This 
was because moonlighting was seen to cause `higher absenteeism, less enthusiasm for 
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the primary job, increased fatigue and reduced productivity' (Bahari 1989: 3). 
Nevertheless, Bahari (1989: 2-4) remarks that the Iranian educational authorities paid 
little attention towards the increasing number of moonlighting teachers in Iran. 
New Philosophy of Education 
Before we can understand the goals of education in the Islamic Republic of Iran, it is 
necessary to consider its new philosophy of education. The philosophy of education 
tries to answer the following basic questions: `what is the nature of the human being, 
and who are we aiming to educate? Where does the perfection of human beings lie? 
What is the identity and nature of the society in which education is pursued? Which 
value is the highest? How do we make a better life? And what is the end of a good 
life? '2 (Taghi-Pour Zahir 1991: 111) 
Despite the existence of many beliefs concerning the purity or impurity of the 
human soul by many religions and scholars, Islam maintains the duality of human 
nature. In this view, human beings contain both spiritual and material aspects. In the 
Qur'anic language, the spiritual aspect is called `nafs-e lavvameh', which aims toward 
truth, beauty, justice, perfection, benevolence and so on, and which makes it possible 
for human beings to reach the highest possible state. The other part of humans, 
according to the Qur'an, is titled `nafs-e ammareh', which tends towards immorality, 
performance of a crime or sin, baseness and so on, and which pushes humans to fall to 
the lowest place imaginable. Such a classification of the soul is reflected in the 
Persian mystic literature, expressed by famous poets like Rumi, Hafiz and Sa'di; and 
even in Islamic philosophy, as explained by Avicenna and Sohravardi. 
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The presence of `will' (eradeh) in human nature, according to the Islamic 
interpretation, enables humans to select either the way of `lavvameh' or `ammareh'. 
The significance of education in guiding humans towards goodness and away from 
badness now becomes clear. Ali Shari'atmadari, a member of `the Council of 
Cultural Revolution' and a famous theorist of post-revolutionary educational policies, 
remarked, according to Mehran (1990: 55): `Muslims believe that the presence or 
lack of education can make a difference in the choice of humans, since it is through 
the acquisition of knowledge that they are made aware of the freedom and 
responsibility of choice'. Therefore only correct and timely education is able to 
discover the potential of individuals and direct their abilities towards freedom, away 
from the low, materialistic, and tempting carnal desires, and, as a result, to attain the 
unity of lover, loved, and love "ettehad-e ashegh, mashough, va eshgh" (see Mehran 
1988: 320-3). 
On the other hand, any change in a society can only follow shifts in the 
individuals' souls, according to the existing interpretation of Islam. The supporters of 
such a theory derive it from the Qur'anic verse: `Truly God will not change a 
people's lot until they change what is in their souls' (13: 11). The individual 
members of society should take on the responsibility of changing their society by 
changing their beliefs and ideas. In other words, `building oneself lies at the core of 
any attempt to reconstruct a new society and establish a new moral order', as 
Ayatollah Khomeini advised the nation (Mehran 1990: 56). Describing the nature of 
`society', the Islamic intellectual, Ayatollah Taleqani also remarked: 
`... [S]ociety is nothing but a composite of individuals and it is the 
spiritual and moral qualities of individuals that determine or change 
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social goals. ... As the character of 
individuals' thoughts and spirits 
change, social relations and the character of society change 
correspondingly ... ' (See Mehran 1988: 3) 
Given these ideas about the nature of `human beings' and `society', it is now 
understandable why the Islamic Republic of Iran paid special attention to education 
and schooling as ways to change the future structure of society, by re-shaping 
individuals in accordance with the new value system. 
The post-revolutionary authorities took advantage of the Iranian students' 
alienation from the earlier regime and attempted to build an educational system which 
could produce students who believed and trusted the Islamic government and who 
believed that, unlike in the previous regime, the Islamic authorities were from the 
people and the servers (khedmat-gozar) of them. They suggested that since the 
Islamic ideology had its roots in the people's culture, an educational system which 
contained Islamic values and ideology would really meet the people's needs. 
Revolution in Values 
In contrast to the Pahlavi's emphasis on the ancient civilisation of Iran, the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 produced the maxim `our revolution is an ideological revolution, a 
revolution in values', like many other revolutions (see Wallace 1956). This was 
reflected in the decision to replace the sign of `a lion with a sword in his hand and a 
crown backed by a rising sun' with the word `Allah', on the national emblem (see 
Mohsenpour 1988). Ba-honar, the Education Minister and then the Prime Minister in 
the early years of the revolution, described the movement of 1979 as: `A revolution in 
the cultural, intellectual and social essence of this nation, and its value system. It is 
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not a change of the political system alone... the cultural pattern of the nation has 
changed' (see Mehran 1990: 53). For this reason the Islamic Revolution of 1979, as 
an `ideological revolution' or `a revolution in values', paid special attention to 
training and teaching young people according to religious values in both higher and 
general education, changing textbooks, curriculum, administration, and institutions. 
Moreover, pre-revolutionary school names, which were thought to serve the Pahlavi's 
interests, were changed to those of traditional and modem religious personalities 
favoured by the ruling Islamic ideology. 
Moreover, since the Iranian Revolution was a Third-World revolution in 
nature, it was inclined to cut the roots of political, economic and cultural dependence 
and foreign domination. In order to study the schooling system of Iran after the 
revolution, one should therefore examine the effects of the fact that the revolution was 
4a revolution in values' and a Third-World revolution in the educational-value system. 
In other words, the main aim of the Islamic Republic of Iran as regards schooling was 
to produce young people who, firstly, recognise their Islamic identity, and, secondly, 
who oppose the interference and control of foreigners over domestic issues. These 
two aims, according to Mehran (1990: 54), played a significant role in formulating 
the educational principles of post-revolutionary Iran. 
Purification and Commitment 
The basic principles of Islamic education call for `purification' and `commitment' as 
responses to questions about the nature of human beings. Purification (tazkieh), 
defined as the cleansing of the soul, has been taken into consideration in the 
educational system of Iran because of the religious nature of the revolution and the 
119 
necessity of creating a new moral order to replace the old values, after 1979. The 
term `purification', apart from the moral and traditional meaning of cleansing which 
covers individuals' private and personal lives, was also used in a political context to 
mean the purging (tasfieh) of unwanted `counter-revolutionaries' from state 
organisations. Both forms of purification, tazkieh and lasfieh, have been stressed in 
the post-revolutionary education of Iran. 
Purification of the soul (tazkieh) has been taught in different ways in schools: 
by the attempt to appoint pious teachers, in all subjects and administrators, to impart 
their experience to students and pupils in classrooms; the publication of Qur'anic 
verses or Persian mystic literature which call for purification in textbooks; printing or 
hanging papers which quote pious quotations from famous religious personalities on 
the walls of schools; the establishment of jama'at prayers in schools and the attempt 
to take students to the Friday prayers and so on. The content of education has 
similarly been purified in order to represent the ideology of the new government 
instead of the previous one. And the educational institutions were purified and 
cleansed of the administrators, teachers and students marked as `counter- 
revolutionaries', `agents of foreigners and imperialism' and `enemies of Islam'. 
Inspired by the Qur'an, therefore, Ayatollah Khomeini announced: `training and 
purification is prior to instruction' (Tarbiyat va tazkiyeh mogaddam bar ta'lim ast)'. 
This statement was written on walls in almost all streets of cities and towns as a post- 
revolutionary educational principle. 
By the ideological interpretation of some religious texts, the term 
`commitment' (ta'ahhod) also entered the post-revolutionary literature. According to 
this interpretation, every Muslim should care of, and take responsibility for, not only 
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his or her own religiosity, but also his or her Muslim brothers and sisters. By making 
no distinction between religion and politics, the authorities gradually began to use the 
term `commitment' to describe the people who were loyal to the ruling Islamic 
ideology. `Commitment' was further popularised, when the authorities used it in 
Islamising the universities (eslami kardan-e daneshgah-ha). 
In the eyes of the religious leaders, both commitment and expertise were 
necessary for cultivating Islamic education. In Ayatollah Khomeini's terms, they 
were `two wings without one of which flying would be impossible' (Mehran 1990: 
56). However, if someone were to ask them which one is more useful for the society, 
they would undoubtedly prefer the committed individual who is faithful to the 
revolution. It was reasoned that `commitment' might be able to bring about 
`expertise', but `expertise' could not produce `commitment'. In Ayatollah 
Khomeini's view, education without commitment is what the majority of educated 
people enjoyed during the Shah's reign, but this educational order could not bring 
about `committed individuals, people concerned with the welfare of their country and 
prepared to overlook their narrow personal interests' (see Mehran 1990: 55). 
In an interview with Mehran (1990: 57), Gholam-ali Haddad Adel sees the 
greatest difference between the present education system in Iran and other educational 
systems in two features: `religious commitment and emphasis on abiding by Islamic 
principles'. For the Islamic Republic, therefore, only a committed and doctrinaire 
expert (motakhasses-e maktabi) is desirable, not just any expert. Mehran (1990: 56) 
adds that the model citizen of the Islamic Republic should actually possess three 
qualities of expertise (takhassos), commitment (ta'ahhod) and true piety (mazhab). In 
Mehran's view, the Islamic Revolution of Iran is similar in this respect to the Cultural 
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Revolution of China where expertise and specialisation came after `redness', devotion 
to Maoism and support of the Chinese Revolution. 
Educational Goals of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
In 1971, the objectives of the Iranian educational system, which were summarised for 
the Paris bureau by the Iranian Commission for UNESCO, were divided into six 
elements: social, economic, political, cultural, health and ethical. The post- 
revolutionary educational goals, which were inspired by the new philosophy of 
education and announced by the Ministry of Education in 1983, were divided into five 
categories of. the spiritual, cultural-scientific, social, political and economic. 
According to Haddad Adel, the ultimate goal of the post-revolutionary 
educational system `has been the transformation of the schooling system from a 
secular, material and dependent state during the Shah's regime to a religious and self- 
reliant one. Creating true Muslims whose expertise will lead the country to 
independence and wipe the shameful stain of ignorance and backwardness from the 
Islamic nation' (Mehran 1990: 58). This is completely different from the pre- 
revolutionary educational system, the main aim of which, according to Iran's Ministry 
of Education, was: `preparing the individual for a desirable personal and social life' 
by paying attention to `particular needs of the youngsters and the adolescents in the 
different stages of their development and by considering their educational and 
occupational objectives' (Mehran 1990: 58). However, the present Iranian 
educational authorities claim that they also consider the personal educational needs, 
interests, and capacities of the pupils which are needed for national development. 
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A comparison of the stated educational goals between before and after 1979 
indicates that while both educational systems are involved in having political and 
ideological direction and in keeping the youth loyal to the ruling power, there is a 
marked difference between them in terms of the nature and the extent of ideology. 
Given the open announcement by the Islamic government of the political state of 
education, it should not be overlooked that schooling during the former regime had 
also been both political and ideological (Nafisi 1992; Siavoshi 1995), although this 
could never be said in public. 
Following Mohsenpour (1988: 85-6) the educational goals of the Islamic 
Republic, approved by the High Council of Education, can be summarised as follows: 
`1. The ideals of education in the Islamic Republic of Iran should 
strengthen the beliefs of students with respect to (a) oneness with god; 
(b) prophethood and revelation; (c) resurrection and its constructive 
role in the journey of human beings toward God; (d) justice of God; (e) 
Imamate and the leadership of the pure Imams; and (f) the dignity of 
humanity, its superior role, its freedom, and its responsibility before 
God. 
2. Spiritual goal include (a) explaining the principles and the decrees 
of Islam; (b) fostering the moral development of children based on 
belief in God and virtue; and (c) strengthening the spirit of 
investigation and innovation in the fields of science, technology, 
culture, and Islamic affairs. 
3. Scientific and cultural goals include (a) helping students discover 
the mysteries of the cosmos; (b) discovering the cause-and-effect 
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relations of natural phenomena for the purpose of accumulation of 
knowledge and technology as well as for utilisation of the knowledge 
and the experiences of human beings; (c) maintaining continuous 
development of schools and technology in the fields of agriculture, 
industry, and military affairs; (d) training committed and skilful 
manpower for all aspects of the development of the country; (e) 
making students familiar with Islamic teachings; (/) nurturing the 
artistic aptitudes as well as the aesthetic abilities of the students; (g) 
teaching the Persian language and scripts as well as the Arabic 
language to familiarise students with the Koran and Islamic 
instructions; and (h) creating a feeling of participation in a continuous 
teaching and learning process. 
4. Social goals include (a) protecting the sacredness of family relations 
based on the Islamic faith; (b) extending and strengthening Islamic 
brotherhood and co-operation as well as strengthening national unity; 
(c) ensuring the existence of social, economic, and cultural justice; (d) 
building respect for the law; and (e) making people aware of the 
importance and the value of education and its goals; () cultivating the 
spirit of charity and `commanding the good and forbidding the evil' as 
a collective duty and mutual responsibility. ' 
5. Political goals include (a) accepting the absolute rule of God over 
the world and human beings; (b)uniting all Muslim nations; (c) 
struggling against any kind of tyranny and domination and securing 
political independence; (d) strengthening the nation's defence capacity 
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through military training in educational institutions for the purpose of 
ensuring the independence of the Islamic Republic of Iran; and (e) 
giving careful consideration to physical education. 
6. Economic goals include (a) training students to participate in 
agriculture, industrial production, and husbandry to lead the country 
toward self-sufficiency; (b) creating a spirit of content and avoiding 
lavish practices in all aspects of the economy; (c) creating a spirit of 
respect for legal ownership; and (cl) observing the principle of hygiene 
and protection of the environment as a public duty. ' 
All shifts in curriculum, textbooks, administration, social relationships, 
gender policies, and so on must be understood in the context of these goals. Changes 
in the curriculum, textbooks and gender relations are worthy of special attention. 
Curriculum and Textbooks 
In Iran, state-produced textbooks have played major roles in the teaching of the 
curriculum at all educational levels both before and after the revolution (see Nafisi 
1992; Siavoshi 1995; Mohsenpour 1988). Given the importance attached to education 
by the Islamic authorities and the crucial significance of textbooks in educational 
policies, most activities in the first year of the Revolution concentrated on revising the 
textbooks provided by the Pahlavis. However, the textbooks are still revised almost 
every year. Although educational officials claim that all curricula and textbooks were 
basically revised after the revolution, some research suggests that only forty per cent 
of elementary schools' textbooks' content and just ten per cent of the content of all 
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general education textbooks' are different from the pre-revolutionary textbooks 
(Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffri 1994: 36). Since most of these changes have affected the 
subjects of religion, literature and the social sciences (in general, humanities), rather 
than mathematics and science, it can be assumed that the changes are mostly in the 
inclusion of Islamic ideology in the curriculum, to meet the new educational 
philosophy and goals. 
The great significance of Islamic ideology becomes clearer still when Haddad 
Adel (1997) explains the Arabs' changing status in Iranian curricula and textbooks 
during both pre- and post-revolutionary periods. In his paper, Haddad Adel 
distinguishes the principles ruling post-revolutionary textbooks from those before the 
revolution. However, all the textbooks and curricula were state-provided during both 
regimes. It is worth remembering that Haddad Adel has been a Deputy Minister of 
Education and has been effectively involved in editing school textbooks and shifting 
the curriculum since the first years of the revolution. He describes the major 
characteristics of pre-revolutionary textbooks as follows: 
'I) Priority of Iranian nationality over Islamic religiosity in defining 
the identity of the Iranian nation past and present. 
2) Putting extraordinary significance on pre-Islamic Iran (the ancient 
Iran) and praising its culture and ideals without citing its political and 
social corruption. 
3) Description of the Arab conquest of Iran as the invasion by a 
barbaric and savage nation of a great civilisation, and the introduction 
of Arabs as being responsible for the backwardness of both ancient and 
present-day Iran. 
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4) Total neglect of the Muslim and, as a result, Arab world. 
5) Unquestioning imitation of the West, especially the US, concerning 
the issue of Arabs and Israel. 
6) Depiction of the attempt to introduce "Shi'ism" as an Iranian 
reaction against the Arabs' invasion of Iran. ' 
In contrast to the pre-revolutionary educational principles for textbooks, 
Haddad Adel summarises the principles approved by the Islamic government since 
1979 as follows: 
`1) Avoidance of contradiction between `Iranian nationality' and 
`Islamic religiosity', taking Islam into account as not just one of the 
bases, but as the fundamental base (rokn-e rakin), of `Iranian 
nationality'; and maintaining compatibility between the foundation of 
Islam and other national foundations such as language and customs of 
the national tradition. 
2) Avoiding too much praise of ancient Iran, but encouraging the 
critical investigation of social and political events which occurred in 
pre-Islamic Iran. 
3) Giving the reasons for the collapse of the Sassanid's governments as 
the results of the weakness of the government; the faith power of 
recently converted Arabs to Islam; the truth-seeking of Iranians and 
their unhappiness with the Sassanid's dynasty. 
4) The introduction of Iranian society into the great family of the 
`Islamic nation' (ummat-e e. slami), another member of which is Arabic 
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society; and paying special attention to this member (Arabic society) 
because of its geographic proximity to Iran. 
5) Adoption of an Islamic and independent political position on the 
issue of Arabs and Israel; defence of Palestinian ideals and definite 
opposition to the political policies of Western states, especially 
America, in this regard. ' 
Inspired by the above-mentioned principles, Iranian post-revolutionary 
textbooks, according to Haddad Adel (1997), had the following ideological character 
in terms of nationalism, Islamism, and Arabism: 
a) Iran is identified as `Islamic Iran' (itan-e eslami) in the textbooks, through 
which various manifestations of belief in Islam, in both past and present-day Iran, are 
presented to students in various forms. 
b) Ancient Iran is no longer described as the lost paradise of Iranians, in 
textbooks. Although some positive aspects of the pre-Islamic Iran are implied, its 
social, intellectual and moral corruption are emphasised. 
c) `Kingship' (shahanshahi) is no longer seen as a gift from heaven, totally 
innocent, but is introduced in textbooks as the major factor for the Iranian nation's 
misfortune and disasters both past and present because of its essentially dictatorial 
nature. Instead, the role of both Islam in the promotion of Iranian society and Iranians 
in the flowering of Islamic culture and civilisation is emphasised in the textbooks. 
d) In the textbooks, the Iranian nation (mellat-e iran) is introduced as a 
member of the Islamic community of nations (ummal-e islam. There is no more 
ethnic exclusivism or chauvinist thought in the curriculum, attributed to the Qur'anic 
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verses of `enna akramakom endallah atgakom' (... surely the most honourable of you 
with Allah is the one among you most careful [of his duty] ... ) (49: 13) and 
4ennama'1 mo'amenoon-a ekhvah' (The believers are but brethren,. .. 
) (49: 10). 
That is, all Muslims are seen as the same as each other and brothers with each other, 
according to Haddad Adel. Therefore, solidarity of all Muslims is considered in all 
curricula as a basic principle. 
More and better views of Arabs are presented in the textbooks. Despite the 
eight-year war imposed on Iran by Iraq, as an Arab country, and despite many Arab 
countries' support of Iraq, Arabs are not accused as the originators of such a war in 
the textbooks. Moreover, Arabs are not mentioned as the responsible and guilty 
people, even in lessons which explain Bloody Friday, during which many Iranian 
pilgrims were killed in Mecca. According to Haddad Adel, this is because the Islamic 
Republic is not concerned with creating hatred and divisions between Iranians and 
Arabs. 
More significantly, `Arabic Literature' has entered all post-primary curricula 
in any subject of study up to higher education. The curriculum of `Arabic Literature', 
for Haddad Adel, is important in terms of Iran-Arab relations for two reasons: firstly, 
it paves the way for the possibility of future Iranian generations to have a dialogue 
with the Arab world; secondly, since the course contains some modern and traditional 
Arabic literature, Iranians will become culturally familiar with Arabic treasures of 
literature. 
e) As the most important change concerning Arabs in the post-revolutionary 
curriculum, in comparison with the pre-revolutionary period, Haddad Adel chooses 
courses related to the `Holy Land' (Palestine) and the issue of Arab-Israel relations. 
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At all educational levels and in many textbooks (particularly those of `Persian 
Literature', `Religious Education', `History', and `Arabic Literature'), various courses 
have been included about Zionism; the occupation of Palestine; the tragic fate of the 
Palestinians and more recently the people of Lebanon and Arab or Muslim nations 
overcoming their occupiers. 
J) In the post-revolutionary textbooks, "Shi'ism" is not introduced as an 
Iranian reaction against the Arabs' invasion. Rather, according to Haddad Adel, 
Shi'ism is shown to have different origins from those assumed by the 
nationalists. Finally, to the question of why Arabs became so important in the post- 
revolutionary Iranian national curriculum, Haddad Adel (1997) responds: 
`... Islam is the principal motive for considering Arabs in the 
textbooks. The relations between Islam as well as the Qur'an and the 
Arabic language, the birth and growth of Islam in Arabic lands, and the 
mixture of the early history of Islam with the history and geography of 
Arab lands have caused Arabs to have a ... considerable presence 
in 
textbooks.... It can be guessed that Iranian presence in the Arabic 
countries' textbooks would be less than Arabs' presence in the Iranian 
textbooks. This is because if Islam has caused Iranians to pay attention 
to Arabs, there is no such necessity for Arabs in relation to Iranians... ' 
This influence of Islamic ideology is so strong that Iraq's role in all the 
disastrous events of the eight-year war and the war's later problems for Iran are 
completely ignored in the curriculum, simply because Iraq is an Arab country. In 
other words, since Arabia was the cradle of Islam, the original roles of Saddam 
Hossein and other Arab leaders in the creation and continuity of the eight-year war are 
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implicitly suppressed for the sake of highlighting Islamic solidarity between Arabs 
and Iranians, according to Haddad Adel (see category "d'). 
Women's Education 
Along with the alteration of curriculum and textbooks, the new educational authorities 
initiated two other educational shifts which were both related to the views of the 
Islamic government on gender: conversion of mixed-sex schools to single-sex ones, 
and the introduction of an Islamic dress code for girls in schools. These two actions 
led to the assumption that the educational policies concerning gender would affect 
women's equal right of enjoying education in terms of both quality and quantity, 
especially in rural areas and in some particular subjects like mathematics and science. 
Research has been conducted to determine the impact of the above gender 
regulations on women's education. Such research has mostly studied women's 
education in terms of women's access to general education, higher education, literacy, 
and the educational content of the curriculum and textbooks. Yet, in order to 
understand the impact of sex-segregation on women's education, much more 
information is required. This is because educational issues are not just restricted to 
the above-mentioned categories. 
Iranian women undoubtedly participate in schooling, and their rights of 
enrolment in education are acknowledged by the Islamic government authorities. Yet, 
their equal access to schooling is a matter for debate, as in many other countries. 
Historically, both traditional and modern educational institutions had been either 
established exclusively for males or at least highly male-dominated. Female 
schooling had always followed males' education. Nonetheless, there has been 
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dramatic progress in Iran on women's enrolment in education in the last few decades, 
beginning in the Pahlavi period, although the number still lags behind men's 
enrolment to some extent. Such progress is illustrated in Table 2 by comparing the 
percentages of women's enrolment in the educational years of 1976-7,1986-7 and 
1996-7: 5 
Table 2: Female Proportion of Total School Enrolment 
1976-7 1986-7 1996-7 
Schooling Total 
Enrolment 
Percentage 
Female 
Total 
Enrolment 
Percentage 
Female 
Total 
Enrolment 
Percentage 
Female 
Elementary 4,768,588 38 7,232,820 44 9,238,393 47 
Middle 
(Guidance) 
1,377,690 36 2,299,510 39 5,188,812 45 
High 
School 
979,182 36 1,292,013 40 3,589,332 48 
According to the above Table, the gap between males and females enrolling at 
the secondary level has narrowed in post-revolutionary schooling, particularly in 
1996. Decreases in the gap between boys' and girls' enrolment could partly be a 
result of the declining rate of males, of each age group, enrolling in school. 
Comparing 1976 and 19866, according to Aghajanian (1994: 47), although the 
percentage of both boys' and girls' enrolment from each age group increased in both 
elementary and middle schools, it decreased in high school. However, the rate of 
decrease was not the same for boys and girls. While the difference (between 1976 and 
1986) for boys was 7.3 per cent (from 47.5 to 40.2), it was just 1.2 per cent (from 25.8 
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to 24.6) for girls. Nevertheless, according to Aghajanian (1994: 47), the increase in 
girls' enrolment from each age group in both elementary (from 41.7 to 61.5) and 
middle schools (from 23.4 to 35.7) was considerable in rural areas, between 1976 and 
1986. 
The assumption that female education was welcomed by families and the state 
will be further reinforced if one considers the following data on literacy programmes. 
According to Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari (1994: 26) the literacy rate for rural women 
doubled between 1976 and 1986. This is because `the majority of the literacy classes 
and the majority of the students have been in rural areas, reflecting both the higher 
rates of rural illiteracy and "the priority given to villagers in the allocation of 
resources in post-revolutionary Iran. "' (Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari 1994: 33-6) 
Nonetheless, sex-segregation becomes more evident at high school level, from 
which specialisation in education starts. Students are channelled at this level, into the 
subjects of study which determine their future roles in the society according to their 
sexes. Although girls form more than half (54 per cent and 52 per cent respectively in 
1986 and 1990 compared with 32 per cent in 1976) of all students enrolled in business 
studies in vocational schools, their enrolment has been practically suspended in the 
agricultural and technical subjects. Women's enrolment in agriculture declined from 
5 per cent in 1976 to zero in 1986 and 1990. In technical subjects, women's 
enrolment fell from 2 per cent in 1976 to 0.07 and 0.5 in 1986 and 1990 (See Higgins 
and Shoar-Ghaffari 1994: 23). 
With regard to high school, although the female proportion of enrolment is 
unfortunately unavailable, the proportion of female graduates illustrates their 
acceptance in high schools. However, the proportion of enrolment would definitely 
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be more than that of graduates for females in comparison with males. This is because 
it is more likely for females than males, particularly in rural areas, to leave school 
because of marriage. It may be worthwhile to mention that the majority of students, 
especially girls, in the Old System of Education (1969-92) were involved in academic 
schools rather than vocational. According to Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari (1994: 30), 
for example, 86 per cent of all high school students (and 93 per cent of girl high 
schools students) enrolled in academic schools. 
Unlike in pre-revolutionary academic schools, all fields of study have been 
appropriate for both of sexes in post-revolutionary schools. This is because the pre- 
revolutionary subject of `Homeworking', which was restricted to females, was 
surprisingly eliminated after the Revolution, and another subject, called `Economics 
and Social Sciences' was added instead for males and females. 
Comparing the graduates from each of the academic areas between 1975-6 and 
1989-90 (see Table 3 on next page), although the proportion of female graduates in 
natural science and mathematics has fallen, their proportion has risen in all academic 
fields compared with the opposite sex. In other words, not only has the gap between 
male and female graduates narrowed between 1975-6 and 1989-90, the proportion of 
women has gone beyond their proportion in the population in the two fields of natural 
science (56 per cent) and humanities (50 per cent). Women constitute 49 per cent of 
the population of Iran. 
Although female enrolment in general education has increased in post- 
revolutionary schooling, particularly in rural areas, and although both males and 
females still enjoy the same formal curriculum, they actually learn different things in 
terms of educational content. Pupils and students from different sexes are not 
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supposed to be the same biologically, as they are in many other countries. According 
to the modem understanding of Islam, although both males and females are human 
beings, they are two different sorts of human beings, each of which has different 
biological, psychological, behavioural and, as a result, social characters (see 
Motahhari 1974). Thus they play different roles in both family and society, to some 
extent. Such a belief in the existence of an organic distinction between men and 
women affects the educational policies implemented, particularly when accompanied 
with another popular idea that sexual instinct, in the absence of regulation, would 
jeopardise all social institutions. However, sexual instinct is thought to be useful if 
under control. Educational policies for women would be tightened further, 
particularly at the secondary level, if it was established that women play a major role 
in arousing men's sexual desire (see Afshar 1987 and 1989). 
Such an ideology affected educational content in the forms of female presence 
in the textbooks; change in dress and in the portrayal of sex-segregation in both 
textbooks and public settings; division of labour for different sexes in the textbooks 
and so on. Of course, the most dramatic change after the revolution occurred in 
women's dress, in textbooks and public settings. In spite of the Pahlavi's sex- 
integrated policies and interest in increasing women's presence in public affairs, the 
pre-revolutionary curriculum and textbooks were sex-segregated. According to 
Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari (1994: 38), women had mainly been shown as mothers, 
housewives, and teachers in pre-revolutionary textbooks. Comparing the pre- and 
post-revolutionary curriculum, there is little difference between them in terms of the 
proportion of female characters pictured in the textbooks, and that of the depiction of 
tasks accomplished by women as home-workers (about half of all characters in both 
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eras), teachers and farmers. However, according to Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari, the 
percentage of women portrayed performing any kind of work declined from 23 to 17 
in post-revolutionary textbooks. 
Consequently, women's access to education has increased greatly at 
elementary and middle (Guidance) levels throughout Iran, although it still lags behind 
males. At the high school level, although the gap between women and men has 
declined considerably, and although the proportion of women attending school has 
increased, the numbers of both males and females from the high school age group 
enrolled in school have declined. However, this has happened more for males than for 
females, particularly in rural areas. To determine the causes of the general fall in 
high-school enrolment rates, more research is needed. 
In brief, sex-segregation in schooling does not necessarily lead to the reduction 
of women's access to education; in fact, it may greatly increase their enrolment at 
school in a society in which families would not welcome mixed-sex institutions and 
where sex-segregation in public is common. This is even more significant when one 
considers that the number of coeducational schools was so small during the Shah's era 
that women's educational rights were often denied. Thus, policies of education 
regarding gender after the Revolution are a more realistic portrait of Iranian society 
than those prior to the Revolution. 
Conclusion 
It is widely assumed that the institution of education is one of the most important 
factors propelling societies towards modernisation and economic development. There 
is clear evidence that this was indeed the case in Iran under the last Shah's regime. It 
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is also true that Iranian governments since 1979 have sought ways of modernising and 
developing the economic resources of the country, but the policies governing Iran's 
trajectory have differed sharply from those operating in most other countries in 
respect of their religious and moral character. Moreover, education has been used as a 
`vehicle', to borrow one of Max Weber's favourite images, for bringing Islamic 
values to bear on the creation and shaping of young people's thinking about the 
country's future. Changes in the philosophy of education and curricula in schools 
since 1979 demonstrate the extent to which attempts have been made to influence the 
processes of modernisation and development in Iran in accordance with a distinctive 
set of Shi'ite principles. The next four chapters will analyse the evidence of these 
changes in schools in one area of rural Iran. 
ENDNOTES 
'A religious liberal who had been the first Chancellor of the University of Tehran. 
2 This text has been quoted from a formal textbook for the students of `Teachers Training 
Colleges', called `usul va nrabani-e amuzesh va parvaresh' (The Principles of Education), 
published by the Ministry of Higher Education. 
' The single term `education' in the English language is composed of two parts in Persian: 
ta'lim va tarbiat or amuzesh vu parvaresh, `referring to the training of the mind as well as 
the education of character and development of personality' (Mehran 1990: 57). 
° (J) is missing from Mohsenpour (1988), so it has been quoted from Mehran (1990: 60). 
5 The source for 1976-7 and 1986-7 is Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari (1994: 23); and the 
source for 1996-7 is Islamic Republic of Iran (1998). 
6 Some further information is needed regarding school enrolment rate of boys and girls by 
age and sex in 1996. 
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Chapter Six 
CURRICULUM AND TEXTBOOKS: THE ISLAMIC FACTOR 
This is an appropriate point to recall the bearing of Max Weber's broadly 
methodological and philosophical perspectives on the design of this thesis. As was 
argued in Chapter One, the main aim is to explore the influence of ideas and values on 
the development of social structures and processes. To use Weber's own imagery, 
these ideational factors operate like `switchmen' in so far as they can change the 
direction of historical forces -- including material forces. But there is no implication 
of necessity in Weber's argument. Rather, he tended to emphasise the probabilistic 
nature of social arrangements and social change. Likewise, the main philosophical 
assumption underlying this thesis is that sociological analysis can do no more than try 
to establish the degree to which certain events and social structures appear to be 
probable in the light of known factors. Again following Weber's example, this thesis 
places heavy importance on the contribution of ideas and values towards the 
probability that the Islamic revolution of 1979 would establish an educational system 
in Iran that would be significantly different from its predecessors. At the same time, 
Weber's fascination with the unintended consequences of attempts to implement 
particular ideas and values helps to reduce the risk of teleological explanation. 
Indeed, the following Chapters will draw attention to some of the ironic outcomes of 
schemes designed to translate ideas into educational practice. 
Weber's practice of isolating one or more factors in a one-sided fashion is not, 
of course, without its problems. It can give a distorted or unrealistically simplified 
picture of complex situations. There is no guarantee that the isolated factors exercise 
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in themselves the most significant influence on events. Nor is it easy to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the isolated factors really are responsible for the effects 
attributed to them. Nevertheless, Weber's ideal-type method can be defended on 
several grounds. Firstly, the method is intended to facilitate comparisons between, for 
example, different religious ideologies or between different types of authority. 
Consequently, it may be justified to make abstractions from complex realities in order 
to distil the most significant factors. Secondly, exaggeration of the importance 
claimed for certain factors may be justified if it helps to correct previous 
misunderstandings. The locus classicus was Weber's claim that he deliberately 
exaggerated the contribution of `the Protestant ethic' towards `the spirit of capitalism' 
in order to balance the tendency of some economic historians, especially Marxists, to 
understand capitalism in exclusively materialist terms. Thirdly, the one-sided 
exaggeration of particular factors can be defended if it forms part of a quasi- 
experimental method -- a `thought experiment' in Weber's terms. This means that 
ideal-type formulations do not claim to reveal the entire truth but only to show what 
can be learned from rigorously examining social phenomena from one particular point 
of view. This thesis does not use the ideal-type methods for purposes of comparison 
but it does place one-sided emphasis on Islamic ideology partly in order to counteract 
excessively political or economic interpretations of the Islamic revolution of 1979 and 
partly in order to conduct a kind of thought experiment to discover the specificity of 
purely religious influences on social life. 
The focus of this Chapter will be on the changes that have occurred in school 
curricula since 1979. The dominant theme running through the Chapter will be the 
ideological pressure to make curricula conform with the new philosophy of education 
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analysed in Chapter Five. Before this theme can be analysed, however, it is necessary 
to give an account of the research methods employed in the collection of information 
about Iranian schools. 
Research methods 
Most of the information on which the following analysis of curricular changes and 
gendered social relations is based was collected during two, three month periods of 
intensive fieldwork in a rural area of North Western Iran based on an ethnographic 
study of religion and everyday life. Inspired by the relevant research literature 
(Atkinson 1990; Burgess 1982; Gilbert 1993; Hammersley 1992,1990; Hammersley 
& Atkinson 1983; and Hobbs & May 1993), 1 watched what happened, listened to 
what was said, asked questions, and in fact collected any data relevant to 
understanding the education issues with which people were concerned in so far as they 
had been affected by religion. Although I used ethnographic methods in order to 
capture the meaning of everyday human activities and adequately understand social 
processes, I also drew upon questionnaires, interviews, life histories, and documents 
about the changes that had occurred over the previous twenty years. The first period 
of fieldwork took place during the autumn of 1995, and the second period in the 
spring of 1996, making a total of six months. 
Both periods of fieldwork were conducted in a small town called formally 
`Firuraq' and in the local dialect `Perah' in the North West of the country. `Perah' is 
an ethnically and religiously homogeneous town of about 10,000 inhabitants in West 
Azarbaijan Province. During the first period, I applied the methods of participant 
observation, life histories, questionnaires and analysis of documentary sources 
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relating to the New System of Education. However, I mostly concentrated on 
participant observation, including occasionally even working in schools as a teacher. 
The town included eight schools in total, all of which, with the exception of one 
primary school for boys, were observed by me. Therefore, during the first period I 
conducted my research at two high schools (one for boys and one for girls), three 
secondary schools (two for boys and one for girls) and two primary schools (one for 
boys and one for girls) as well as a vocational school in the neighbouring city of 
`Khoy', where some students from rural areas, including `Perah', were studying. 
Furthermore, I administered questionnaires about both `in-service' and `initial 
teacher' training programmes to 93 (67 male and 26 female) teachers, head teachers 
and administrators in all seven of the schools that I studied in the town. In addition, I 
interviewed ten other teachers from schools in neighbouring towns. 
During the second period of fieldwork, I made further use of participant 
observation and life history methods as well as interviews. In addition, I collected 
documentary evidence and as many official statistics as possible. However, I 
concentrated mostly on interviews with teachers in the two high schools for boys and 
girls, a vocational school for boys, as well as with officials in the Local Education 
Authority (LEA) and head teachers. All teachers in the above schools, except one 
female teacher, head teachers and required officials of the LEA co-operated with me, 
so that I interviewed forty-five persons in total. I also administered four sorts of 
questionnaires, each with 167 questions, to about thirty teachers, head teachers and 
instructors. In the light of the first fieldwork experiences, three areas for investigation 
were selected for special attention in the second period. Each of them related to 
ideological and institutional changes following the Iranian Revolution of 1979: 
142 
i) gendering of the curriculum (relating mainly to textbooks, timetabling, study 
conditions, discipline, assessment and access to resources) 
ii) teachers' conditions of work (training and qualifications, job security, 
authority relations, relations with parents and clergy, casualisation, pensions, 
morale, etc. ) 
iii) a new system of vocational education (teachers' attitudes, ideological 
justification, resourcing, records of achievement, training, etc. ) 
Although the project was successfully conducted, and the information that I 
required was obtained, it met with numerous difficulties even in the early stages. My 
sponsor's decision to place a limit of three months on each period of fieldwork was 
the root of such problems. This is understandable in the light of the Iranian 
government policy to discourage students from conducting any social science research 
on Iran. However, my project was eventually approved by the Scientific Advisor to 
Iranian students in the Iranian Embassy in London. It may be worthwhile to mention 
that the authority to approve projects was subsequently transferred to the Ministry of 
Higher Education instead of the Scientific Advisor, presumably in a further attempt to 
impose restrictions on research. 
Therefore, it was not easy to identify a suitable site for successful fieldwork in 
such a limited period. The site had to meet the special requirements of my research in 
terms of population, lack of ethnic and religious diversity and representativeness of all 
important educational and religious institutions. Moreover, it had to be a site where I 
could obtain the local authorities' and informants' co-operation. 
The role of friendship, personal acquaintance and a sort of patronage is so 
important for making social relationships in Iranian culture that it is almost impossible 
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for a complete outsider to gain access for research purposes. Even an insider who 
wishes to conduct research also encounters special problems such as the jealousy of 
friends and relatives. In cases like this, there may be gossip about the investigator 
behind his or her back, and this may adversely affect the outcome of research. 
Nevertheless, making and having close relationships with informants was the key 
factor in obtaining information, so that the more friends I had in a school, the fewer 
problems there were. 
Trust was a major issue for the local authorities and Islamist teachers, on the 
one hand, and for teachers from political positions such as liberalism, Marxism, 
socialism, social democracy, and so forth, on the other. However, none of the 
teachers who were opposed to the government's ideas identified themselves as 
supporters of such ideologies. After seventeen years of anti-Western propaganda, a 
researcher who attempted to collect information for a Western university would not 
easily be allowed to penetrate a site of research. The fact that Iranian society had been 
politicised under the various political perturbations of the previous two decades and 
was almost a stranger to the spirit of qualitative research methods helps to explain this 
situation. That is, research was interpreted in a very ambiguous political way. 
Collection of data could mean for some radical Islamists that a researcher was seeking 
to supply information to the West, which had been identified in the mass media as the 
major cause of Iran's catastrophic problems both before and after 1979. Thus, 
acquiring permission for my research from educational authorities, which was finally 
granted by the national educational authorities, took up many weeks of my first period 
of fieldwork and generated a lot of disappointment and stress. Nonetheless, friendship 
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and patronage played a very significant role in getting this permission. It would have 
been impossible without recourse to these resources. 
Yet obtaining permission did not necessarily guarantee that the project would 
proceed smoothly. The research process could have been interrupted or cancelled at 
any stage for many unforeseeable reasons, such as lack of co-operation by teachers; 
the revocation of permission from schools or local education authorities to continue 
with the research (particularly in female schools in view of sex-segregation policies); 
protest by Islamist teachers due to their suspicions about the nature of my research; 
the disagreement of the town's mayor with the conduct of fieldwork in that region; 
and so forth. The issue of suspicion became very serious during the first period of 
fieldwork, when I was mostly using participant observation. The schools' authorities, 
who were not familiar with such a method, were gradually losing their confidence in 
the research because, in their view, I was doing nothing in schools other than 
watching and listening. This was so serious in one school that I was followed around 
by a member of the school wherever I went. 
The different expectations that most schools' authorities, on the one hand, and 
most teachers, on the other hand, had of me was a major problem during both periods 
of fieldwork, which seriously jeopardised the outcome of my research on occasions. 
From the early stages of the research onwards, I understood that `if I did not give 
information I would not get any co-operation from my informants'. But they were not 
content with hearing my answers to their questions in private. Instead, they asked me 
some very controversial questions in public in staff rooms. These questions were 
sometimes asked by teachers who had already been identified as political opponents 
of the regime; and some even had legal convictions. Therefore, their presence in 
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some schools had maximised the sensitivities of schools and Local Education 
Authorities toward my research. This sometimes made me resentful and disappointed, 
but it was clear that without my previous knowledge of the community and unless I 
responded knowledgeably to their questions, the research could not have progressed. 
Contrary to the Islamist teachers and authorities, who might have suspected that I was 
collecting information for the West, such opposition teachers might have been equally 
suspicious that I was getting information for the Iranian authorities. The point to 
emphasise is that obtaining and keeping the trust of such diverse informants and, as a 
result, their co-operation, was an extremely difficult aspect of my research. 
In order to avoid any suspicion or mistrust, I chose to write at nights about my 
days of observation in schools. Moreover, I avoided recording interviews with a tape 
recorder. I preferred to conduct informal interviews by making close relationships in 
the early stages, but formal interviews were also conducted, and notes were taken, 
only after I had elicited enough confidence from the informants. Furthermore, in 
order to collect information about the nature of changes in education before and after 
1979, I avoided asking questions in which the words `before the revolution' or `after 
the revolution' were used. These formulations would have affected informants' 
responses and increased their wariness. Therefore, I asked them about the year of 
their graduation from schools and of entry into employment at the beginning of each 
interview in order to ensure that my questions referred to their own experience. 
Although speaking with women in rural areas was virtually impossible, 
interviews with female teachers became possible in female schools. However, it was 
really embarrassing, especially in the first stages of interviews. Female teachers were, 
at first, accompanied by another female teacher during each interview, but they came 
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for interview by themselves after they had gained enough confidence. Although the 
average length of each interview was more than two hours for male interviewees, it 
was about 75 minutes for female interviewees. 
The main reason for choosing a diversity of research methods was to obtain a 
`rounded' view of the influence of Islam on educational changes in Iran since 1979, 
but there were other considerations as well. Firstly, it was necessary to take 
precautions in case I was prevented from applying any particular method in my 
research project. Having a variety of methods at my disposal was one such 
precaution. Secondly, I needed to collect information about a wide range of activities 
and processes: some took place in the offices of the LEA; some in school staff rooms; 
some in classrooms and playgrounds; and some in family homes. No single research 
method would have generated information about activities in all these, and other, 
locations. And thirdly, the influence of religion on public policy and personal conduct 
can be subtle, profound, unrecognised and controversial. As a result, it was necessary 
to adopt an eclectic approach to data gathering, in the expectation that interesting 
material would emerge from the variety of methods employed. 
Textbooks and Curricula 
The institution of education is based on state policies and supervision over what is 
taught, who is taught, and who teaches both males and females. In most modern 
societies, educational policies are designed to cultivate those human resources which 
governments deem necessary or desirable. In contrast to the educational policies of 
most developed and developing countries, which concentrate on training workers, 
Iranian educational policy places more emphasis on the need for training religiously 
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committed, socially responsible and faithful men and women who support the Islamic 
government. 
Although, because of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the state-provided 
textbooks were altered in some ways, specifically in the area of humanities, these 
changes were the same for both girls and boys. However, some courses are taught 
differently for boys and girls, such as 'Defensive Readiness' which is specific to boys; 
'Self-dependence' in the New System and 'Physical Education', for which the 
curricula differ between males and females. Although the changes in curriculum and 
textbooks are supposed to be scientific in some aspects, nobody can ignore the process 
of politicisation and Islamisation of the whole curriculum, which has been going on 
since 1979. 
After the revolution, major changes occurred in the areas of Humanities and 
Social Economics, with some courses attracting more attention than others. The 
courses of history, philosophy, Arabic literature, Islamic education, and to some 
extent the courses of geography and Persian literature were considered the most 
suitable fields within which the political ideology of the Islamic Republic could be 
cultivated. 
(a) In history courses after the revolution, the study of pre-Islamic Iran was 
replaced with the history of Islam, although a brief history of the Prophet had been 
taught during the pre-revolutionary period. Moreover, an experienced teacher of 
history made clear to me that the course of contemporary history was taught 
completely differently in the Pahlavi period. Another long-standing teacher of history 
told me that, because of the revolution, the size of the history textbook increased by 
about one-third, and is being increased further each year. In addition to the increase 
of the history textbook's size, the time allocated to the course has also been increased. 
He added that in the post-revolutionary educational system, teaching and learning 
history became one of the most important subjects of all the academic branches. This 
may have happened due to the specific attention which the Qur'an pays to the role of 
history as the main resource for learning from the fate of past communities and tribes. 
The same fate can be repeated at any time if the members of a community do the same 
thing, because the divine traditions are the same for all people in all times. In 
addition, the dominant political ideology of the state can be imparted to the younger 
generation through studying selected events of history. 
(b) The curriculum of philosophy for humanities students in the present 
educational system of Iran is more generic than it was before the revolution (see Siasi 
1975 and Abu-talibi 1994; and Appendix). This refers to human knowledge or ideas 
about what is the place of human beings in the world and what is valuable in life in 
the view of Islam or of those ancient Greek philosophers not considered inconsistent 
with Islam. This is in contrast to `philosophy' courses taught in the West, which tend 
to ask old questions by means of new procedures related to recent social phenomena. 
Rather, the `philosophy' course in modern Iran is designed to restore the 'pride of 
Iranian intellectualism' -- which existed for centuries -- by perpetuating the Islamic 
philosophical disciplines (hikmat-e eslami) (see Rahman 1982: 35; 104-9). 
According to one teacher of philosophy, a pre-revolutionary `Philosophy' textbook, 
which only contained discussions of Western philosophy, was replaced by two 
different books entitled `Philosophy' and `Acquaintance With Islamic Philosophy'. 
The 59-page textbook of `Philosophy' for third year students of humanities contains 
topics related to the meaning and the realm of philosophy, and the ideas of the early 
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philosophers Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. In this teacher's opinion, the 156-page 
textbook `Acquaintance With Islamic Philosophy', which is given exclusively to 
Year-twelve students of humanities, is similar in content to theology. `It contains the 
idea of monotheism in the view of the first Imam, Ali, the narratives from the Prophet 
and the twelve Imams and issues referring to metaphysics, which is all directed to 
remove any doubt that Muslims had no philosophy and just copied Greece, India, or 
Judaism and Christianity', a teacher of philosophy said. This corresponded with the 
political ideology of independence and self-belief which has been one of the major 
characteristics of the Islamic Republic so far. The Ministry of Education, taking 
another step in this direction, published a new edition of `Acquaintance With Islamic 
Philosophy' in 1995, in which the origins of Islamic philosophy and the ideas of 
anonymous Islamic philosophers are given special consideration, as this teacher let me 
know. He added that the textbook, which has been provided for the new system of 
education, is connected to theology in a more political way and indicates the 
philosophy of Ayatollah Khomeini's circle as a prominent one which tends to 
mysticism to some extent. Moreover, in the recent textbook, the cover pictures of 
Plato and Aristotle were replaced by the picture of the outstanding contemporary 
Islamic philosopher Allameh Tabatabaei, who was the philosophy teacher of Mortaza 
Motahhari. 
(c) `Arabic Literature', apart from the course of `English Literature' as a 
Western symbol, received special attention as a sacred phenomenon after the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979. Learning `Arabic Literature' was required of humanities students 
before the revolution because of its specific influence on Persian literature in post- 
Islam Iran, but in the post-revolutionary educational system of Iran, because Arabic 
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was the language of revelation and the Qur'an, it became a mandatory course in all 
subjects for all years from the guidance level to the end of high school (see Khazaei 
1971; Refa'at 1993; and Appendix). Although the Islamic Republic used the 
Constitution to get all Iranians to learn Arabic, the educational system was too weak 
to put this into practice. However, the use of Arabic terms in administrative letters 
and teaching Arabic literature in traditional religious schools as well as the modern 
schools were taken as signs of increased religiosity. Regardless of one's beliefs, 
whoever used many Arabic words in letters would be considered very religious. 
Using the language of the Qur'an, the Prophet and his successors in Arabic is counted 
as a social and religious value, while using Western vocabulary in public arenas and 
in formal communications is not only discouraged but forbidden according to the law 
approved by the Islamic Parliament (see Ettelaat 5 December 1996: 2). The 
importance of Arabic is being increased by the authorities year by year so that the 
textbook's size has doubled and two hours per week have been added to the Arabic 
literature schedule at high school since 1993, as a teacher of Arabic literature 
explained to me. In his view, the parts which have been added to the textbooks, to be 
taught in the New System of education, are equal amounts of historical topics, moral 
issues, general information and issues from the Qur'an and Sunnat. 
(d) The greatest changes in textbooks probably occurred in the subject of 
`Religious Education'. The pre-revolutionary title of `Religious Education' was 
changed to `Islamic Education' after the Islamic revolution, except in Year-twelve (or 
Year-four of the high-school) which kept its old title until about 1990. However, the 
contents were Islamic during both regimes (see Shoar 1968; Sadat 1993; and 
Appendix). Besides the dramatic changes in the content of the textbooks, almost all 
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pre-revolutionary religious education teachers were replaced by new teachers, from 
any subject of study, who were loyal to the Islamic values. Since religious education 
enjoyed less importance than courses of art and handwriting during the Shah's period, 
whichever teachers could not teach the main courses were appointed to teach religious 
education -- even if they had no religious beliefs. After the revolution, 
however, 
religious education was taken more seriously at schools. According to a teacher of 
`Islamic Education', while moral issues formed the bulk of religious teachings before 
the revolution, post-revolutionary Islamic education textbooks contained the Islamic 
world view and ideology -- to protect the young revolutionary generation from 
both 
Western and Eastern ideologies, especially Marxism -- due to the high level of activity 
of different leftist groups in the early years of the revolution. 
A teacher of Islamic education and the Qur'an explained to me that after the 
revolution the interpretation of the Principal Shi'ite doctrines (Ustd-e-din), with the 
exception of `justice' (ad'1), (i. e. belief in monotheism [towhid], prophecy, the 
Imamate [nobovval va emamat] and resurrection [the return to other world, ma'a(fl) as 
well as the doctrine of guardianship and governance (velayat va hokumat), was 
distributed among the Islamic education textbooks for years one, two and three 
respectively. The Year-twelve textbook, called `Religious Education', covered issues 
about the knowledge of human beings, determinism and free will, human nature, 
divine laws (traditions), Marxism and some morals. She added that the Qur'an was 
not taught at the high school level during these years, and that Islamic education was 
taught three hours per week. By adding the Qur'an to years one, two and three of the 
high school curriculum, as well as the Secondary Shi'ite doctrines `Foru-e-din' 
(religious precepts), according to another teacher, the Islamic education timetable had 
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increased from three to five hours per week in 1985-86. Moreover, the title of Year- 
twelve textbook was changed to `Islamic Education'; Marxism and some other 
sections were eliminated; and a new section on `family' was included. After 1987-88, 
however, the schedule was reduced from five to three hours per week (two hours for 
Islamic Education and one hour for the Qur'an) again, and this was accompanied by a 
reduction of the content. 
(e) One of the educational areas which became very active in a different way 
was 'Omur-e-tarbiati' (extra-curricula activities). This area's activity during the reign 
of the Shah was restricted to the establishment of morning ceremonies (assemblies) at 
schools and the registration of some students as the Corps Students `Danesh-amuzan- 
e Pish-ahang' who attended demonstrations on public holidays during the Shah's 
regime and who dealt with artistic jobs such as painting, handwriting, poetry and 
fictional writing. After the Islamic revolution of 1979, the institution expanded its 
activity to establishing Islamic revolutionary values in schools and was eventually 
changed to `moral education'. However, it retained its title of `omur-e tarbiati'. 
Apart from initiating morning ceremonies in which Qur'anic verses were read instead 
of a song for the Shah, `Moral Education' called students to attend noon prayers at 
school with a clergyman who had been appointed by the LEA as an Lnam-e Jama'at. 
Competitions to recite the Qur'an, Nahjo'l-balagheh (the collection of Imam Ali's 
letters and speeches) and to sing revolutionary songs were added to those of 
calligraphy, painting, theatre, book reading, poetry and story writing. In the opinion 
of another teacher, people were keen to attend the required programmes of this subject 
in the early years of the revolution. In the mid-1980s, the subject was formalised and 
given specific duties, which the LEA asked the teachers of moral education to 
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undertake. In addition, at the guidance level, `moral education' had entered the Year- 
six national curriculum replacing English literature after 1986-87, and it benefited 
from having a formal textbook in all years of the guidance level from 1988-89 
onwards. Its timetable for Year-six was two hours per week and for the other two 
guidance-level years was one hour per week. There was no systematic curriculum to 
teach pupils, and the lessons were mostly epistemological in the first years after 1986- 
87; but now most lessons have moral aspects. 
The grades achieved in moral education are not reflected in the pupils' final 
results. The students at high school level, both boys and girls, have no textbook or 
curriculum for this subject. However, a comparison of two teachers showed that 
moral problems in a girls' high school were more serious than those of boys. 
According to a male teacher of moral education, `the moral problems of the students 
are referred to the Staff Council for Morality (hasteh-ye tarbiati-e kar-konan) at the 
school; then they are dealt with according to the disciplinary rules of schools: the 
student writing a guaranteed commitment; keeping the student outside of the 
classroom for a certain time; contacting parents; reducing their grades.... If the 
problem is serious -- political, or violent..., the student will be referred to the LEA, but 
this has not happened at the school so far'. However, a female teacher of moral 
education told me: `the students talk to me about their private, family and school life, 
or sometimes they tell me about the behaviour of other students. In the many years 
which I worked at the girls' high school, only four students could carry on their 
studies after high school level, because the moral corruption has increased among girl 
students, to such an extent that eighteen students have married at high school level so 
far this year. ' 
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0 As for the course on `Geography', although a teacher of the subject told me 
that most changes in this area after the revolution were because of new scientific 
findings, and changes have been towards more human geography than physical, 
including geomorphology and climatology. However, nobody can ignore the impact 
of the ruling political ideology on the textbooks' titles and their contents. After the 
revolution, a textbook called `the Geography of Muslim Countries' was added to the 
national textbooks at high school level. However, this textbook was eliminated from 
the national textbooks provided for the New System of education, and another 
textbook called `Political and Economic Geography' replaced it. A section on 
political geography was added for the New System, in order to familiarise the students 
with politics, in the geography teacher's opinion. Moreover, according to this teacher, 
another textbook called `The Geography of Continents' was omitted from the series of 
textbooks provided for the New System of education by the government, while the 
textbook of `General Geography' was almost unaltered. Concerning the `Geography 
of Iran' textbook, he made clear to me that the section on Natural Geography 
remained almost the same, while a section on Human Geography was completely 
changed after the revolution. 
(g) In the field of `Persian Literature', the biggest change after the revolution 
was in the academic subjects of Humanities and Social Economy - there were 
increases in the size of textbooks and schedule and changes in the content of the 
textbooks (see BPET 1976; BPET 1991; and Appendix). According to a teacher of 
Persian literature, the timetable for Humanities and Social Economy subjects 
increased from four hours per week before the revolution to six hours, for years one to 
three, and to eight hours for Year-twelve after the revolution. The timetable schedule 
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remained the same, four hours per week, for the academic branches of Experimental 
Sciences (ulum-e tajrobi) and Math-Physics (riazi-fizik) and the changes in content 
were negligible. However, as was suggested to me by another teacher of Persian 
literature, the time devoted to literature was reduced from six to four hours per week 
for years one to three, for a while, by establishing the vocational programme of `Tarh- 
e Kad' in 1982. 
In the opinion of a teacher of Persian literature, the content of post- 
revolutionary textbooks is totally different from pre-revolutionary ones. He believes 
that the literature in the Shah's period imposed blind obedience to the West in 
students' brains in any possible way, and that the students thought that `there was 
another world in the West to which they should have access'. He maintains that `in 
the literature of the textbook of the White Revolution, the Shah appears as the 
manifestation of God's will'. But after the 1979 revolution, in his view, literature was 
presented in Islamic form. `Students understood that there were self-made and 
honourable people in the country who could influence the country's fate, as became 
clear in the War' he said to me. He implicitly admitted that daily political issues 
affect Persian literature: `since nowadays the issue of cultural invasion (tahajom-e 
farhangi) is an important one, everything in society is ready to contend against it, 
including the textbooks in general and particularly through the mass media and 
journals'. 
(h) Among courses on humanities and social sciences, some were changed less 
than others mentioned above, in terms of timetable schedule, the size of textbooks or 
their contents. According to a teacher of history, all three courses of history, 
geography and social sciences together had just one textbook until 1974, and the 
minimum pass mark for this course was seven out of twenty. Drawing attention to the 
subjects' importance, their textbooks were separated from each other and the 
minimum passing grade increased to ten -- the same as other courses -- since then. 
Although the above situation continued after the revolution, the courses changed in 
other ways too. In the opinion of a teacher of sociology, the impact of religious and 
political ideology on the content of social sciences or sociology textbooks was greater 
than on other courses (see Nezami-Taleshi 1978; Tajgaram & Qandi 1979; and 
Appendix). For instance, the time allotted to sociology since the revolution has been 
dramatically reduced from thirteen hours per week for all years at high school until 
1992-93 to just four hours under the New System of education. Moreover, the pre- 
revolutionary textbook title of `Sociology' changed to `Social Sciences' for all 
textbooks, for all students in Humanities as well as in Social Economic subjects, 
except the Year-twelve textbook, which kept the title of `Sociology'. The same 
happened in the departments of Sociology at all universities in post-revolutionary 
Iran. 
(i) Regarding `Economics', it should be noted that the four pre-revolutionary 
academic subjects of study of Social Economics (eqtesad-e ejtemaei), Humanities 
(uluni-e ensani), Experimental Sciences and Math-Physics continued after the 
revolution until about 1993. After that date, the first two subjects were combined to 
form a separate academic subject of `Literature and Humanities' which, in the view of 
a teacher of economics, is more about Humanities than economics. In the same way, 
the earlier textbooks of `Islamic Economics' and `Economic Growth and 
Development' in Year-twelve were replaced by just one textbook called `Iranian 
Economy'. According to this teacher, the content of the latter book was more realistic 
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than the former, because although the textbook of `Islamic Economics' presented 
economic arguments from the Islamic point of view and the textbook of `Economic 
Growth and Development' had discussions of political economy, the new textbook 
included the present-day economic problems of Iran: electricity, population growth, 
OPEC, the economic value of oil etc. The creation of an `Islamic Economics' 
textbook was in fact one of greatest impacts of Islamic ideology on social sciences 
after the revolution. 
(j) An experienced teacher of Biology, Botany and Geology, who was unhappy 
with the New System of education, believed that the textbooks had progressed and 
developed gradually since 1970, the beginning of the Old System of education. This 
is because, he said, `we are aware of the progress of science to some extent'. 
Comparing the pre- and post-revolutionary timetable for these subjects, he explained 
that the increase in time given to them after the revolution happened because of the 
demand for growth in the biological sciences. He made clear to me that, for example, 
Year-twelve students had eight hours a week for these courses between 1970 and 
1975. Then, by eliminating the section on Botany from the `Biology' textbook and 
the section on Evolution from the `Geology' textbook, the hours were reduced to six 
by 1978. But after 1978, by increasing the biology hours from four to six and a half, 
re-establishing the botany course for two hours a week and increasing geology from 
two to three hours, the time devoted to these subjects in the weekly timetable almost 
doubled. 
A biology teacher, confirming the reflection of recent findings in science on 
the textbooks, also admitted that the ruling Islamic ideology had had an effect on the 
content of the textbooks. He, who had taught science at guidance level both before 
and after the revolution, believed that the pre-revolutionary textbook of Science was 
different from the post-revolutionary textbook, in which science is related to God and 
the knowledge of Him, and that this issue is mentioned wherever possible in the 
textbooks. In the early years of the revolution, he claimed, there had been some 
contradictions between the courses of Islamic Education, on the one hand, and biology 
or geology, on the other. While the science textbooks, according to the theory of 
Evolution, introduced monkeys as predecessors of mankind, the religious textbooks -- 
trying to indicate the theory of Evolution or the ideas of Darwin as just a theory and 
not necessarily a matter of fact -- introduced Adam and Eve as the first humans. 
According to this teacher, since 1984 there have been some attempts to reduce 
sensitivities towards such theories: `for example, the name of Darwin was omitted 
from textbooks. Alternatively, his work was presented as "the theory of Evolution" or 
as "cause and effect", "the interaction of natural and human factors" or "the process of 
interaction between living things and non-living things"'. He also described as 
unsuccessful the experience of teaching courses on health, biology and microbiology 
to Theology students in the Teacher Training College, because firstly, the course was 
started late, and secondly, in his opinion, there was no connection between these 
subjects and this sort of course. Because of this, he had encountered 
misunderstanding about the theory of Darwin etc. In his view, religious issues were 
not the only things which affected the textbooks of science, for the anti-Western 
ideology of the revolution also affected the textbooks: `although there was then such 
sensitivity towards foreign names in the textbooks- nowadays they have been 
converted to Persian synonyms. ' Another long-standing teacher of Geology, without 
explaining detailed changes in the content, suggested to me that changes in the 
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Geology textbook have been directed more to scientific aspects than others. 
Analysing the data regarding the titles of courses and textbooks, there is no doubt that 
the country wanted to develop through the Islamic Revolution of 1979, but in a very 
different way from the period of the Shah's rule or that of the West. 
To respond to the pre-revolutionary needs of the remote regions, which had 
not been met, and to meet the post-revolutionary primary needs caused by the 
dramatic increase of the population, it was natural for the revolutionary authorities to 
turn to science and its recent findings, particularly in dealing with one of the main 
social problems of that time, health. Besides the dramatic increase in the number of 
students recruited by medical schools in comparison with pre-revolutionary university 
entrance guidelines, the post-revolutionary authorities accepted a huge number of 
medical students for different state-based universities in Iran by setting up a special 
competition in medical sciences as a matter of urgency after the Cultural Revolution 
of 1980. Therefore, the increase in teaching of the above-mentioned courses at 
schools, particularly biology, corresponded to these needs, as all three teachers of 
science I spoke to pointed out. It is interesting that besides the increase in time for 
studying biology in the weekly timetable, for the first time, there is a separate 
laboratory hour in the schedule in the New System of education, although this is just 
one hour per week for just three months of the six-month educational year, for Year- 
twelve students. Of course, this issue can be considered as just the first step of the 
Islamic government authorities' attention to experimental science. 
Yet, as the data show, the special interest in developing science in the school 
schedule was just one face of the coin, but it had another face, a more prominent one, 
which the Islamic ideology of the revolution also demanded- that the Islamic ideology 
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be developed, through the courses of Islamic education, and by removing or 
weakening doctrines which contradict religious demands in the view of the majority 
of Ulama. Thus, post-revolutionary changes in textbooks concerning the elimination 
of discussions about Embryology, the theory of Evolution etc., the change in their 
titles, the conversion of Western scientific terms into their Persian synonyms are all 
responses to the demands of the religious-political revolutionary ideology. For this 
reason, another much-needed university entrance competition, besides that of Medical 
Sciences, was established after the Cultural Revolution of 1980 to allocate Theology 
students, in order to meet the religious needs of the schools and other institutions. 
(k) Regarding the courses of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics, it seems 
that there has been no major change in their contents or schedule- as was expected. 
According to a teacher of physics, the post-revolutionary textbook of Physics is the 
same as the pre-revolutionary one, except for the replacement of some chapters, which 
mostly took place in 1994 and 1995, for both the Old System and the New System of 
education. `These changes have been due to the reduction of the huge size of the 
textbook, not because of the recent findings of science', he suggested to me. 
Complaining about these changes, the physics teacher remarked that the chapters have 
now lost their continuity and harmony both with each other and with other courses 
like mathematics. Another teacher of physics, however, confirming that reduction in 
textbook size was the motive for the changes, claimed that the changes in the New 
System textbooks have corresponded with the new findings of science usually taught 
in countries like Great Britain and the USA. However, he, without giving any 
evidence for this claim, admitted that he had never taught the earlier Physics textbook, 
but he had seen it. With regard to the post-revolutionary Physics textbook, what is 
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interesting is the establishment of a two-hour per week course in physics for Year- 
eleven humanities students. When I asked the above teachers the reason for this, the 
latter professed his ignorance, but the former suggested that it was due to the relation 
of Physics to Philosophy. 
(1) Regarding the course of `Physical Education', an experienced teacher of PE 
made clear to me that, unlike in the early years after the revolution, sport and PE have 
now been taken into consideration. He added that some aspects of PE have now 
become even more organised than they were in the Shah's period. For example, 
according to the new regulations of refereeing, a referee has the right to give an 
offending player a red card at school level. When asked whether there are differences 
between girls and boys schools in terms of PE curriculum, he suggested that since 
1985 handball has been added to the pre-revolutionary PE curricula of basketball, 
volleyball, football, table tennis and running at the boys' schools of the city of Khoy 
including Firuraq. He denied the existence of any textbook about PE courses either 
before or after the revolution. He believed that the number of matches between 
different classes and schools of boys has increased since the mid-1980s, even in 
comparison with before the revolution. However, all matches at school and class 
level were stopped by the authorities in 1995 as a result of another policy, through 
which the Physical Education Organisation (sazman-e tarbiat-e badani) deals directly 
with the selection of some skilled youths in order to attend provincial matches. 
I interviewed a female PE teacher; it was conducted at a messy laboratory and 
she was accompanied with a female teacher of moral education. She confirmed that 
there was no special textbook available, due to lack of resources in her view, for the 
PE curriculum, and that girls' curricula and assessments were different from boys'. 
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She made clear to me that there were no martial arts at girls schools, but that their 
main courses were: volleyball, chess, basketball, badminton and table tennis. 
According to this teacher, the games common to boys and girls were: volleyball, 
chess, handball and basketball. However, there was no facility, or perhaps possibility, 
for basketball at the girls school in which she worked. 
(m) In the academic year 1995-96, a textbook was published, which was to be 
taught to Year-nine students, called `General Acquaintance with the New System of 
Education'. Its aim was to guide the students through the new state-provided 
strategies of education. Although this was an optional course, pupils were encouraged 
to take it because, firstly, there was no other alternative facility to help students 
choose subjects -- according to a female teacher of this course -- and, secondly, all 
students who were going to choose the main subjects of study the following year 
needed to take it, according to a male teacher of this course. He explained to me that 
although the title of the curriculum is the same for both girls and boys, different topics 
are taught to each sex in Kar-Danesh (vocational studies), which is a new subject in 
the New System, and Vocational subjects. Although both Kar-Danesh and Vocational 
are, in fact, vocational (different from the academic subjects of Literature & 
Humanities, Experimental Sciences, and Math-Physics, for which the curricula are 
almost the same for both sexes), Kar-Danesh seemed be taught to a lower level than 
Vocational. However, in both subjects, the curricula taught to girls are more 
vocational -- and this means more invention is needed than in other subjects; and the 
curricula allocated to boys are more technical -- more appropriate to boys' mentalities 
and physical capacities, as the male teacher of this course explained to me. 
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Interpreting the changes that had occurred in curricula and textbooks from a 
rather one-sided perspective, the impact of Islamic ideology on these changes was 
considerable. The changes occurred in all possible subjects of study including 
humanities and sciences. However, the susceptibility of humanities subjects to the 
imposition of ideology was greater than that of the sciences. Besides the changes 
required by religion, there have also been some other creative changes required by 
science, although they had to satisfy the religious requirements. To borrow a 
Weberian approach to the analysis of these changes, Iran was still in a `rational' 
mode in so far as it was making attempts to increase domination over the external 
world. Nonetheless, it is interesting that none of teachers in the areas of science 
interpreted the increasing post-revolutionary attention to their areas as religious 
requirements. But, as Weber discovered during his studies on Asian religions (see 
Roth and Schluchter 1979: 45-59), there were major differences between Western 
Protestantism and Iranian culture. 
Libraries 
As has already been mentioned, an open atmosphere was not available for Iranian 
students and teachers to study different science books. The textbooks required by 
students and teachers were provided by the Iranian government, in both pre- and post- 
revolutionary regimes. The importance of libraries had always been hidden from 
Iranian society. Since Iranian students did not become properly familiar with the idea 
of book-reading and libraries, and were guided by state-provided textbooks and 
teachers from the early years of their education, they expected their lecturers to 
provide something for them to read and to help them pass higher education exams as 
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well. As a result, libraries were rarely considered by students -- if Iranian schools had 
them at all. It was interesting that when I asked teachers about the use of libraries by 
students, they replied: `If they [students] study their own textbooks, that is good 
enough. There is no need to go to libraries to read other books'. 
Because of the revolution of 1979, the schools' libraries, at least in the studied 
area, became active -- but only in the special field of religion. Some teachers from 
different academic subjects enthusiastically looked for some Islamic books, so they 
could become familiar with the new interpretation of Islam, in the very early years of 
the revolution. However, such enthusiasm did not last long. In my view, the 
existence of such enthusiasm was not surprising, in a secular society which was 
experiencing a new interpretation of an old religion. For this reason, I agree with the 
opinion of some writers who believe that the Iranian revolution of 1979 was political, 
as well as religious. If it had been religious alone, it would have been the continuation 
of earlier Islamic movements -- and there would have been no place for enthusiasm in 
understanding something which people already knew. Nevertheless, this enthusiasm 
was noticeable among both students and some teachers at schools during the first 
years of the revolution. 
After the revolution of 1979, although both schools' and cities' public libraries 
were expanded, they developed specifically in the area of religious books. Regarding 
town and city libraries, there was no considerable increase in the number of scientific 
or practical books, even about Persian literature. The same was true for school 
libraries after the revolution, although most schools had no library at all before the 
revolution, as two teachers remarked. As I observed myself, and five teachers 
confirmed, there were no books relevant to their subjects of studies, other than 
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religious books, in the libraries of either boys' or girls' schools. However, there were 
far fewer books in girls' high schools than in boys' schools, according to my own 
observation. During my six months fieldwork in all the schools of one area, except 
for a few pupils on one occasion in a boys' guidance school, I never saw anybody use 
these libraries. Except for a few scientific books, which were described by the 
relevant teachers as useless, all the other books were religious and had been written by 
ulama who were loyal to the Islamic ideology of the revolution. In this regard, an 
educational official suggested: `the role of libraries (in schools) is that the ruling 
ideas should reach the students through the libraries. The LEA has sent schools some 
books two or three times, all of which were religious books, except a few scientific 
books which are almost useless. ' 
I investigated the New System of education in the new branch of `Kar- 
Danesh' at a Vocational High School in a city close to the rural area- because there 
was no vocational high school in the rural area. Since this school employed a 
librarian and was well organised, I was able to acquire some statistics about the stock. 
Among the 3550 books at that school, there were about 2000 (56%) books on religion, 
about 200 (6%) books on different aspects of science studied at the school, about 500 
(14%) historical and fictional books, about 20 (less than 1%) volumes on sport, about 
30 (22%) volumes of religious and gnostic poems and about 800 (22%) books which 
the librarian called `miscellaneous'. I then investigated students' visits to the library 
for their own needs over a period of about two months. In this vocational high school, 
of 481 visits to the library, 141 (29%) inquiries had been for religious books, 69 
(14%) for books which met pupils' scientific needs and the other visits were for other 
titles. It should be noted that these inquiries were made by the male students of the 
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vocational branch, not the students of the branch of `Kar-Danesh'. Moreover, 
according to the head teacher of the vocational high school, most of the scientific 
books had been provided recently because of the special attention paid to scientific 
books and experiments by the New System of education. This could be confirmed by 
comparing the data regarding inquiries made by students of the New System and Old 
System. Out of the 481 inquiries, 379 (78%) cases were related to the New System of 
education and 102 (22%) cases were from students of the Old System of education. 
Moreover, while in the New System there were twice as many references to religious 
books as to scientific books (107 against 57), in the Old System of education there 
were three times as many (34 against 12). Furthermore, according to the librarian of 
the school, the students in the New System used the library more than the students in 
the Old System. I was told by some educational authorities that the role of the teacher 
of moral education and his activities was very important in all schools. As an 
example of a vocational school in a city in which the New System of education had 
led to shifts in scientific views, such statistics hint at the situation of schools' libraries 
in rural areas. 
As regards town and city public libraries, I have to mention that apart from the 
problem of insufficient science books, which also affected schools' libraries, there 
were specific difficulties in terms of gender, which did not exist in the sex-segregated 
schools of Iran. As expected, the situation for girls wanting to use a town's public 
library was more problematic than it was in the city. Unlike the city girls, girls in the 
town even encountered problems in borrowing books. However, some teachers who 
were natives of the region believed that the number of female students who used the 
library for borrowing was very slowly increasing at that time, in comparison with the 
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early years of the library's establishment (1992). Out of twelve teachers, some of 
whom were natives, confirmed that the girls of that town were more or less deprived 
of using the library, because of its remote location in the town and their families' 
disagreement with the girls' use of it. Unlike boys, the female students of the New 
System of education were taken to visit the public library by the female advisor of the 
New System in that school, which could be interpreted as evidence of deprivation of 
library use by girls' families. Moreover, two female teachers and the school's head 
teacher stated that girls had borrowed books from the public library through the 
school, but either the school's authorities or the girls' teacher had returned the 
borrowed books. Furthermore, a male native teacher remarked that the girls in the 
village used their brothers, if they had any, to borrow or return books for them. 
According to the twelve teachers questioned, the families in the village were too 
biased culturally to allow their daughters to go to such public places. Although the 
boys had greater access to public places including libraries, they showed less interest 
in using them than girls, according to several teachers. 
When I asked teachers about the possible reasons for students' lack of interest 
in reading books, and what they were interested in instead, they replied that the 
direction of students' interests had changed in recent years. Also, the libraries lacked 
sufficient power to attract youths there. Regarding boys' and girls' interests, some 
ideas seemed to be different from those of the first decade after the revolution but 
remained similar to those of the pre-revolutionary period. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the influence of the new philosophy of education 
(outlined in Chapter Five) and the Islamic ideology purveyed by agencies of the 
Iranian state after 1979 can be clearly discerned in aspects of school life. In 
particular, post-revolutionary revisions of textbooks and of the hours time-tabled for 
delivery of the Islamised curriculum reveal the extent to which, and the direction in 
which, education was transformed. These findings, in conjunction with evidence 
about other educational changes in Iran to be analysed in the next three chapters, are 
the first empirical contributions towards the case to be summarised in the Conclusions 
that Iran presents an interesting mixture of features which cut across some of Max 
Weber's distinctions between, for example, tradition and modernity, patrimonial and 
rational bureaucracies, and disenchantment of the world and rationalisation. It will be 
shown that Iran has been modernised, but not quite in ways predicted by Weber. 
Similarly, the growth of modem educational bureaucracies in Iran has not eliminated 
all aspects of patrimonialism. And attempts to rationalise educational provision have 
not furthered the disenchantment of the world. The effects of the Islamic Revolution 
on curricula and textbooks represent a particularly interesting compromise between 
aspects of tradition and aspects of modernity. 
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Chapter Seven 
GENDERED SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS 
The previous Chapter reviewed the changes in school curricula which followed the 
Iranian revolution of 1979. It showed how far Islamic ideology has affected the 
contents of textbooks and the delivery of teaching. This Chapter is designed to 
explain the changes that have occurred in the hidden curriculum running through post- 
revolutionary schools, especially the changes in social relations between teachers and 
students. The main theme is that not only textbooks and curricula but also school life 
in general had to conform with the new philosophy of education. Therefore, special 
attention will be given in this Chapter to the process of trying to ensure that social 
interactions between males and females were governed by Islamic ideology in all 
circumstances. 
State-provided textbooks and curricula for students all over Iran are almost the 
same for both females and males. Yet, as we saw in Chapter Six, the effects of sex- 
segregation in education are greater than can be shown through the investigation of 
textbooks alone, for the delivery of education is not just confined to textbooks. Sex- 
segregation can take the form of inferior facilities or opportunities for one gender; 
different methods of teaching for each sex; fewer possibilities for boys or girls to 
express themselves in school, classroom or even in high positions in the LEA; fewer 
opportunities to pursue interests in a single-sex-dominated atmosphere and so on. I 
investigated these differences in social relationships and contexts in schools in a small 
town in north-west Iran. In this research, I looked at a wide range of student-teacher 
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interactions in male and female classrooms and schools as well as their respective 
facilities. 
Teachers' relations with students 
It was particularly important, in studying gendered social relations in schools, to learn 
about the experiences of teachers who worked with students of the opposite sex. To 
begin with, I conducted interviews with twenty male teachers who had taught in girls' 
schools. Ten of these teachers were either not employed before the Islamic revolution 
of 1979 or were not teaching girls at that time. The other ten informants adopted a 
wide range of practices for addressing their female students by full name. Five of 
them claimed that they addressed their female students merely by their surnames, 
while the other five teachers said that they called them either with the prefix of `Miss' 
(khanom), in order to show them respect according to Iranian culture, and their 
surnames or just `Madam' occasionally. But of all twenty male teachers, most were 
teaching girls when the interviews were conducted. Only one of them announced that 
he still addressed girls merely by their surname. Three of the teachers made clear to 
me that apart from just using `Madam' or `Miss' accompanied with the girls' surname, 
they sometimes addressed them as `sister' or `sister plus surname'. Another three 
teachers told me that they sometimes call them `sister' or by their surname 
accompanied with the prefix `sister', and sometimes just their surname, nothing more. 
Another teacher suggested that apart from using all of the above methods of 
addressing female students, he used the phrase `my sister' as well. Two of the twenty 
teachers said to me that they addressed their female students by their surnames as well 
as the phrases `dear sister' and `my daughter'. However, nine teachers rejected the use 
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of the word of `sister' altogether. 
Comparing data regarding pre- and post-revolutionary ways of addressing 
female students by male teachers, we can perceive the impact of the revolution on this 
matter. If we suppose that the use of words like `madam', `miss' (khanom), `my 
sister' or `my daughter' indicates a respectful and friendly relationship, different from 
the traditional formalities of classrooms, we can conclude that the gap between 
students and teachers has narrowed since the revolution. My findings show that the 
50% (5 out of 10) of teachers who addressed their female students by their surname 
alone before the revolution reduces to just 5% (1 out of 20) after the revolution. 
Moreover, some new words have entered into the language of male teachers 
addressing their female students which were not used before the revolution. Firstly, 
the use of `sister' or `surname accompanied with the prefix of sister' indicates the 
impact of religion on this issue. These terms were in vogue in the formal language of 
the Islamic state authorities. Secondly, the language of `my sister' and `dear sister' 
imply, apart from the impact of Islam on the post-revolutionary teacher-student 
relationship, a relatively friendly and close relationship between them. This would be 
especially significant in view of the traditional language of that rural area. Thirdly, 
the use of `my daughter', mainly by old teachers, indicates again a narrowing of the 
wide gap which used to exist between teachers and students in pre-revolutionary 
education. 
Of these twenty teachers who had worked in both girls' and boys' schools, 
fifteen believed that there was no difference between boys' and girls' classrooms in 
terms of teaching methods, while the other five teachers believed that gender issues 
sometimes affected their teaching methods. Yet, in terms of teachers' behaviour, 
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sixteen teachers of the above twenty claimed that their ways of behaving in girls' 
classrooms are different from in boys' classrooms. Only four teachers claimed that 
there was no difference at all between the two sorts of classes in terms of the teacher's 
behaviour. 
The existence or lack of any difference in teaching methods among teachers 
depends to a great extent on the nature of their courses. The subjects of the five 
teachers who believed that they sometimes behaved differently in girls' classrooms, 
were biology, Persian literature and Islamic education. Both teachers of biology 
suggested that there were restrictions in teaching genetic issues in terms of speaking, 
presenting examinations and pictures and even clothing, according to one of them. He 
added that the girls' classes were not enjoyable for reasons to do with the ruling 
culture both before and after the revolution. However, there had been no control over 
the method of teaching before the revolution, and even genetic issues had been 
presented openly, while lessons on the sexual organs or menstruation were taught in a 
bowdlerised form in post-revolutionary classrooms. 
Two experienced male teachers, of the four Persian literature teachers, made 
clear to me that the lessons relating to real love, as portrayed in the mystical literature 
of Iran, were affected when taught in girls' classes. One of them told me that he gave 
less explanation of those texts in girls' classes than in boys'. Another teacher 
remarked that a teacher felt shy and modest in teaching texts in which words were 
used like love (eshgh), body (badan, for example, in the sentence of Hasank badani 
dash: chun sim-e noghreh), separation (hejran), unite with a sweetheart after 
separation (vesal) and so forth. Such terms, according to this teacher, were used 
openly in boys' classrooms. In his view, the situation which affected the teaching of 
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such issues in girls' classes was intensifying daily in society, in comparison with pre- 
revolutionary times. Another two teachers of Persian literature, who believed that 
their methods of teaching in girls' schools were the same in boys' schools, had either 
little experience of teaching girls at high school level or experience of teaching girls at 
guidance level only. 
One of the two male teachers of Islamic education who had taught at girls 
schools stated that some parts of the Islamic Education textbooks, concerning 
marriage or which contained words like 'sperm', and parts of the Qur'an which were 
related to 'Mary' and 'Joseph', affected his way of teaching in girls' schools. For 
example, when a female student had once asked him the meaning of the word `sperm', 
he had become embarrassed and pretended he had heard nothing, and, fortunately for 
him she had not repeated her question. A teacher of psychology claimed that although 
the method of teaching was the same for both genders, there were some topics, like 
sexual glands, in the psychology textbook which he quickly passed over when he 
reached them in girls' schools. 
The four teachers, out of twenty, who denied any difference between girls' and 
boys' classrooms in terms of teachers' attitudes to addressing students, taught courses 
of 'Persian literature', 'English literature', 'Physics', and 'Geology'. The other 
sixteen teachers all indicated that they had to exert more self-control in girls' classes. 
A young teacher of geography told me that his relationship with female students was 
less friendly than it was with boys. Even his way of looking at girls' faces was 
different; he tried to look at girls' faces less than boys'; and he avoided looking at girls 
individually. There was no contact between them out of class hours, and, inside 
classrooms, he was allowed to speak briefly to ill-disciplined students simply in order 
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to direct their mind towards lessons. He remarked that he had to appear more serious 
in his behaviour in girls' classes than in boys'; he laughed less and paid more attention 
towards lessons. However, in his view, the longer a teacher teaches the same female 
students, the fewer restrictions he will have with them. However, this openness will 
be never the same as in boys' classes. According to him, a teacher could not call a 
female student by her forename or use words like 'my dear' because a mate teacher 
had to be more careful in his behaviour in girls' schools in the interests of not losing 
his job or respect and prestige among people. 
Of the above twenty teachers, the two teachers of 'psychology and economics' 
and 'philosophy' pointed out that sensitivity about male teachers' behaviour in 
addressing their female students was lower in 1995-1996 (the time when this 
fieldwork was conducted) than in the mid-1980s when the prevailing atmosphere in 
girls' classes was less open. Conversely, a teacher of English literature claimed that 
the situation was still the same as in the mid-1980s. As mentioned above, we cannot 
ignore teachers' different personalities in dealing with this issue; the behaviour of 
teachers is too complicated to be reducible to a general formula for all mate teachers at 
girls' schools. However, the exertion of great pressure and control over girls' schools 
cannot be ignored in the post-revolutionary educational system, especially in the 
1980s. For example, the teaching of 'physical education' by male teachers in girls' 
schools was prohibited after the Islamic revolution of 1979. 
By comparison, about 52% of the 23 teachers who were working in boys' 
schools continued the formal and traditional way of addressing male students after the 
revolution, 35% of which had been in a respectful way. But the other 48% of teachers, 
when addressing their male students, employed terms which were not used before the 
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revolution: 'brother', 'dear brother', 'faithful brother', 'my brother', 'brother and 
surname', 'sir' (aqa), 'haj aqa', 'master (arbab)', 'my dear', 'my son', 'dear pupil', 
and also used their forenames. 
Comparing the terms of address used for both male and female students by male 
teachers before 1979, we can conclude that the numbers addressing girls just by their 
sumame or with a prefix was almost the same as it was for boys. After the revolution, 
however, male teachers used the new terms for girls more than they did for boys. In 
other words, the impact of the Islamic revolution has been greater on relations with 
female students than males on this issue, particularly if we just consider the impact of 
religion on the use of these terms. That is, while 40% (8 out of 20) of teachers, 
however infrequently, addressed girls as 'sister' or 'sister and sumame', only about 
17% (4 out of 23) of teachers called their male students 'brother', 'faithful brother' 
and `brother and surname'. 
Although some female teachers worked in a girls' high school, there was no 
female teacher at a boys' high school. However, in primary schools, the majority of 
teachers were women even in boys' schools. This was the same as in pre- 
revolutionary schools. Although there were no male teachers in girls' primary 
schools, a girls' high school in this rural area was mate-dominated. However, as an 
experienced teacher suggested, these schools were more male-dominated before 1979 
than after the revolution. Regarding the working situation of female teachers, two 
experienced teachers of history and biology who had worked in girls' high schools 
before the revolution, pointed out that female teachers and even female students did 
not wear the 'hejab' inside school at all, but some of them might wear 'chadors' or 
scarves outside of school. One of these teachers reminded me that the school staff- 
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room was common to both male and female teachers at that time, but after the 
revolution staff-rooms were sex-segregated. 
In my fieldwork, I conducted an interview with a girls' high school assistant in a 
rural area. He was also the husband of the head teacher of that school, whom I could 
not interview directly. He asserted that he and his wife were, in fact, the same. He was 
technically called a 'director of courses' (modir-e droos) but he played the role of 
assistant to his wife. It is possible that he was in practice the real head teacher of that 
school; for example, he went to banks and the LEA to deal with the administrative 
affairs of the school. Mate teachers consulted him about their problems, and he 
became very concerned when something was wrong with the school. In other words, 
he shouldered all of the responsibility for that school on his own, and his wife was not 
much more than a good arbitrator for female teachers. In other girls' high schools a 
male assistant would usually be a mediator between the female head teacher and male 
teachers. 
In the girls' high school in which I conducted my fieldwork, there were eight 
female and eleven male teachers as well as a male administration assistant, a male 
laboratory assistant, two male cleaners, who also served tea to both male and female 
teachers, a male assistant head teacher, and a female head teacher. Thererore, the 
number of male officials in this girls' school was almost twice that of females. This 
indicates that, although there had been an attempt to make schools more sex- 
segregated in post-revolutionary times, male officials still dominated institutions in 
terms of employment. Among the eight female teachers from whom I requested an 
interview, only one teacher rejected my request. She taught biology for one day a 
week but was dissatisfied with teaching in a rural school. The other seven female 
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teachers agreed to be interviewed by me, but my requests were passed on to the head 
teacher through her husband, who was meant to be her assistant; and she transferred 
the requests to the female teachers. 
Six of these female teachers stressed that they did not use the prefix 'miss' in 
front of pupils' surnames, except for a teacher of Arabic literature who mentioned that 
she sometimes used 'miss' when not addressing the girls as 'sisters'. A teacher of 
chemistry said that she had used the prefix of 'miss' the previous year, but this had 
caused the girls to laugh at her because of the rural culture they lived in. However, 
she still employed this term for addressing adult women in the city. Just one teacher 
out of the six, who was a teacher of moral education (rnorabbi-e oinur-e farbiati) and 
so did not really teach an academic subject, addressed the girls by their forenames. 
She reasoned that she knew all of them well enough, having lived in that rural area for 
seven years and that herjob required a close relationship with them: 'my relationship 
with them is friendly. I usually speak to the students who are lonely or sad during 
break times'. A teacher of physical education reported that she addressed her female 
students by their forename and surname, while a teacher of literature addressed the 
girls just by their surnames without putting 'miss' or their forename in front. A 
teacher of Islamic education explained that she addressed them mostly as 'sisters' or 
just by their surname inside the class, but she might call them by their forenames 
outside of classes. She added that if she addressed the girls just with their forenames, 
they would undermine her authority; there had to be a wall between teacher and 
students. 
Comparing these findings with male teachers' ways of addressing both their 
male and female students, we can see that the formal and traditional terms of address 
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are used more by female teachers with girls than by male teachers with either female 
or male students. 
Regarding other behaviour, a teacher of chemistry said: 'when I teach [the 
pupils] a lesson, I expect them to listen it. If they do not pay attention, I may react 
towards them, for example I send them out of the class. ' Then she pointed out: 'Of 
course, I have a friendly relationship with adults and the students of Year-eleven, but 
my relationship with the students of Year-nine is merely a teacher-student 
relationship. ' Yet, contrary to the mate teachers' relationships with their female 
students, female teachers' relationships with their girls students are more open and 
friendly outside school than inside classes. 
A very important point which I discussed in an interview with the teacher of 
Islamic education was that she went to the back of a female class, sat among the girls, 
and talked with them about different issues like assessments, questions, lessons, moral 
issues and even family and private issues. This was only possible in a class with a 
female teacher and female students. It would have been impossible and even 
dangerous for male teachers to do this in girls' classes after the revolution, although a 
few 'corrupt' male teachers might have tried it in some girls' schools before the 
revolution, as one of my female informants pointed out. 
It seems that both female and male students have enjoyed more openness in their 
classes after the revolution and that they have left behind their very fonnal pre- 
revolutionary relationships with teachers. After the revolution, however, there have 
been restrictions for girls which never existed for boys: their outward appearance has 
been changed dramatically and they must wear school dresses which are the subject of 
strict regulations. Moreover, the girls' relationships with the opposite sex carne to be 
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controlled by school authorities and in-school organisations established after the 
revolution. 
Students' relations with teachers 
Of the twenty-six mate teachers who responded to my question about change in male 
students' behaviour in addressing them, twenty five teachers admitted that there had 
been some changes in comparison with either the pre-revolutionary student-teacher 
relationship or the early years of the revolution. Sixteen of them had either taught, or 
studied at high school level, during the last years of the Shah's reign, and the other 
eight teachers had only experienced early post-revolutionary schools as high school 
students. The findings reveal a transformation in the post-revolutionary relationship 
between students and teachers; students felt more comfortable in classes and schools 
after the revolution than before. The teachers had various interpretations of these 
transformations, based on their own experiences and cultural backgrounds. 
Six of the teachers commented on pupils making more noise and having less 
respect. These teachers believed that politeness and education are connected, and that 
since students had lost their motivation for studying, their respectful and polite 
behaviour had changed. 
A teacher of physics blamed pupils' disrespect towards teachers on a lack of 
motivation and on the economic issues of the society: 'Respect towards teachers is 
less these days, in comparison with [before the revolution] when I was a student. 
Nowadays students do whatever they want. No more privileges are granted to 
education except to the children, particularly the daughters, of teachers. The children 
of the rich do not pay attention to education at all; when they are asked why they do 
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this, they point out the state of their own teachers' lives. ' He added: 'Of course, the 
motive for education here, as a rural area, is stronger than it is in the city but it has 
decreased in general. ' An experienced teacher of chemistry told me that students 
think that their duty is just coming to school, not studying. He explained that since his 
relationship with his students was not very friendly, he did not notice many changes in 
their moral behaviour, but he claimed that respect towards teachers had declined: 
jThe pupils] consider teachers as an instrument, nothing else. Whenever I see the 
men who used to be my teachers, I show respect to them in the same way that students 
should respect their teachers. When I was walking with one of my colleagues in an 
orchard a few days ago, one of my students shouted "don't steal the fruit, sir"'. 
Two teachers of 'Persian and Arabic literature' and 'mathematics' linked the 
issue of students' behaviour to how far the school was from a city; the more remote a 
village, the more respect a teacher will enjoy there. Two other teachers welcomed the 
openness of their relationship with male students. One of them, who taught 
economics and psychology, thought that there had been many changes in students' 
behaviour after the revolution. Welcoming these changes, he described his 
relationship with his male students as friendly and remarked that they talked to him in 
a relaxed manner -- except for years one and two, particularly in humanities. Ile 
reasoned that since physical punishment was prohibited after the revolution, 
friendliness between teachers and students had increased. 
Only six male teachers, out of the above-mentioned twenty-six, had taught in 
pre-revolutionary female schools in an urban area. As a matter of fact, there had not 
been girls' high schools in rural areas, so the girls who reached high school age or 
even guidance school age had to stay at home and wait for the relatives of a boy to 
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come and ask her parents to marry him, or go to the city to continue their studies. 
This was the fate of all girls in rural areas before the revolution -- at least until 1985 in 
that part of north-west Iran in which I conducted my fieldwork. But a teacher of 
history who had taught at pre-revolutionary female schools in two cities of north-west 
Iran, comparing female schools before and after the revolution, noted that it had once 
been possible for boys and girls to mix in a school where a small number of female 
applicants were studying a special academic subject, such as Experimental Sciences or 
Math-Physics. He also made clear to me that although there were some restrictions 
about make-up in pre-revolutionary girls' schools, they were not universally observed; 
whereas there was much more strictness in girls' schools after the revolution. 
Furthen-nore, neither girls nor boys had clothing restrictions under the Shah's system 
of education, but could not wear whatever they liked at post-revolutionary schools; 
jeans, for example, were banned. Unlike before the revolution, girls were now obliged 
to wear uniforms, in forms determined by the Islamic revolutionary authorities, called 
'manto' and 'maghnaeh' with specified types and colours of socks and shoes as well. 
In general, sensitivity towards opposite sex relationships has increased in all 
Iranian institutions, including schools, after the Islamic revolution. Nowadays, if 
corruption occurs in an institution, particularly schools, this sensitivity will be 
increased greatly through the authorities making strict guidelines for all institutions- 
possibly even legislation. For example, the relationship of a male teacher with a year- 
eight girl in a girls' school in the academic year 1993-4 resulted in the compulsory 
wearing of the 'chador' in school and classes for all female students in 1994-95 by an 
order issued by the school's new head teacher, although this requirement was against 
the educational regulations. Although sensitivity about wearing the 'chaclor' had been 
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reduced by 1995-6, the appointment of new school authorities with particular personal 
attitudes meant that strict limitations on male teachers' relationships with girls, even 
with regard to academic discussions, remained in force. 
The matter of relationships with the opposite sex was not a new issue caused 
by the Islamic revolution. Most Iranian families, particularly in rural areas and small 
towns, were aware of the problem; it was not easy for a young girl to ask her male 
teacher an academic question in public in small towns. There is no doubt, however, 
that the opposite-sex relationship issue had been handled by families alone before the 
revolution, but was controlled by both families and the Islamic authorities after the 
revolution. Clearly families' control over their children, especially their daughters, 
increased after the revolution, owing to fears about their social status and future. 
Thus, in my opinion, the social status of young girls became more fragile as a result of 
the revolution of 1979, although the Islamic identity of the revolution made traditional 
families give their daughters more chances to appear in public places and institutions. 
Regarding female students' relations with their female teachers, there were, 
predictably, no limitations on female teachers' making friends with girls either outside 
of classes or in school. However, the traditional and formal teacher-student 
relationship and perhaps the special roles girls had within families restricted them to 
have more contact inside school than outside. Nevertheless, female students had no 
problem in showing their feelings, emotions, respect and kindness towards their 
female teachers. Almost all the teachers mentioned the girls' kindness and expression 
of emotions, especially when a female teacher felt unwell. Nevertheless, none of the 
teachers characterised. their students as shy, modest or bashful, but called them 
sometimes noisy, impolite or undisciplined. In this regard, there did not seem to be 
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any difference between pre- and post-revolutionary girls' schools. 
From my interviews with female teachers, I gathered that there had been a shift 
in the rules concerning married female students after the Islamic revolution. 
According to the pre-revolutionary educational rules, married female students were 
not allowed to enrol at a school; this was probably one of the means to stop families 
letting their daughters get married while very young. The Islamic-revolutionary 
authorities apparently did not see any contradiction between girls' perfonning both 
educational and family duties and so decreed that married girls could continue with 
their studies. According to some teachers, however, female students who revealed to 
other students details of their private relationships with theirfiances or husbands, 
spread moral corruption in girls' schools. In fact, this issue was cited by female 
teachers in particular as one of the main problems of girls' schools, which affected the 
students' behaviour towards teachers. Protesting against the moral corruption 
allegedly caused by having married students in schools, for example, a teacher of 
moral education had argued with the head teacher of a girls' school over why she was 
not going to dismiss married students from her school. Apparently head teachers had 
recently been given permission to dismiss married students, who had gone to live with 
their husbands and had caused moral problems at school. ' 
Free Time 
The school curriculum accounts for the formal interaction between teachers and 
students, but informal interaction during 'free time' is also revealing about the 
character of social relations in Iranian schools. But applying the phrase 'free time' to 
schools and classes is a little misleading for teachers; in fact, they did not really know 
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what I meant by it. The teachers thought that classes were the place for education and 
nothing else. What I had in mind were the few minutes of free time which were 
inevitably left at the end of each educational period or during refreshment breaks or in 
the exam season when some teachers used teaching time for marking students' exam 
papers. In both pre- and post-revolutionary educational systems of Iran, only teachers 
spoke during classes; both systems of education were boring for students and teachers, 
and breaks were needed in each 80- or 90-minute educational period. As the teachers 
were the only speakers and active members of classes, they expected their students to 
be active in these short breaks and to ask questions about their lessons. Seventeen 
male and female teachers, of the twenty-seven teachers who were interviewed on this 
topic, criticised students' lack of desire to ask questions, unaware of the fact that the 
students had become tired with long lectures. 
However, we must also consider the changes which happened in the prevailing 
social, cultural and political atmosphere; students might have been interested in 
talking to each other about fashion, football matches or their family's material wealth 
before the revolution, whereas, after the revolution, they would be more interested in 
talking about politics, including opposition groups, or about the religiosity or 
secularity of their relatives and so on. The Islamic revolution of 1979 strongly 
affected male teacher-female student relationships during these free times in classes as 
well. Two teachers of history suggested that it had been possible to talk to girls 
individually in free times in pre-revolutio nary girls' schools where they had worked, 
but there were no such possibilities in that rural area, and even in some urban areas, 
after the revolution. Male teachers' interpretations and expectations of girls' classes, 
regarding free time, differed from boys'. 
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Similarly, each gender's reaction to their teachers' free-time policy was 
different from the other. For example, a teacher of English literature, whose policy 
was to tell jokes to students in the few minutes of free time, suggested that male 
students reacted differently from females when they were told jokes; boys laughed 
loudly while girls laughed quietly; and, sometimes when they were too excited girls, 
caught their friends' skirts or leaned over each other. Thus, since boys showed 
obvious reactions, some teachers believed that they preferred free time in classes to 
females. In my opinion, one of the main effects of the Islamic revolution on women in 
public institutions, including schools, was that they attempted to present themselves as 
more shy and modest than they had been before the revolution. Thus, although the 
girls could not hide their excitement about their male teacher's jokes, on the other 
hand, they also wanted to show that they were not shameless girls, but were self- 
controlled and modest. These conflicting personalities in people, particularly women, 
became so strong after the revolution that families were recommended to cultivate 
them, at least in public. Moreover, since modesty in the religious texts was considered 
as a sign of religiosity (al-haya-o men-a al-ddin), it was also considered a religious 
value. 
Since the Islamic revolution of 1979, differentiation between social and 
religious values has not been easy. Irrespective of whether the modesty was real, it 
even affected female teacher-female student social relationships in those girls' schools 
in which male teachers also worked. For example, a girls' high school assistant, 
talking about a female PE teacher's work, made clear to me that she did not like to 
teach sport in the school's playground because there were male teachers in the staff- 
room; she had even told him that male teachers should sit with their backs to the 
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windows in the staff-room so as not to see the yard, and that she would not run in the 
yard. According to the assistant, this situation had meant that students were too shy to 
play in the school's yard because of the men in the staff-room. This was different 
from pre-revolutionary PE in which male teachers played with their female students 
together in the yard. A female advisor of the New System of education also claimed 
that the presence of male teachers, and the special insistence on wearing the 'chador' 
in a girls' school, prevented her from having a close and friendly relationship with her 
students in the school yard. 
Before 1979 there was a department in each pre-revo lutio nary LEA, called 
'omur-e larbiati', which was responsible for extra-curricular activities in schools. 
Extra-curricular activities included painting, calligraphy, creative writing, journalism, 
singing and theatre; and they usually happened as part of the celebrations on important 
days such as the Shah's birthday. After the revolution, however, this LEA department 
retained its Persian title (otnur-e tarbiati), but its work was changed to 'moral 
education', and it became one of the most important devices used by Local Education 
Authorities for diffusing the political ideology of the Islamic revolution through 
schools, to the extent that Rajaei, the Education Minister at that time, called moral 
education teachers the 'soldiers of the revolution'. 
After the revolution, more subjects were added to the content of 'moral 
education' such as reciting the Qur'an, Nahjo'l-balagheh (the collection of Iniam Ali's 
letters and speeches) and book-reading. Since there was little interest among students 
in staying at school after lessons ended, and the break times were too short (about ten 
or fifteen minutes) to do much, most of the above activities were done at home. There 
were some 'moral-cultural centres' (canoon-hayefat-hangi-tat-biati) available for girls 
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in the city, where sewing, embroidery of flower designs, cooking, painting, 
calligraphy, design, decorative arts, manual arts, making nosegays, knitting and the 
Qur'an were taught. In my view, these sorts of centres were to replace pre- 
revolutionary centres like the 'houses of youth' (khaneh-yejavanan) or the 'houses of 
scouting' (khaneh-ye pish-ahangi). In the opinion of a female teacher of moral 
education, although the rural girls of that area and their families welcomed one-day 
trips to the countryside or journeys to the cities of Mashad or Ramsar, most of them 
did not welcome such centres. These one-day trips or seven-day surnmer trips to 
Rarnsar, for which only clever and artistic students were selected, were in vogue 
before the revolution. After the revolution, however, a trip lasting a few days to the 
religious city of Mashad, was added to the journey to Rarnsar. 
By contrast, physical education lost its importance in the curriculum after the 
Islamic revolution of 1979. In my opinion, at least two issues, brought about by the 
ideology of the revolution, affected the status of physical education. First, physical 
education was considered to be connected somehow with pre-revolutionary activities, 
which were downgraded in many aspects of everyday life after 1979, including 
outward appearance, marriage festivals and parties. Second, a sort of Islamic 
rationalism was developed after the revolution, which questioned some aspects of life 
in vogue during the Shah's reign, like studying courses on religions or playing and 
watching certain sports. Ayatollah Montazeri, once the deputy of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, in questioning the philosophy of football suggested that there was no 
rational logic in a ball being chased by a number of players and, worse still, it was 
watched enthusiastically by thousands of people. 
Special PE teachers who taught in pre-revo I Litio nary primary schools were 
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transferred to different sections of Local Education Authorities, and the main teachers 
of primary schools were expected to teach PE as well. Moreover, these PE teachers 
lost the social standing they had before the revolution, and were not paid much 
attention in schools or society. He added that the administration of girls' sports 
changed after the revolution, and female PE teachers or instructors were put in charge 
of girls in schools and other institutions. He believed that this lower status of PE 
undoubtedly affected athletics events among students which had been popular, as in 
European societies, for both boys and girls at all educational levels in cities, provinces 
and the country before the revolution -- with no restrictions in terms of gender. 
These athletics event were re-established for both boys and girls in the mid- 
1980s, but with more emphasis on boys than girls and with changes in some areas. 
For example, the running races for girls were eliminated, and male fans could not 
attend female matches and vice versa. According to LEA officials in 1995-96, 
although PE had still not recovered from the shock of the revolution, especially 
regarding females, the situation had improved in comparison with the early years of 
the revolution. This was because of PE's special role in filling the leisure time of 
youth thereby resisting 'cultural invasion' (fahajoni-efarhangi) from the West and 
raising the national flag of Iran among other flags of the world. In my view, the 
Islamic authorities were also trying to change the ideology of PE from the pre- 
revolutionary bodily concept to a spiritual one; the slogan of '0 God, strengthen my 
body in the service of You' (ghavve ala khedmatekajavarehi), which was a prayer of 
the first Imam, Ali, in the 'Komeil Prayer' (doa-ye Konzeiý, was used in all PE 
activities at that time. According to the Education Minister's order of that time, 
special PE teaching for years four and five was re-established at the primary school 
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level, but the problem still existed for other school years. This was such a problem 
that the PE authorities, according to an LEA official, were unable to assemble enough 
students to fill the city's volleyball team for participation in the province's 
competitions (despite the fact that volleyball was a popular sport). Furthermore, as he 
made clear, school races had been eliminated in 1995 in order to vire the funds into 
the country's Development Plan. The provision of resources for PE was more difficult 
than before the revolution. 
Teachers' Councils 
Discussion of problems with teaching, assessing and disciplining students 
occasionally took place in the local meetings of Teachers' Councils (shura-ye 
m'oalleman). These normally convened once a month and were attended by the 
authorities and teachers who worked in a particular school, both before and after the 
revolution. In both regimes, such meetings were usually announced by a school's 
authorities in order to discuss problems with teachers, and to improve the scliool's 
situation. Some teachers claimed that there had always been a top-down relationship 
in these councils, pre- and post-revolution, and a large number of teachers who had no 
experience of teaching in pre-revolutionary schools also confirmed explicitly or 
implicitly that this was the case in post-revolutio nary schools. According to those 
with teaching experience before 1979, a school had little authority to solve its teaching 
problems and, therefore, the authorities had to report major problems to the LEA. In 
both pre- and post-revolutionary Teacher's Councils, disciplinary problems were 
discussed more than all others. In both regimes, the primary aim of such councils had 
always been the issuing of orders, by the LEA, for teachers to implement. 
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According to seven teachers who had taught in pre-revolutionary secondary 
schools, although both pre- and post-revolutionary Teachers' Councils had a similar 
structure owing to the nation-wide centralisation of education, the following two 
differences existed between them. Pre-revolutionary councils were taken more 
seriously than the post-revolutionary ones; and teachers had felt more obligation to 
attend such councils during the Shah's regime than they did after 1979. 
The expression 'Bring us our sweets; we are ready to sign your proceedings-, 
but then let us go' was popular when I personally attended several councils during my 
fieldwork. This meant that there was no need for teachers to sit and discuss the issues 
which a head teacher wanted to set forth for discussion on behalf of the LEA and then 
sign the resolutions, for the teachers were ready to sign it in advance without wasting 
any time. Although political arguments sometimes arose in such councils after the 
revolution, there had previously been no possibility of criticising the Pahlavi's policies 
of education in such meetings. Finally, according to my informants, while female and 
male teachers sat next to each other in girls' school councils before the revolution, 
their meetings were later separated; alternatively, men and women sat in different 
rows. School authorities in both regimes, allegedly reacted the same way to the 
difficulties facing teachers at school. School authorities dealt with teachers' problems 
whenever they couldý otherwise, they reported the issues to the LEA. Only one 
teacher believed that the Teachers' Councils in pre-revolutionary schools enjoyed 
greater independence in so far as their decisions were accepted by the Director of the 
LEA. 
Regarding the importance of Teachers' Councils, the post-revolutionary 
meetings can be divided into two periods, firstly the very early years of the revolution, 
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between 1979 and about 1982; and secondly the period from 1982 until the present 
day. Using one of the most popular slogans of the revolution, 'Independence, 
Freedom, and the Islamic Republic', and Ayatollah Taliqani's emphasis on the 
necessity of consultation in managing the country's affairs after the victory of the 
revolution, many types of councils were either established or re-established in 
different institutions, including schools, in the very early years of the revolution. 
Ayatollah Taliqani was a member of the Freedom Movement Party and an intellectual 
clergy whose ideas were always seen as symbols of support for freedom. I conducted 
interviews with fourteen teachers who had been in employment in that period during 
the early years of the revolution, and it seemed that a much more open atmosphere 
ruled over these councils than before the revolution. This was because the teachers 
felt that they had to determine their own educational fate through councils and 
consultations in both girls' and boys' schools. 'Ideas were presented explicitly in such 
meetings, and nobody was afraid of anything', a teacher told une. In this period, 
although female teachers now had to sit in a different row from male teachers, they 
still shared the same office when they discussed issues. However, they were more 
reluctant to discuss certain topics than they had been before the revolution. 
Teachers' Councils gradually lost their 'legitimacy' in boys' and girls' schools 
for the following reasons, according to some teachers, heralding the beginning of the 
second period of such councils' status. Firstly, the loss of legitimacy had been caused 
by the impact of teachers' economic situation on education. There was no spare time 
for post-revolutionary teachers to spend in such meetings; instead, they had to deal 
with the necessities of life after school. Difficulties in the provision of foodstuffs and 
the existence of inflation, which caused some teachers to take additional jobs, kept 
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teachers busier than they had been before the revolution. Therefore, teachers just 
wanted to sign the proceedings as soon as possible and get on with their daily 
business. According to a teacher of science, the councils' legitimacy was affected by 
teachers' social status; since teachers has lost status, there should be no expectation of 
legitimacy and high status for the Teachers' Councils either. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the councils lacked any executive backing. 
Certainly in a centralised system, in which a top-down bureaucratic policy operated, 
there was no room for the presentation of ideas. Teachers described the council as a 
'formality' which had no capacity to solve problems or even make decisions; and even 
if decisions could be made, according to a few teachers, solutions could not be 
implemented. There was no difference between boys' and girls' schools on this count, 
as all fifteen male informants emphasised. The fact that there were no practical results 
from the councils played an important role in the lack of teachers' interest in such 
councils. But whenever they felt that a practical decision was going to be made during 
a meeting, they made sure they attended it: 'If the planned subject ora meeting is 
related to pupils' assessment, they [teachers] will attend it; otherwise, either they will 
not attend or will just discuss different unrelated issues like welfare and economic 
problems', an educational official told me. 
It was interesting that, unlike male teachers, female teachers were optimistic 
about Teachers' Councils. Five female teachers, out of six interviewed, described it as 
a 'useful and necessary' meeting, and another female teacher criticised the school's 
authorities because they paid no attention to it. She also criticised the teachers 
themselves who did not show serious interest in the council, leading to its irrelevance 
in her school. They were in favour of Teachers' Councils in which they could express 
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their ideas and problems, but, in my opinion, they lacked sufficient experience to see 
the results of these meetings -- they were too young to make an informed judgement 
about it. These teachers were more critical of themselves and the head teacher, who 
was female, than the structure of such councils. A female teacher also mentioned the 
limited number of female teachers in her school as an obstacle preventing them from 
attending such meetings seriously, because the council's meetings took place 
separately for male and female teachers. 
Although both male and female teachers' meetings shared the same structure, 
there were differences in terms of the content of discussions between the councils in 
boys' and girls' schools. In the Teachers' Councils in girls' schools, according to one 
teacher, some of the points which were often discussed were rarely mentioned in boys' 
schools. Female teachers, for example, were asked to arrive at school on time; this 
was a special problem for married female teachers who could not always arrive at 
school on time or had to leave earlier due to their family commitments, as a female 
school official made clear to me. Moreover, all teachers were asked not to dismiss a 
female student from a classroom or a school, because there would be the possibility of 
her making a relationship with someone of the opposite sex outside the school. On the 
other hand, teachers were not allowed to teach female students after school hours for 
the same reason. In these meetings, school authorities emphasised that any change in 
a girls' school leaving time should be reported to parents in advance. But in general, 
wearing the 'hejab' was the most important issue, according to all teachers who taught 
at female schools, and it was increasingly emphasised by the authorities in the 
meetings of girls' schools' Teachers' Councils. 
The issue of assessment was probably tile one which was most likely to make 
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teachers take Teachers' Council meetings more seriously. Teachers were asked to 
provide exam questions, to be in school during assessment time, to mark exam papers 
and then present them to the school on time in co-operation with the school 
authorities. Some teachers, most of whom were experienced, showed no interest in 
teaching, and they either left school early or arrived at school late, giving various 
excuses, as I observed. This was a common problem for boys' and girls' schools and 
was frequently discussed in council meetings. The registration of students and oral 
assessments by teachers were other issues with which the authorities were concerned. 
Furthermore, schools' financial problems, such as the cost of fuel or paper, and the 
jobs which teachers had to do for future special religious or national celebrations were 
other points about which teachers were questioned by the authorities. The teachers 
themselves complained about students' discipline, advised each other not to make very 
close relationships with students, discussed the lack of motivation for education 
among them, and chatted with each other about problems in their personal lives and 
the effects of inflation on their economic position. However, we should not forget that 
the main purpose behind holding these councils was for the LEA to issue orders to 
teachers via school authorities. Yet, attendance at Teachers' Councils, like many other 
things, had become more relaxed after the revolution. 
Prayers in schools 
Unlike in pre-revolutionary schools, after the Islamic revolution of 1979 Collective 
Prayers (namaz-ejamaat) were established in both male and female schools. Such 
prayers were usually performed by Imams who were appointed by the LEA. These 
prayers were established under the supervision and responsibility of moral education 
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teachers. It was unusual that the clergy associated with the Imamate of a girls' school, 
according to one teacher, also taught some classes when the teacher had not come to 
school, in order to teach the female students religious duties (ahkam). This never 
happened in boys' schools; when I asked a boys' high school official about this, he 
replied: 'the role of the clergy in school isjust Imamate of praying, nothing else. ' 
Whilst conducting my fieldwork, I attended these prayers in different boys' 
schools of a rural area. The boys of each class attended the collective prayers in turn, 
each day. According to the girls' schools' authorities, the situation was the same for 
girls as for boys. This illustrated the increased formalisation of prayer, in ternis of 
periodicity, since the early years of its establishment. As an observer, I noticed a few 
students who made a noise and interrupted prayers. However, this could have been 
expected during the early years of this practice, when sonic were not going to prayers 
of their own volition. 
While there was no contact between the school's clergyman and boys, 
according to one teacher, female pupils at guidance level were more interested in 
asking the clergy their religious questions than were high school students. In this 
teacher's view, the pupils of guidance level were also more interested in praying at 
school than were high school students. She added: 'we do not force thern [high 
school students] to pray due to limitations of space'. Moreover, according to a native 
male teacher, rural girls normally had less access to clergy, for cultural reasons, than 
boys. He claimed that girls did have access to mosques, although they actually went 
there less often than boys. 
Although there was no special connection between the boys' high school and 
the mosque at all, the female students had been taken to the mosque four times during 
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one educational year: twice to pray, another time to attend the death anniversary of 
hazrat-e Fatemeh (the daughter of the Prophet), and another time for taking part in her 
birthday celebration, named by the Islamic government the 'Day of Women' (rouz-e 
zan). 
Some students from each school, who were selected by senior staff, had had to 
attend Friday prayers in turn, accompanied by their teacher of moral education or 
school authorities, twice a month since 1995. According to my informant, it was not 
obligatory, but the principle was 'Don't ask; just do it'. This was another sign of the 
increased fon-nalisation of prayers in recent years in comparison with the early years 
of their establishment. 
Conclusion 
The analysis of changes in social relations between teachers and students suggests that 
interactions between them in the post-revolutionary era are both more relaxed ancl 
more constrained by a prevalent concern with segregating the sexes as much as 
possible. This was apparent in the gendered differences in the ways that teachers and 
students commonly used for addressing each other. Sensitivity about the propriety of 
students relations with members of the opposite sex had increased sharply since 1979, 
thereby amplifying some patterns of pre-revolutionary culture. Even the conduct of 
'free time' in schools had been influenced by gender sensitivities; and physical 
education had been severely curtailed. It is not surprising, then, that the business 
transacted at meetings of Teachers' Councils were heavily influenced by Islamic 
ideology. And the increased degree of formalisation in the relations between schools 
and the Imams appointed to conduct weekly prayers in further evidence of the 
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seriousness with which socialisation in Islamic values is now conducted in Iranian 
schools. 
This chapter has provided further empirical evidence about the nature of the 
changes that have occurred in Iranian schools in response to Islamic ideology. This 
ideology illustrates the point made in the Conclusions below about the significance of 
irony in Max Weber's view of modernisation processes. For it is ironic that the post- 
revolutionary accentuation of the need for gender segregation in schools has coincided 
with a surprising degree of relaxation in relations between teachers and students. 
Further evidence of irony will be provided in the next chapter when an attempt will be 
made to examine the ways in which teachers have responded to the 'official' Islamic 
ideology in respect of their management, control and discipline of students. 
ENDNOTE 
'According to Iranian culture, sexual relations between a couple are only allowed after 
the bride goes to her husband's house to live there permanently - not during the period 
of engagement. 
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Chapter Eight 
TEACHERS' RESPONSES TO EDUCATIONAL CHANGE 
The two previous Chapters sought to explain how Iranian authorities systematically 
brought Islamic ideology to bear upon school curricula and relations between teachers 
and students from 1979 onwards. It was possible to trace many major and minor 
changes back to the pervasive influence of Islamic ideology. This ideology was 
mediated (with varying degrees of success) by textbooks, the structure of the 
curriculum and, among other things, strict segregation of the sexes. Of course, it 
would be an exaggeration to claim that everything in Iranian schools was drastically 
transformed after 1979; and there is no doubt that some changes were relatively short- 
lived. Moreover, some new policies produced unintended consequences. 
Nevertheless, Iranian schools show clear evidence of the power of Islamic ideology to 
re-order educational pfiorities and to shape classroom interactions. 
Not surprisingly, Iranian school teachers have been sensitive to the impact of 
Islamic ideology on their professional training, career development, sense of job 
satisfaction and social status. Again, this impact has not been experienced uniformly 
but, as this Chapter will argue, there are some clear patterns in teachers' responses to 
the perceived changes in their professional life. It will become apparent once more 
that ideological ly-i nspired policies have not always produced their intended 
consequences. 
The central role of teacher training institutions after 1979 as 'vehicles' for 
Islamic ideology's influence on education will be examined at the beginning of this 
Chapter. The focus will then switch briefly to changes in methods of teaching and 
assessing students, before examining at greater length teachers' relations with a range 
of other parties interested in education. Finally, an attempt will be made to analyse 
teachers' perceptions of the ways in which their professional role and social status 
have changed since 1979. 
Teacher Training Programmes 
The issue of teacher training courses has been investigated in tenns of both in-service 
and initial teacher training for both male and female teachers at primary, guidance and 
high schools during the three periods of the pre-revolutionary era, the first post- 
revolutionary decade (1979-1988) and the second period of the post-revo lutio nary era 
(1989-1996) in a rural area of Iran. This investigation was conducted by interviewing 
all teachers, with the exception of one primary school for boys. The total number of 
my informants was ninety-three, including sixty-seven males and twenty-six females. 
Regarding the teacher training programme for men, although all teacher 
training colleges were established during the pre-revolutionary period, the number of 
teachers who had enjoyed such a programme before the revolution, especially at the 
primary school level, was less than it was after the revolution. In the area where I 
conducted my fieldwork between 1995 and 1996,1 interviewed twenty-three male 
teachers from different academic levels who had taught during the pre-revol ut io nary 
period, and found that about 61 % of them lacked any experience of teacher training 
college before becoming a teacher during the reign of the Shah. But, after the 
revolution, about 43% of them had completed such courses whilst working in schools. 
This was because, beside the establishment of teacher training colleges, the Education 
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Corps were also serving the needs of education, especially primary schools, under the 
impetus of the White Revolution (already discussed in Chapter Two). After the 
elimination of all corps policies after the revolution, teacher training colleges 
inevitably expanded throughout the country. Moreover, the ideology of the revolution 
required teaching to be seen as 'the job of Prophets', as the founder of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran called it; and more consideration was given to training responsible 
and committed teachers through the development of the two-year teacher training 
colleges. 
On the other hand, this ideology needed to deal with employed teachers as 
well. After interviewing male teachers, I found that the average length of existing 
teacher training courses in that area before the revolution was less than it was after the 
revolution; that is, it was 12.25 hours per each year against 29.77 hours in the post- 
revolutionary period. Furthennore, the locations of these courses had been in the 
local city, the centre of the province, and the capital city of Tehran, highlighting the 
centralisation of educational policy before the revolution. 
As for the post-revolutionary period, this issue was studied separately for 
female and male teachers in two different stages; one between 1979 and 1988 and the 
other between 1989 and 1996. The percentage of male teachers who successfully 
completed teacher training college courses or some special university courses to 
become qualified to teach in school before being employed by a Local Education 
Authority, increased dramatically from about 31% before the revolution to more than 
83% in the first post-revolutionary stage and more than 80% in the second. The data 
also showed that while 100% of guidance level male teachers in that area enjoyed 
such qualifications in both post-revolutionary stages, 50% of primary male teachers 
(again in both stages), and about 15% of high school teachers in the first stage and 
about 17% of them in the second one lacked such qualifications. The low level of 
graduates from teacher training colleges at the primary education level had been 
affected by the Shah's Education Corp programme since all of them had been 
employed before the revolution, and the number of them at the high school level was a 
response to the special need for teachers in some specialisms who had graduated from 
universities in subjects other than education. Thus, the post-revolutionary educational 
authorities, unlike the pre-revolutionary ones, attempted to employ teachers who had 
graduated in Education (tarbiat-dabiri) or from teacher training colleges, as much as 
possible. 
One of the main reasons for the importance of teacher training colleges reflects 
the religio-political ideology of the revolution which claimed that the future of the 
revolution depended on the good education of Iranian children, 'the builders of the 
future' (ayandeh-sazan). After interviewing a woman who used to teach at such 
colleges and became Director of teacher training college, it became clear to me that 
such colleges faced many changes after the revolution of 1979. The earlier two-year 
'Tribal Teacher Training Colleges' (daneh-saraye ashayeri), to which students had 
been admitted after leaving primary school, and the two-year 'Elementary Teacher 
Training Colleges' (daneshsaraye moghaddemaii), to which students had been 
admitted after passing Year-nine, were dissolved after the revolution. Moreover, the 
former two-year 'Guidance Teacher Training Colleges' (claneshsaraye rahnenwei), 
for which students were selected from high school graduates took the additional 
responsibility of training teachers for elementary schools -- in addition to changing the 
name to 'the Centres for Teacher Training' (marakcz-c tarbiat moallem) after the 
revolution. Furthermore, the pre-revolutionary four-year 'Fligher Teacher Training 
Colleges' (daneshsaraye ali), whose students had been high school graduates and who 
were to be trained as high school teachers, retained their position with a mere change 
of title to the 'University of Teacher Training' (daneshgah-e larbial moallem). 
According to my informant, the centres for teacher training became the focus 
of attention for post-revolutionary authorities hoping to make teachers loyal to the 
religio-political ideology of the revolution. Therefore, apart from establishing some 
special ideological courses for the students of such centres, they were governed by 
special rules, which differentiated them from the rest of the country, such as the 
obligatory wearing of the 'chador' for women. My interviewee described this as a 
fruitless attempt, because when they graduated, some if not all students abandoned the 
obligatory 'chador'. In that area, even the female chancellor of such a centre was also 
obliged by the Local Education Authority (LEA) to wear the 'cha(lor'. Therefore, tile 
centres for teacher training had special significance for the post-reVOILItioilary 
authorities as the main sources of ideological inspiration for all people who chose 
teaching as their profession. This feature sharply differentiates pre- and post- 
revolutionary teacher training programmes. 
In my view, empty formalism not only ruled administrative affairs, as 
mentioned in the section above related to Teachers' Councils, but was also commonly 
felt even in dealing with religious and ethical issues at schools or such colleges. The 
special emphasis placed on the use of the 'chador' by female authorities, teachers and 
students at such centres, regardless of its ironic role in society and its inappropriate 
psycho-social affects on them, is a clear sign of such formalism. 
The importance of ideology is also reflected in the place accorded to courses 
on Islamic Theology and political ideology in post-revo I uti o nary in-service teacher 
training courses. Through interviews conducted with ninety three teachers from 
different academic levels of education, subjects of study and levels of experience in a 
rural area of Iran, the figures in Tables 4,5,6 and 7 were obtained. The prominent 
position of the religio-political ideology course emerges clearly from comparison with 
the others. 
Table4: The percentage of in-service courses taken by the inale 
leachers of a rural area between 1979 and 1988 
Number Course Title Percentage 
I Theology and Qur'an 43.52% 
2 Teaching methods of elementary level 
mathematics 
11.64% 
3 Elementary level teaching methods 8.34% 
4 Mathematics and its methods of teaching 
in secondary level 
5.46% 
5 Humanities other than history 5.09% 
6 Science 4.18% 
7 Physical Education 3.43% 
8 Administration and secondary level 
management 
3.17% 
9 History 2.24% 
10 Vocational courses 1.01% 
II Elementary level management 0.64% 
12 Courses not relevant to teaching Zý )1.28% 
Table 5: The percentage of in-service courses taken by the male 
teachers of a rural area belween 1989 - 1996 
Number Course Title Percentage 
I Theology and Qur'an 50.25% 
2 Science 8.42% 
3 Administration and secondary level 
management 
7.45% 
4 Humanities other than history 6.79% 
5 Advisory for the New System of 
education 
4.08% 
6 Mathematics and its method of teaching 
in secondary level 
2.34% 
7 Social studies & methodology 2.33% 
8 Elementary level teaching methods 2.27% 
9 Elementary level management 2.23% 
10 Teaching methods of elementary level 
mathematics 
1.3% 
II Vocational courses 1.03% 
12 Physical Education 1% 
13 Art 0.63% 
14 History 0% 
15 Courses not relevant to teaching 9.88% 1 
Table 6: The percentage of in-service courses taken by thefentali, 
teachers of a rural area between 1979-1988 
Number Course Title Percentage ZD 
I Theology and Qur'an 67.86% 
2 Elementary teaching methods 18.38% 
3 Mathematics and its method of teaching 13.76% 
Table 7: The percentage of in-service courses taken by thefemale 
teachers ofa rural area between 1989-1996 
Number Course Title Percentage 
I Theology and Qur'an 73.12% 
2 Art 10.43% 
3 Teaching methods in elementary level 5.16% 
4 Science 4.18% 
5 Advisory for the New System of 
education 
4.08% 
6 Physical Education 1.32% 
7 Humanities 0.92% 
8 The relationship between families and 
school 
0.79% 
In the pre-revolutionary system of education, although the political ideology of 
the regime which emphasised the pre-Islamic civilisation of Iran had been exerted 
through the curricula and courses, particularly History and the White Revolution, 
there was no place for a course of theology and RE in teacher training programmes. 
Comparing the two regimes in term of the content of in-service teacher 
training programmes, the most important difference between them is the huge 
proportion of courses devoted to Theology and Qur'an (on average about 60% of all 
courses) after the revolution (that is, 43.52% of all courses between 1979 and 1988 by 
male teachers, 50.25% between 1989 and 1996 by males, 67.86% between 1979 and 
1988 by female teacbers, and 73.12% of all courses between 1989 and 1996 by female 
teachers). 
Secondly, about half of all post-revolutionary training courses were totally 
unrelated to either the teachers' profession or their subject of teaching or, at most, 
barely related to their main job. 
In comparing the pre- and post-revolutionary teachers' training programmes, 
some other differences arise -- for example, training for elementary school 
management in the pre-revolutionary educational system was more important than it 
was after the revolution. Also, psychological studies of children's behaviour had been 
independently taken into consideration more at that time than in post-revolutionary 
schools, at least in terms of in-service courses. 
Comparing the above data regarding in-service teacher training programmes 
during the two regimes, I conclude that elementary school teachers in that area of Iran 
were given greater consideration in the pre-revolutionary educational system than in 
the post-revolutionary one. But the elementary level of education lost its relative 
importance after the Islamic revolution, to the benefit of the secondary level. Besides 
the reduction of in-service teacher training programmes, other events led to 
elementary teachers believing that their positions had been undermined after the 
revolution. For example, they talked to me about their low social status, unjust 
economic conditions and low incomes, and the existence of limits on the promotion of 
elementary level teachers. All these conditions led some primary school teachers to 
leave this level to work at higher academic levels or to take second, or even third jobs, 
like farming or carpet-weaving, in the hope of improving their living conditions and 
status. 
Attention to secondary level, particularly high school, teachers was relatively 
stronger after the revolution. However, the appearance of different sorts of 
universities, including many branches of the Islamic Azad University in various cities 
and even towns of Iran, and the Summer Teacher Training Programmes was a good 
opportunity for some elementary level teachers to improve their positions. The 
ideology behind this added attention to secondary level teachers was not so clear. 
Perhaps the post-revolutionary government wanted quick results to present to the 
world as a good example of Islamic government's benefits. This supposition is 
supported by the fact that the so-called improvement in the educational system, in the 
form of approving a New System, began at the high school level, although it had 
already been tried in the elementary and guidance levels before the revolution. 
Furthermore, we should not ignore the huge number of teacher training 
programmes, together with the variety of courses conducted by the revolutionary 
authorities, in comparison with those provided by the pre-revolutionary regime. 
Comparing the average of all post-revolutionary in-service teacher training Courses 
with pre-revolutionary courses, we can conclude that the average number of courses 
conducted by both post-revolutionary male and female teachers in that area, 29.77 
hours per year, was about two and a half times higher than it was in the pre- 
revolutionary period, showing the importance of such courses after the revolution. 
Furthermore, there were many differences and similarities in terms of the 
contents and number of courses between the first period of post-revolutionary teacher 
training programmes (1979-1988) and the second one (1989-1996), on the one hand, 
and between the two periods in terms of gender, on the other. Regarding the Former 
point, Table 8 surnmarises the data: 
Table 8: The average percentage of in-service courses taken by both male and 
female teachers of a rural area in the two periods of 1979-1988 and 1989-1996 
Number Course Title 1979- 
1988 
1989- 
1996 
1 Theology and Qur'an 55.69 
010 
61.69 
% 
2 Elementary level teaching methods 13.36 3.72% 
3 Mathematics and its methods of teaching in 
Elementary level 
12.7% 0.65% 
4 Mathematics and its methods of teaching in 
Secondary level 
2.73% 1.17% 
5 Humanities other than 'history' 2.55% 3.840, "o 
6 Science 2.09% 6.3% 
7 Physical Education 1.72% 1.18% 
8 Administration and management for Secondary 
schools 
1.58% 3.7 3 0/16 
9 History 1.12% 0 
10 Vocational courses 0.5% 0.51% 
11 Management for Elementary schools 0.320,6 1.11% 
12 Advisory for the New System of education 0 4.085"o 
13 Social Studies and Methodology 0 1.16% 
14 Art 0 5.530, o 
15 Relationship between families and schools 0 0.39% 
16 Courses incidental to teaching 5.64% 4.94% 
According to the above Table, there were few changes in the subjects of 
Physical Education, vocational courses, relationship between families and schools, 
and incidental courses, in the second period after the revolution. However, the 
content of these changes might be more important than the extent of change. For 
example, although there was a small percentage difference between the two periods in 
the area of 'Incidental Courses', in actual fact, between 1989 and 1996 more courses 
of 'Theology and Qur'an' (which was unrelated to the teaching subjects of the 
majority of teachers) replaced another unrelated subject of 'military training', which 
had been required in the first period due to the eight-year war with Iraq. Thus, 
although the content of incidental courses changed, there was only a small shift in the 
proportion of teachers taking the courses. But, in any case, the 6% increase in the 
course of 'Theology and Qur'an' between the first and second periods confinns the 
point already discussed in the sections on 'Gender' in Chapter Seven , according to 
which the emphasis of the LEA on the observance of Islamic modesty by females, 
both students and teachers, increased after about 1982/3. In other words, after the 
revolution, teachers, especially females as will be seen later, were exposed to a 
bombardment of ideology, which increased in the second period. This fact becomes 
more curious when we consider that besides the 6% increase of 'Theology and 
Qur'an' in the second period, the courses on 'Science', 'Art', and to sorne extent 
'Social Studies and Methodology' also enjoyed more attention. This followed the 
popular slogan of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which claimed there was no 
contradiction between religion and science. In other words, the new face of Islamic 
development, in which religion and science had come together, became clearer in the 
second period. 
On the other hand, while the average time spent on in-service courses for niale 
teachers in that area decreased from 31.53 hours per year in the period of 1979-1988 
to 26.22 hours in 1989-1996, it increased for female teachers from 26.57 in the first 
stage to 32.3 hours per year in the second period. This suggests that more importance 
was given to female teachers than males in tenns of in-service teacher training courses 
betwe6n 1989 and 1996 in comparison with the previous post-revolutionary years. 
Thanks to the traditional culture of Iran, girls had been allowed to be 
employed in the LEA as elementary school teachers during both the pre- and post- 
revolutionary periods. However, this situation had been more difficult for women in 
the reign of the Shah than after the revolution. After 1979, in my view, women had 
more opportunity to extend their educational opportunities from GCSE level to the 
higher academic areas than they did in pre-revolutionary times. This was because, 
firstly, families showed less resistance to this, because of the creation of a proper 
Islamic atmosphere in the country by the Islamic Revolution. Secondly, the sex- 
segregation policy of the post-revolutionary government required the employment of 
as many female teachers as possible, so that men did not have to teach women. This 
was very noticeable in secondary schools, because there had been more than enough 
female teachers for both male and female elementary schools during both regimes, to 
the extent that elementary schools had been known as 'tile female schools'. For this 
reason, while the number of female teachers at elementary schools in the area studied 
was static during 1979-1988 and 1989-1996, the number of female teachers in 
secondary schools shifted from three in the former to twelve in the later period. This 
means that the number of male teachers who used to teach fernale secondary students 
had been reduced in the second period in comparison with the first. 
Regarding differences between male and female teachers in relation to in- 
service teacher training programmes, Table 9 offers relevant data: 
Table 9: The percentage of in-service courses taken byfemale and male 
teaches ofa rural area during the post-revolutionary period 
Number Course Table Males Females 
I Theology and Qur'an 46.89% 70.49% 
2 Science 6.3% 2.09% 
3 Secondary Level Math and its Methods of 
Teaching 
3.9% 0 
4 Elementary Level Math and its Methods of 
Teaching 
6.47% 6.88% 
5 History 1.12% 0 
6 Humanities other than History 5.94% 0.46% 
7 Social Studies and Methodology 1.17% 0 
8 Art 0.31% 5.221, -o 
9 Elementary Level Teaching Methods 5.3% 11.77% 
10 Elementary Level Management 1.43% 0 
11 Administration and Secondary Level 
Management 
5.31% 0 
12 Advisory for the New System of Education 2.04% 2.04% 
13 Vocational Courses 1.02% 0 
14 Physical Education 2.22% 0.66% 
15 the Relationship between Families and 
School 
0 0.39% 
16 Courses not relevant to teaching 10.58% 0 
In addition to the sex-segregation policy of conducting in-service teacher 
training courses separately for different sexes, there are a lot of differences between 
female and male teachers, according to the above Table, in terms of the courses 
offered by the LEA. 
The majority of experienced teachers did not attend any in-service courses in 
the 1990s. When I asked them the reason for this, they responded that they had no 
need for such courses because they already had the maximum advantages determined 
by the education department. Therefore, perhaps the most important motive for 
attending such courses would be the possibility of promotion. This fact, on the one 
hand, and a lack of regular and systematic planning for the development of such 
courses by the Education Department, as some teachers indicated and even some 
newspapers argued (for example, Ham-shahri, 29th November, 1995, p. 11), had led to 
a reduction of the quality of such courses. This is particularly noticeable as regards 
the very old-fashioned method of teaching, i. e. lecturing, on such courses. The 
problem increases when we consider the accumulation of all courses over a short 
period. For example, a 150-hour course was crammed into 15 days, and a 21 0-hour 
course into 24 days. Another problem concerns the content of courses planned by the 
education department which were to be taught in each educational period of ninety 
minutes. For example, one session of ninety minutes on the Psychology of Growth, 
according to the planned programme, was supposed to cover all theories of Freud, 
Fromm, Ericson, Adler, Piaget and others from the Islamic perspective. 
Teaching and Assessing Methods rlý tp 
According to participant observation and interviews conducted in the region, I 
discovered that the methods of teaching at all levels of elementary and secondary 
schools and those of pupil assessment under the New System of education as well as 
the old one were in general the same as in pre-revolutionary times. 
A very old-fashioned method of teaching, with the teachers talking and the 
students listening and then memorising or practising, still governed the classrooms. 
Floý, vever, a more open relationship between teachers and students, discussed in 
Chapter Seven set the post-revol utio nary schools apart from pre-revolutionary ones in 
tenns of the students' chances of participating in the process of teaching through 
asking questions or making comments. 
According to all twenty-nine of the teachers questioned on this subject, 
methods of teaching and assessing were the same as before the revolution, although 
under the New System some changes had occurred in the content of textbooks. For 
example, there were changes in the ways of proving some formulas in mathematics 
and in the relative attention to practical experiments and the use of laboratories in 
some courses in science. However, methods of teaching, and to some extent of 
assessment, permitted more flexibility in terms of the opportunity for teachers to 
develop personal interests and styles than was possible in the case of textbooks. 
Such flexibility gave the teachers a chance either to cultivate their own 
planned or unplanned activities or to use school time simply as a way of biding their 
time until they could enjoy the job's real benefits (pension) in retirement. This is a 
particularly relevant point if we consider the security of theirjobs. No teacher had 
lost his or her job except in a few 'political' cases. 
It seemed that the expression of personal taste in teaching methods for some 
science courses was easier than it was in humanities. Regarding teaching some 
sessions in science, for example, a teacher suggested: 
4 according to my own interest, in order to teach about anatomy, 
students mostly provide some animals themselves, like rabbits, to 
dissect. If a sample was too rare to be found by students, I will bring it 
from my home. I teach all anatomy in the school laboratory using 
living creatures, not slides, etc. Neither LEA nor the school authorities 
play any role with this regard. ' 
This personalised. and empirical teaching in science, which has been rare in the 
history of Iranian education of that region, was welcomed by students because it 
required them to provide the live material for their courses. 
There was not so much freedom in teaching humanities. Although a teacher of 
geography believed different methods of teaching state-provided textbooks could be 
employed according to teachers' own personal tastes, he did not assume it was an easy 
job: 
'in my subject, the tradition of teaching is talking by me and listening 
and memorising by them. This is our tradition. Students have fallen 
into this habit. But breaking a tradition and habit is so difficult that it 
takes as much as a whole year. As an example, in teaching political 
geography, I ask my students to present essays using daily newspapers 
etc. Yet I confront difficulties from students and my colleagues. They 
think that I want to show off that I enjoy a degree of mastery in my 
subject. ' 
Regarding changes in the methods of assessing students, a major difference 
between pre- and post-revolutionary education was greater centralisation of the 
process. However, the way of assessing in both regimes was the same: oral, written 
or a combination. In the oral form, a student was obliged to answer questions put by 
their teacher. This method constituted only a small part of the first two periods' 
assessment marks. However, in the New System of education, this method amounted 
to a quarter of each term's exams. The main method of assessment in Iran had always 
been in the written examination, whereby students had to answer questions in an 
explanatory form. Therefore, there was no hint of the British way of assessing 
students, by means of essays, or reports. 
Whatever ideology was behind the post-revolutionary introduction of 
standardised and externally moderated examinations, the new arrangements weakened 
teachers' power in the management of their classes. Obviously, this could lead to a 
further reduction of their social status and self-confidence. 
Yet, there was no publication from the LEA regarding local schools' 
assessment results on the basis of which schools could compete among themselves, in 
the British way. However, there were rumours that competitions were taking place in 
the city, near the rural area in which I conducted my research between private schools 
trying to attract as many students' as possible. But there was no systematic and 
rational form of competition between them. 
'Subject Specialist Groups' 
A 'Subject Specialist Group' (grouh-e annizeshi) was a gathering of teachers in an 
area who taught the same subject in a LEA's area. They were supposed to discuss 
new and better ideas regarding their subject, but my informants were not agreed about 
how far the groups were successful. 'Subject Specialist Groups' were post- 
revolutionary phenomena and were taken seriously in the early years of the revolution. 
But their importance gradually declined, for various reasons, after a while. 
A few teachers explained that these groups had been active until 1992-3, until 
which time meetings for making comments about courses had been held once per 
month. In the following year, the meetings occurred once every three months. There 
was no meeting for such groups in 1994-5, although a Director of groups had been 
appointed by the LEA in that year. According to the regulations at that time, teachers 
who encountered any special difficulty in their teaching had to write to such directors 
in the LEA and wait for a response. Yet, during 1995-6 all 'Subject Specialist 
Groups', except in a few areas, were dissolved in the local area. Since then, teachers 
who wanted to ask questions about teaching difficulties, had to write to the LEA, who 
then had to send the letter to the LEA of the relevant province. It would be 
investigated and answered by a team of three directors for that subject, which could 
take up to six months. 
According to one teacher, the directors of such groups had been appointed by 
Education Authorities according to their experience and the percentage of students 
who had achieved success in their subject of teaching. Obviously, there had never 
been a female teacher as a director of such groups in that area. 
Regarding the factors which had caused these groups' dissolution, one group 
of teachers believed that financial and economic issues had played an important role 
in their loss of importance. According to them, while the directors of such groups 
(who had been appointed by the educational authorities and not selected by the 
teachers themselves) were paid, the teachers who attended such meetings were not 
paid or given any other benefits. As a result, the teachers either did not attend the 
meetings or, if they did attend, they did not take them seriously and wanted to sign the 
relevant letters and leave the meetings as soon as possible, as in the Teachers' 
Councils. 
A second group of teachers maintained that what led to the failure of 'Subject 
Specialist Groups' was the same empty formalism as had blighted the "Teachers' 
Councils". In their opinion, major educational problems and the new findings of 
various fields of science were never discussed in such meetings. 
None of the teachers commented on the fact that the 'Subject Specialist 
Groups' had gone out of existence, while the "Teachers' Councils" still survived, 
although the majority of teachers treated them alike in terms of empty formalism. In 
my opinion, this might be because, firstly, the formation of 'Subject Specialist 
Groups' was a financial burden for the LEA. Secondly, the payment for the directors 
of 'Subject Specialist Groups' was likely to have led to tension between the majority 
of teachers, on the one hand, and the LEA, on the other. However, this did not 
happen with the Councils. Thirdly, taking account of Iranian bureaucracy it seems 
reasonable that the "Teachers' Councils", in which more administrative issues were 
discussed than educational ones, should take precedence over 'Subject Specialist 
Groups', the main function of which was educational. 
Nevertheless, there were three subject areas in which teachers continued to 
gather in a special place to discuss their own problems: Physical Education, Moral 
Education and the Advisory of the New System. Some meetings had been formed for 
PE teachers to discuss competitions between students and how to assess students in 
PE. Two meetings per month were being run for the teachers of moral education to 
discuss the tasks they should complete for the next month. They had to decide, for 
example, whether competitions about the Qur'an, or which religious celebrations 
should be held. One of these teachers made clear to me that, in such meetings, they 
were advised how to deal with students' morality and religiosity. She added that they 
ought to ask such questions of the educational authorities in writing, but did not 
explain the reason for this. Apart from two meetings, attendance at one of which was 
obligatory for teachers, three other meetings were held during the educational year. 
According to a teacher of the New System Advisory course, there were 
meetings once a month for such teachers under the supervision of the moral education 
Office in the LEA. When I asked her about the difference between her position and 
that of teachers of moral education, she replied that these latter dealt with students' 
beliefs and religion, while she was to deal with students' morality and education. She 
added that, in practice, their work on morality was the same. 
In sum, subject specialist teachers in PE needed to meet in order to co-ordinate 
competitions between schools, but staff in moral education and in the New System 
Advisory courses seemed to be motivated more by ideological careers with the 
religious and moral development of their students. 
Teachers' Relationship with Students' Parents 
The question of their relationship with students' parents did not seem to be important 
for teachers. Most of them thought that it was not their responsibility but should be 
accepted by school authorities and families. In line with the old-fashioned school 
bureaucracy, teachers still resorted to school authorities in order to convey their 
comments to a student's parents -- whether they wanted to talk to them directly or 
leave a message for them through the school. Moreover, they assumed that it was the 
parents' duty to make enquiries about their children's situation. 'reachers were 
allowed to make such an enquiry only 'when they consider that a student's future is 
going to be jeopardised', according to a teacher of science. 
25% of my informants rejected the idea that they should attempt to forge any 
relationship with students' parents anyway. These were mostly teachers on the 
courses related to humanities and those not native to the area. Furthermore, most of 
them had a great deal of experience and a second job. 
In comparison, 28% of my informants had reasonable communications with 
their students' parents; and 47% of teachers suggested that they only had a little 
contact with them. It should be noted that the British practice of holding a "Parents' 
Evening", for parents to visit schools to get information directly from their children's 
teacher (in elementary schools) or tutor (in secondary schools) at set times during an 
educational year, did not exist in the area where I conducted my fieldwork. Only the 
parents who had a feeling of responsibility for their children's future visited schools to 
acquire information, whenever they felt it necessary or could make time for it. In the 
case of these visits, the head teacher or his assistant helped the parents by showing 
them their children's marks which were printed in books specific to each teacher or 
class. 
If school authorities asked a student's parents to visit the school, they did not 
usually welcome it. As one head teacher suggested, this contact happened either when 
a school confronted financial problems and some help was required, or when a student 
had encountered very serious educational and/or disciplinary problems. Calling on 
parents for financial help, in fact, went back to the post-revolutionary 'Public 
Contribution' policy approved by the Ministry of Education, according to which 
parents should pay a part of schools' expenses as a 'voluntary contribution'. Yet, this 
was in tension with the post-revolutionary Constitution of Iran, according to which 
education and health care must be free for all Iranian citizens. 
The only teachers who took the initiative to contact parents about their 
children's work were all native to the area studied, and it is interesting that they were 
all teachers of humanities. 
Although several topics are put forward in the above quotation, the attitudes of 
villagers about the motives of education for both males and females, which was 
another evidence of the first form of relationships being established by parents, and 
also the teacher's interpretation of his status are all worth noting. In the view of the 
teachers who dealt with initiating contact with parents without being asked about 
them, this action increased after the revolution, in comparison with the first form in 
which parents first asked teachers about their children's situation. 
In short, although there was no change before and after the revolution in terms 
of the existence of a system for making and keeping reasonable relationships with 
parents, the number of meetings was affected under the post-revo lutio nary economy, 
and as a result, there was a change of attitude towards education as the most proper 
way of gaining income and employment. 
The Relationship with Clergy 
Clergymen have always played important roles in Iran as a country in which the 
majority of the population are Shi'ite Muslims, especially after the Saffivid dynasty. 
The necessity to follow a Shi'ite Grand-Ayatollah (taghlid azz j, ek marja-e taghlito, 
without which a ShPite Muslim's worship and prayers would be ignored by God in 
the eyes of the Ulan? a (learned authorities on Islam), has always established a strong 
link between Shi'ite Ulama, on the one hand, and ordinary people, on the other. 
Therefore, a mutual relationship between clergymen and other Muslims was 
inevitable in all areas of life in both pre- and post-revolutionary Iran, as in many other 
countries in which religion has been important to culture and society. 
Although all state institutions, including schools, were run on the basis of a 
secular ideology under the Pahlavi regime, a sort of relationship undeniably existed 
between some clergy and some institutions, such as schools in a few cases, 
particularly during the last Shah's reign. My informants reported that there had been 
a few clergy who had some contact with the regime through, for example, the 
Organisation of Bequest (sazman-e oivghaj), who taught courses such as Arabic 
literature in the pre-revolutionary schools of N. W. Iran . But those people who 
had 
worked in state institutions lost their legitimacy in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
According to a teacher, some of them were even accused of being collaborators with 
SAVAK, the secret Infonnation Service of the Shah. 
My interviews with various teachers and administrators showed that the clergy 
had established relationships with schools in two possible ways during the early years 
of the revolution: through the establishment of collective prayers (naina-7-eftund(it) 
at school and the teaching of some courses, mainly RE and Qur'an. The only clergy 
allowed to do the abovejobs were those whose merits had already been confirmed and 
who were introduced to the LEA by a powerful clergyman or the revolutionary 
'Organisation of Islamic Advertisement' (sazman-e tablighat-e Island). Both jobs 
were unknown in the schools of that region before the revolution. 
Collective prayers (namaz-ejama'at) at noon were established at schools, 
along with other state institutions, under the charismatic message of the revolution, 
which was 'do not tell prayer that you have jobs to do, but do tell your business that 
you have prayers to deal with' (a famous expression from the second Islamic Prime 
Minister which was written on the walls of state institutions). During the revolution's 
early years nearly all students and most teachers willingly or unwillingly attended 
such prayers which were conducted, at least at the secondary schools of the area 
studied, under the aegis of the Imamate. But, in the opinion of my informants, the 
ruling charismatic atmosphere over the schools in that area gradually turned to a sort 
of formalism in which the students of each class attended prayers in turns according to 
a schedule planned by school authorities. However, according to my own participant 
observation, there was still no special schedule for the classes of a boys' Boarding 
Guidance School. Yet, unlike in the early years of the revolution, the majority of 
teachers and even the head teacher no longer assumed that they were bound to attend 
such prayers. This was a common pattern in all schools which I observed. 
Unlike the boys' secondary schools, including both guidance and high schools, 
there were no clergy in boys' elementary schools. There the teacher of each class was 
responsible for saying prayers with his pupils. There was also a schedule for the 
performance of collective prayers every day. If the pupils were interested, the teacher 
also taught them how they had to wash their faces and hands (vezu) and pray. 
As a stranger (na-mghram), I was unable to conduct participant observation in 
female schools. However, I was informed by the school authorities that female 
schools were also running programmes of scheduled prayers. 
The person responsible for establishing collective prayers at each school was 
the teacher of moral education (mot-abbi-e omur-e farbiyati). Policy about prayers 
was made by a council called the 'Council for Establishing Prayer' which was made 
up of the head teacher, teacher of moral education and the clergyman of a school. 
Yet, as all teachers and head teachers emphasised, there was no other special 
relationship between a clergyman of a school, on the one hand, and the teachers and 
the authorities of that school, on the other hand. 
The visits of clergy to schools in order to teach Religious Education gradually 
reduced to nothing after a while -- for no apparent reason, despite their restricted 
presence in the early years of the revolution. This was in contrast to the clergy's 
increasing numbers at universities due to the establishment of courses related to 
theology and morality. Such courses were entirely taught by clergy in most 
universities; and non-clergy people, even graduates of theology, had no way of 
teaching them. 
Therefore, an important change between pre- and post- revo I uti onary schools 
with this regard was that clergy appeared at schools in the early years of the revolution 
as additional agents of the ruling politico-Islamic ideology in an attempt to persuade 
staff and students to accept it through the traditional and familiar way of collective 
prayers. 
Relationships with the Local Education Authority 
The most important contact with the LEA for teachers at all academic levels was in 
the early weeks of each educational year, when they had to go to the appropriate office 
and discover the school at which they would teach. Yet, after a placement in a school 
of their choice or otherwise, each teacher could make an administrative inquiry to the 
LEA regarding their subject/level of teaching. For example, they could obtain 
information about in-service teacher training programmes and the possibility of 
registration on them, or the wording of end-of-year questions for tile students in their 
region. 
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But as far as personal welfare was concerned, any teacher could contact their 
LEA when they confronted special problems, regardless of whether they had been 
caused by the authority, or about their own personal life when they thought that there 
was a possibility of getting help. For example, teachers might go to the LEA to 
correct the mistakes in administrative promotion certificates, to collect monthly 
payment slips, to discuss Health Insurance or to apply for a loan. 
Although 21% of teachers questioned believed that the social relationship 
between themselves and LEA officials had improved and was gradually getting better, 
few of them gave evidence for their claims. According to some teachers, post- 
revolutionary educational authorities had become more courteous in their dealings 
with people who made inquiries to them, unlike the pre-revolutionary officials. One 
teacher described such conduct as friendly and Islamised. Recalling his time as a 
director of the same LEA before 1979, he said that the education authority's head 
under the Shah did not even allow teachers, particularly elementary school teachers, to 
sit down before he did. He said that it had been nearly impossible to make an 
appointment with the General Director of the Education Department for the province 
before the revolution, 'but all doors are open for you nowadays'. 
Yet, the majority of teachers (76%) maintained that the situation was worse or 
more complex now than under the pre-revolutionary administrative system. In their 
view, a number of problems with the LEA had either occurred after the revolution or 
had developed strongly since then: 
irregular expansion of administration; 
favouritism; 
treating teachers informally instead of formally; 
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inexperience; 
shirking responsibilities; 
sabotage the use of facilities which the law had provided specifically for 
teachers, not for educational administrators, such as continuing professional 
education; 
insisting that they were always right in disagreements over law and regulations; 
failing to deal with teachers' problems promptly; 
stiff relationships between ordinary staff and teachers, despite a more open 
relationship between the authorities and teachers; 
and the control exercised by a few experienced staff, instead of a director, over 
the administration. 
Some of these difficulties must be understood in the context of changes that 
occurred after the revolution such as: the increase in the number of teachers, schools 
and students, and further centralisation of educational administration. 
The case of female teachers' relationships with the LEA differed from that of 
male teachers. Their average rate of contacting the LEA was lower than males'. 
Women mostly resorted to their close male relatives such as their husband, father, 
and/or brother to solve administrative or personal problems, or else they preferred to 
telephone the office to make an inquiry. 
To summarise, although the social relationship between educational 
authorities and teachers had become friendly and open in so far as teachers enjoyed 
the possibility of defending their rights as a consequence of the revolution, 
educational bureaucracy had not only failed to improve under the post-revo I tit io nary 
policy but it had also been affected by other economic and social factors. So, teachers 
still had to go to the LEA to find their salary slips among a pile of other slips and 
among a crowd of teachers who would blame their own colleagues for mixing the 
slips up. 
Relationships with School Authorities 
According to my own observation and interviews conducted with teachers, the 
relationship between managers and teachers in schools became more friendly and 
open after the revolution. Neither of these groups complained about their relationship 
with the other. In the teachers' view, unlike pre-revolutionary schools in which 
extremely formal relations between superiors and subordinates prevailed, post- 
revolutionary school authorities had established friendly, polite, and, in the words of 
religious teachers, 'brotherly' relationships with the teachers. 
But most teachers believed that school managers still had no choice other than 
to pass the issues which they were unable to solve in school over to the relevant 
department in the LEA. However, in their view, there were slight differences in the 
nature of pre- and post-revolutio nary reports to the LEA. That is, the top-down nature 
of the relationship between the school managers and teachers might have been 
emphasised more in pre-revolutionary reports than in post- revolutionary ones, as had 
also happened inside schools. Yet, schools after 1979, managers tried to solve 
problems inside schools not by relying on the LEA but by resorting to a method of 
arbitration, often used by village headmen. Nevertheless, the top-down relationship 
between the education authority administrators and school managers remained the 
same after the revolution. 
Teachers' Assessments and their Promotions 
Until about 1992-3, the criteria for the promotion of teachers had referred entirely to 
their competence and experience as teachers. Since then, according to all my 
informants, a sort of assessment form for teachers appeared in which morality and 
religious practices were given special recognition alongside their professional 
experience. In fact, these forms replaced the former criteria by which teachers could 
qualify for some kinds of promotions on the basis of their experience alone. 
Promoted teachers received financial and administrative advantages, but only a small 
amount of money differentiated the best teacher of the area from the worst one. 
Moreover, the introduction of this new promotion system increased tension between 
head teachers, on the one hand, and the majority of teachers, on the other. 'rhis 
tension started with the teachers' suspicion that promotion decisions were being made 
by head teachers alone, although there were meant to be four assessors. 
In the first year of the new scheme, the majority of head teachers had given the 
maximum assessment mark (30) to all teachers, but this drew protests from the LEA. 
After several meetings in which the education authority explained the importance of 
this issue, the head teachers reduced the marks slightly for some teachers. 
Nevertheless, 53% of my infon-nants who commented on the new forms of 
teachers' annual assessments, disagreed with the criteria chosen. Most disagreements 
were about the section related to morality and religion. In their view such issues were 
not relevant to theirjob. Some teachers, including even those who were teaching RE 
and morality, believed that the application of such criteria had given rise to hypocrisy 
among some of their colleagues: 'You see someone who does not make their daily 
prayers, but they attend the Friday prayer, without making ablution (ve--u), in order to 
be seen by the head teacher, or they write their name on the list provided. As a result, 
those who wanted to take part in the Friday Prayer for the sake of God, do not do so. ' 
A further 32% of teachers trusted neither the criteria nor the head teachers, or 
others, who had been appointed to implement the new promotion scheme. In their 
view, apart from the problems of the criteria already raised, most of the people who 
were to deal with the criteria lacked enough commitment and knowledge to deal 
honestly with them because favouritism would affect the criteria. 
In short, the impact of revolution on the annual assessment of teachers was not 
very noticeable until the 1990s when there was special emphasis on outward 
appearances and religious formalism leading, in an ironic way, to people becoming 
interested in going to the opposite extreme. Moreover, although the classroom, as the 
'teachers' castle', had remained inviolate and no one examined or assessed the 
teacher's activities inside the classroom, not all teachers disagreed with their 
assessments. 
Job Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction 
Despite the existing personal and educational difficulties, the majority of teachers 
with whom I conducted interviews, were happy with theirjob. However, most of 
them, who were happy with their jobs, were displeased about their economic situation. 
For example, a teacher of philosophy gave this balanced opinion: 
'As a Muslim, I do not believe only in this-worldly rewards, but I 
believe that my real rewards are reserved in my other-worldly account. 
Although the education department does not pay enough to me, I am 
proud that I transfer my knowledge to students without having special 
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expectations from them. Hereby, I make a bridge between myself and 
the way of the prophets, and I know myself as a person who is subject 
to the verse of the Qur'an "those (the prophets) who publicise His 
message... and fear nothing, but God"' 
This was the real impact of the Islamic ideology on teachers' views about the 
meaning of their life. It was rarely seen in pre-revolutionary times. 
Only 9% of teachers in my sample were totally dissatisfied with theirjob. 
Among them was a teacher of moral education, because the regulations concerning 
teachers of moral education were far more strict than for teachers in other subjects. In 
her view, the LEA discriminated between various teachers of moral education in terrns 
of the types of schools to which they were appointed and the faimess with which their 
appointments were made. 
Considering the Islamic-political ideology of the revolution, it is not surprising 
that the section responsible for moral training was more active than others in the LEA 
and that it expected its personnel to be more active than those of other sections. In 
fact, this was the most important feature which differentiated pre-revolutionary 
educational ideology from the post-revolutionary ideology. But what was surprising 
was that not only had the voluntary offer of concerned teachers to teach religion and 
morality in the early years of the revolution been transformed into bureaucratic 
formalism, but even the teachers who had been employed precisely to meet such 
objectives were also long-standing critics of their own jobs. 
In addition to the shifts regarding teachers'job satisfaction, all my informants 
who were head teachers also voiced their dissatisfaction with being a head teacher. 
By their conduct at schools I visited, and their interviews, they implied that they were 
230 
really unhappy with being head teachers. Considering the situation, one head teacher 
said 'it is not clear for whom we work, students? teachers? or the LEAT. I-le, in fact, 
wondered which of the above groups had priority over others in post-revolutionary 
schools. Moreover, according to head teachers, they were destined to clash with 
everybody: 'teachers come to the school with their special complexes, and so do 
students with their specific passions, each of which plays his own musical 
instrument', according to a head teacher. In addition to the usual difficulties of 
dealing with pupils, parents and officials head teachers also cited financial and 
material shortages; registration fees; the weakness of disciplinary regulations; 
teachers' assessment forrns; and low payment for doing management jobs. The 
situation of these head teachers seemed to be different from that of their pre- 
revolutionary counterparts in many respects. 
Working Conditions 
The working conditions and life of teachers looked very different from pre- 
revolutionary periods, according to my own observations and my informants' 
suggestions. According to the Islamic ideology of the revolution teachers were not 
only described as people whose jobs were the same as the prophets' but it was as if 
they had also been promoted, when I was conducting my fieldwork, to the position 
which God himself held: 'God is a teacher, man is a student, and the world is a 
classroom' the General Director of the province Education Department announced in 
a seminar on ' Investigation of the Problems of Elementary Schools'. But, in practice, 
this ideology had been crushed under the wheels of inflation and economic pressures. 
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In actual fact, they were more than teachers: about 53% of my informants 
were engaged in occupations other than teaching. In other words, their second, and 
sometimes their third jobs were unrelated to teaching, but could be divided into two 
sections. The first group were the teachers, who were normally either natives or 
originally from other rural areas, who were involved in occupations which the 
villagers also held in that area, such as agriculture, carpet-weaving, animal husbandry, 
apiculture etc. This group formed about 3 1% of the teachers whom I interviewed. 
The second group were the teachers who were also involved in urban 
occupations, like owning or renting stores to sell, for example, food, automobile spare 
parts, household requirements and carpet equipment, or painting on mirrors and 
selling them for relatives, as one teacher confessed with embarrassment. 'Of course, 
apart from painting, I also know carpet-weaving, construction work, and giving 
medical injections' he added. He was too embarrassed to announce whether or not he 
was doing the above jobs which he mentioned that he knew. This group amounted to 
22% of my informants. 
Although, according to the data, there was no significant difference between 
male and female teachers in terms of their working hours as teachers, the women were 
supposed to work further at home (cleaning, washing up, cooking etc. ). But women's 
housework was supposed to be invisible in the eyes of their families. 
Nevertheless, nobody in my sample was interested in retiring from teaching 
either at the normal retirement age or earlier except for a few teachers who thought 
they would have more money if they could work full-time in their extrajobs. By 
interviewing an administrator in the LEA, I found out that tile rules for pension 
payment in post-revolutionary periods were approximately the same as they had been 
before the revolution. 
Job Security 
No teacher had been employed as a 'part-time' teacher from the beginning of service 
by the Education Department. However, it was possible for a full-time employee to 
teach some additional courses part-time to earn more money. This had happened 
during both the Islamic Republic and the monarchical regimes. Also, in both periods, 
any employees who had been in the service of the education department as 
probationary teachers had to pass a test in the first six months of their employment. In 
the case of confirmation after six months, their position of employment would 
automatically change to a formal one. After that, they continued with theirjob until 
they retired, unless they had a serious political problem which might jeopardise their 
position. 
In the first months after the victory of the revolution, according to my 
informants, nearly all teachers, including those who held beliefs opposed to the Shah, 
from various ideologies (whether right or left) and those who had been in favour of 
him, kept theirjob in that region. The exceptions were those who had co-operated 
with SAVAK. Since that time, however, any serious political action against the post- 
revolutionary government which could jeopardise its security could be problematic for 
any teacher fully or partly involved in such activities. By contrast, the issue ofjob 
security was not of concern to the vast majority of my informants. 
Finally, the area where I conducted my research, had never had any 
professional association for teachers either before or after the revolution, except for a 
very short period of time in the early years of the revolution in a nearby city, when an 
association called 'the Islamic Society of Teachers' had been established. But this too 
was dissolved after a while due to the penetration of the group by some extremists. 
Teachers' Social Status 
Without revealing the source of his information, a former Minister of Education 
claimed that although teachers were in twenty-third place in terms of their economic 
situation in Iran in the 1990s, they had the second highest social status among the 
various social classes of the society. Without having further information concerning 
the details of which social classes were better or worse than teachers in terms of social 
status and social class, most teachers were sceptical about the Minister's opinion and 
disregarded such claims about their own status in the community. 
Although more than 80% of my infon-nants believed that their status was 
constantly being degraded, about 18% of them were absolutely satisfied, including 
one who formally announced his satisfaction but informally criticised his status. One 
half of them were totally dissatisfied, and 32% of them enjoyed relative satisfaction 
about their own social status. 
In identifying the reasons which led to the decline of their status, about 87% of 
reasons offered by my informants were related to post-revolutionary economic 
problems. In other words, these teachers believed that their social status was 
dependent on their economic position; their lower income dictated their lower status. 
For example, one teacher believed that when people saw teachers buying low quality 
goods and foods, they would not respect them. Another claimed that when teachers 
were unable to leave tips for a hairdresser or present a gift to a relative, they would 
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not be respected. There were many examples of this, but I content myself with a brief 
but radical quotation from a teacher: 'a teacher is regarded with contempt, and the 
teaching profession means poverty. ' 
Apart from the impact of economic problems, some teachers believed that 
other issues had affected their status, such as the appearance of different institutions 
issuing qualifications without meeting the official standards of higher education and 
without supervision by its authorities. According to teachers, this led to all higher 
education qualifications being devalued and, as a result, to the downgrading of 
knowledge. As examples, they mentioned the establishment of Islamic Azad 
Universities in all areas of the country, in-service teacher training institutions and 
private universities. 
Moreover, according to a teacher who seemed to be loyal to the Islamic 
ideology of the revolution, ordinary people's ignorance of Islain had caused such a 
problem. In his view, Islam accorded the same function to teachers as to the clergy, 
so the former should enjoy the same social status in the community, but the masses 
did not understand Islam. He added that zdama had pushed teachers 'off the stage', 
and that the weakness of teachers and of Islamic ulaina themselves had been another 
factor contributing to the low status of teachers. 
In my view, the impact of the Islamic revolution was mainly felt by the middle 
class and lower class in Iran. The upper class and upper-middle class were cruelly 
affected by it as well during its early charismatic phase, but after a while they 
appeared to recover. Yet, it seemed that the middle and lower classes had changed 
places as a result of economic corruption on the one hand, and of the special attention 
of post-revolutionary governments to the lower classes on the other hand. They were 
235 
now called the 'Oppressed' people (a religio-political ten-n for the lower classes) and 
were supported by the revolutionaries according to the Islamic ideology of the 
revolution. This could be connected to the ideologisation of the virtues of manual 
labour in the cultural background. There were few religious or political meetings in 
which a preacher or lecturer would not repeat the Qur'anic promise that the oppressed 
people would rule of the world. These lower classes were called the 'benefactors' 
(vali-ne'mat) of revolutionary authorities by the founder of the revolution; and the 
revolution was indebted to their attempts and sacrifice, as he and other authorities 
emphasised repeatedly. Yet, on the other hand, middle class people, who were mostly 
administrators and who played a major role in the protests against the Shah's reign in 
the last decades of his rule, before 1979, lost their former social and economic status 
after the revolution, despite being theoretically praised by the authorities. The 
sanctity of manual work is also reflected in a famous suggestion attributed to 
Ayatollah Khomeini that Allah is ihe origin of work and craftsmanship (haq-ta'ala 
mabda'a-e kar va kargari ast). 
Although September 23rd (the first day of each educational year) had been 
dedicated to teachers in the last years of the Shah's reign as 'Teachers' Day', this 
never enjoyed much popularity among teachers, students or their families. After the 
revolution it was expected that the anniversary of the death of Dr Ali Shari'ati, whose 
ideas had played a major role among educated people in the creation of the revolution, 
would be announced as 'Teacher's Day', but the death anniversary of Ayatollah 
Motahhari was given that title instead by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the 
Islamic Republic of-Iran. This may be another symbol of the intention to shape 
edu cation and its public image in accordance with Islamic ideology. 
Conclusion 
The implicit theme of this chapter, as of several others, has been irony. In this case, it 
is ironic that the elevated spiritual status assigned to school teachers in the post- 
revolutionary Islamic ideology of Iran has not been matched by an improvement in 
any aspect of their professional lives. Instead, teachers in a rural area of north-west 
Iran consistently reported that their selection, training, socialisation, relations with 
parents, clergy and educational authorities, job satisfaction, job security and social 
status had all deteriorated since 1979. At the same time, this Chapter also argued that 
some of the worst bureaucratic features of education under Mohammad Reza Shah's 
regime had, rather unexpectedly, been mitigated by a new spirit of informality after 
the revolution. 
This is further evidence of the point made in Chapter 7 about the unintended 
consequences of the Islamic Revolution for teachers' professional lives. Their 
relations with students appeared more relaxed; and their interactions with LEA 
officials had lost some of their formality. In this sense, the pattern of modernisation 
in Iranian education has not followed exactly the trajectory mapped by Max Weber, 
since the bars of his 'iron cage of bureaucracy' have been softened to some extent by 
Islamic ideology. As will be argued in the Conclusions, Iran's path to a modern 
system of education is distinctive for its combination of traditional and rational 
components. And, as the next chapter will show the introduction of the New System 
of Education was further evidence of the Iranian state's determination to bring 
education into line with an Islamic ideology, whilst incidentally providing a boost for 
private-sector employment markets. 
2 33 7 
Chapter Nine 
THE NEW SYSTEM OF EDUCATION 
A separate, but brief, consideration of the New System of Education (NSE) is required 
at this point for two reasons. Firstly, the post-revolutionary philosophy of education, 
as was argued in Chapter Five, intimated that a new balance should be struck between 
theoretical and practical components of the school curriculum. In many respects, the 
NSE represents just such a new balance -- at least in principle. It is therefore 
important to discover how well the new practice conforms with the new principle. 
Secondly, the NSE is a very recent innovation. As such, it descrves careful 
examination to see whether it offers any evidence of change in the Iranian 
government's education policies. At numerous junctures in this thesis it has been 
argued that the design and implementation of public policies have not evolved in a 
straight line but have changed as they passed through various stages. The relevance of 
the NSE to this thesis lies mainly in the opportunity it offers to assess whether 
significant new changes have occurred in education policy. 
A note of caution is also in order at this point. The NSE was just beginning to 
be phased in at the time when fieldwork for this thesis was being conducted. It has 
still not been fully implemented in all parts of Iran, so the following observations 
must be regarded as partial and provisional. 
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Vocational Schools and the 'Tarh-e Kad' 
Even before the Iranian revolution of 1979, the system of education at high school 
level had been divided into two main areas of 'Theoretical' (shakheh-ye nazari) and 
'Vocational' (shakheh-yefanni va herfehei) Studies, the latter being for to boys only 
in the area I studied. The students who went to the only vocational high school 
(honarestan) in that area were those whose marks were usually lower than those who 
had chosen Theoretical studies. 'Theoretical' studies, which was the most important 
area, included the four subjects of Humanities and Literature (atlabiyat va ulum-e 
ensani), Social Economics (eqtesad-e ulum-e ejtemaei), Experimental Sciences (uhan- 
e tajrobi) and Maths-Physics (riazi-fizik). However, the first two were subsumed 
under the new name of 'Humanities' (zduni-e ensani) in the early 1990s, with the 
emphasis more on humanities and literature than on social economics. 
In accordance with the self-sufficiency policy of the revolution which aimed to 
achieve for both cultural and economic independence, a vocational programme called 
'Tarh-e Kad' was introduced into high schools in 1983. It was the first time that 
pupils and their families were made aware that schools might provide the necessary 
bridge between school and work. In other words, until that time the public conception 
of education was restricted to thinking that schools only provided children with the 
background for obtaining jobs in government departments. The main function of 
schools was allegedly confined to training people for administration, so whoever 
failed in their studies had to look to the open market to survive. Thus the programme 
of 'Tarh-e Kad' was a post-revolutionary bridge between state schools and various 
private sectors of society. Girls took some vocational courses in schools, but it was 
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boys who were usually directed towards modem business and computing to retain 
their supposed high status. 
Finally, by reducing the time spent on courses such as Persian Literature, high 
schools kept one day free for 'Tarh-e Kad' in the form of 'work experience'. Students 
had to go to private shops and workshops which had been selected by agreements 
between themselves and their parents and which were approved by the Local 
Education Authority (LEA) in order to learn skills for the future. Through the 
programme of "Farh-e Kad' and becoming acquainted with their intended occupation, 
students tested their suitability for the job, on the one hand, and acquired knowledge 
about the realities of society outside school, on the other. Furthermore, this 
programme provided further economic help for the government, because the costs of 
education for high school boys were met for one day per week by private sectors of 
the economy. 
Teachers who had experience of vocational affairs were employed as teachers 
of 'Tarh-e Kad' and as co-ordinators of relations between private businesses, and the 
students themselves. It had been assumed that such teachers, using their knowledge 
and life experience, would be able to recognise the special talents and needs of their 
students and give good advice to them and their parents about their future careers. 
According to my informants, including the person who was in charge of 'Kar- 
Danesh' (vocational) Studies (a new area of study in the NSE) at that time, and the 
former director of 'Tarh-e Kad' in the LEA, such a progressive programme actually 
failed to meet its objectives. Not only did students fail to learn as much as they could 
from the open market to correspond with their theoretical teachings, but they also 
became involved with the hypocritical system of Iranian society. The contradiction 
between the ruling value-system of schools and the ruling cultural value-system of the 
free market, was something that had been considered even by the designers of the 
'Tarh-e Kad'. According to the LEA official in charge of it, '[Tarh-c Kad] had been 
designed in the hope that the value system of schools would influence the open 
market's values through the involvement of students, but the very opposite happened. 
The culture of the bazaar affected our schools' values'. In other words, students had 
been turned into puppets trained to follow illegal orders on the black market, 
according to my informant. 
Moreover, the directors of shops and workshops refused to teach students 
properly on the grounds that they damaged tools and instruments. According to them, 
although the LEA had promised to help private businesses in terms of providing 
replacement instruments, this promise had not been kept by the LEA. This had 
created further distrust among the managers of private industry. On the other hand, 
students and their families often lacked the ability to replace damaged instruments, as 
one teacher remarked. 
The majority of the teachers of 'Tarh-e Kad' either had had no familiarity with 
their duties, or were not able to identify and manage their students' problems 
properly. The quality of relevant teacher training courses and their scheduling, on the 
one hand, and the criteria for employing the teachers of 'Tarh-e Kad', on the other, 
had also been a problem. This was because the teachers who had been selected to 
teach 'Tarh-e Kad' were often those teachers, including my informants, who did not 
fit in well with any other part of the LEA or schools. Furthennore, according to one 
teacher, the majority of administrators and teachers who were involved in its delivery 
'had no familiarity with "Tarh-e Kad", and had not been trained in tile relevant 
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courses. ' Then he continued: 'Of course, no training course was available in 'Tarh-e 
Kad' for any teacher or authority in the early years of its establishment. Some courses 
were established in its final stages, but were not effective. For instance, I took some 
courses entitled "Teaching Tarh-e Kad" for 140 hours just two years before its 
collapse, which had actually no benefits at all. ' 
Finally, the course's lack of popularity among families and lack of attention 
from the educational authorities themselves -- for example, students' marks in 'Tarh-e 
Kad' were not recorded on their certificates -- caused this progressive programme to 
fail, according to my informants. But, in their opinion, lack of motivation to work 
'vojdan-e kari' on the part of the people involved with 'Tarh-e Kad' had also been a 
major factor leading to its failure. The programme really amounted to not much more 
than registration of students in their places of work; and there was no guarantee that 
they would even do that well. Nobody had cared about teaching the young people. In 
fact, one teacher alleged that the teachers of 'Tarh-e Kad' mostly used the time 
devoted to it for their own benefit in the open market. In other words, there was no 
commitment to the project in the area in which it had been one of the main objectives 
of the post-revolutionary educational system. 
The Philosophy of the New System of Education 
The above-mentioned problems of the 'Tarh-e Kad' as well as other problematic 
issues which the 'Theoretical' area of study had encountered in practice caused the 
authorities to review the Old System of Education (OSE). A book entitled Kollyyat-e 
Nezam-e Jadid-e Amuzesh-e Motavasseteh (Generalities for the New System of I-ligh 
School Education), printed by the office of Executive Affairs for the New System of 
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High School Education (omur-e ejraei-e nezam-ejadid-e amuzesh-e motavasseteh) 
(EANSHSE 1992: 19-20) at the Ministry of Education, lists the educational 
insufficiencies of high schools under the OSE as follows: 
- lack of flexibility towards students' different talents and interests; 
- pressure on students to enter universities, leading to a constant increase in the 
number of students failing to obtain admission; 
- emphasis on 'Theoretical' studies and lack of attention to applied and practical 
applications, as well as the failure of the 'Tarh-e Kad'; 
- lack of correspondence between the contents of curricula and the conditions of life 
in towns and villages; 
- lack of flexibility towards innovations and the special problems of different parts of 
the country; 
- wasting resources by making pupils repeat the same year if they fail just a few 
courses and, as a result, causing more students to leave education prematurely; 
- the improper exercise of executive procedures; 
- remoteness from communal needs; 
- inflexible regulations which make it difficult to use resources optimally; 
- and absence of a reciprocal relationship between vocational teaching on the one 
hand, and short courses on learning skills and special courses in higher education, on 
the other. 
A group of experts called the 'Council for the Fundamental Transformation of 
the Educational System' (CFTES) (shura-ye taghyeir-e bonyad-ei nezani-e annizesh 
va parvaresh) were commissioned in 1986 to provide a general framework for the 
New System of Education by the 'Higher Council of the Cultural Revolution' 
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(HCCR) (shura-ye ali-e enghelab-efarhangi). Soon after, the CIFTES investigated 
the foundations, objectives and strategies of Islamic education before designing the 
structure of General Education (amuzesh-e omumi). Guidelines for the New System 
of Education (NSE) were finally approved by the HCCR in 1989 (OCFTES 1991: 4). 
Because of the importance of high schools in the eyes of the Islamic 
authorities of education, on the one hand, and high schools' more fragile and sensitive 
position among other levels of education, on the other, priority was given to 
producing 'A Design for a Shift into Desired High School Education' (tarh-e enteqal 
beh amuzesh-e motavasseteh-ye matloob), which was approved by HCCR in 
September 1990 and sent for implementation to the Ministry of Education in February 
199 1 (OCFTES 1991: 4-5). Finally, the Ministry of Education put the above- 
mentioned design into effect for ten per cent of Year-nine students in Iran in 
September 1992 (EANSHSE 1993: 10). 
There were three reasons for the importance of high schools, according to the 
Islamic educational authorities. Firstly, high school was a link between general 
education and higher education, so any insufficiency would affect both of them. 
Secondly, high schools were transitional courses in terms of. (a) transmission from 
public and general education to higher education, (b) transition from the leaming 
environment to the work environment and real life, and (c), transition from childhood 
where an individual's requirements were met by others to youth where an individual 
gained independence and accepted more responsibility. Thirdly, in many countries 
including Iran, high schools were the main centres for training skilled and semi- 
skilled workers, so special attention to high schools would have direct effects on plans 
for socio-economic development (EANSHSE 1993: 18-19). 
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The New System of Education was put into effect gradually in different areas 
of the country, year by year; beginning with the largest cities. The educational year of 
1995-6 was the first year of the system's establishment in the town where I was 
conducting my fieldwork. Therefore, all students of year-nine were beginning the 
NSE. Year-nine was a general level, in which pupils' talents and interests were 
identified by advisors of the NSE, and students were advised to specialise in either 
'Theoretical', 'Vocational' or 'Kar-Danesh' areas of study for the next two years -- 
until GCSE level -- depending on their exam results and interests. The reduction of 
the period of general education from twelve years to eleven, by reducing time at high 
schools from four years to three was one of the main changes under the NSE. 
The eleven-year period of education in the New System of education is similar 
to the British model, particularly if we compare the two separate periods of education 
in Secondary schools in England. Although I have no evidence that Iran imitated the 
UK on this issue, the author of Amuzesh va Parvaresh dar Engelestan va Veils 
(Education in England and Wales) says, in his Preface: '. J hope such [comparative] 
studies will be expanded, particularly at the present time when the necessity of a 
design for educational revolution at all levels of education, which could meet the 
needs and expectations of society, is obvious. Hereby, the educational planners and 
authorities could utilise the experiences of other countries which have transformed 
their educational systems in order to develop their societies' (Agha-zadeh 1991: 6). 
Differences from the Old System of Education 
Considering the shortcomings of the Old System of Education (OSE), listed above, 
four of the nine points were related to lack of sufficient attention to Vocational 
Studies (shakheh-yefanni va herfehei). Two further points were connected with the 
importance of vocational studies in so far as the system failed to respond to the special 
needs of different regions of the country or to make a connection between the 
curricula and the conditions of towns and villages. As a result, special emphasis on 
vocational courses was inevitable in the NSE. 
Contrary to the OSE's division of 'Theoretical' and 'Vocational' Studies, the 
NSE consists of the three areas of 'Theoretical', 'Vocational' and 'Kar-Danesh', with 
special emphasis on the last two. Although both 'Vocational' and 'Kar-Danesh' areas 
of study are, in fact, vocational, there are slight differences between them. As a result, 
the 'Vocational' area underwent several changes and achieved higher status in the 
NSE; and 'Kar-Danesh' acquired the old status of 'Vocational' Studies. 
One of the major differences between the two systems of education was the 
change from 'years' to 'semesters'. Instead studying particular courses each 
educational year and of being assessed three times for each course, under the NSE 
students have to select courses each semester and are assessed only once in them. 
The structure of the 'Theoretical' area of study remained the same in the NSE 
-- it still consisted of the three major subjects of study: Humanities, Maths-Physics, 
and Experimental Sciences. Students who gained GCSEs in one of the three major 
subjects of the 'Theoretical' area could either continue their studies for 'Pre- 
University' (pish-daneshgahi) courses (equivalent to A-levels), or transfer to the area 
of 'Kar-Danesh' to take skill-based courses in order to have a better chance of 
becoming employed, or carry on their studies in 'adjoining' (peyvasteh) or 'non- 
adjoining' (na-peyvasteh) higher diplomas (kardani) if they had certain qualifications 
or passed 'compensating' courses. 
The previous 'Vocational' area of study was elevated from GCSE level to the 
Higher Diploma (kardani-e peyvasteh) level in the NSE and was extended to five 
years. However, students could give up study after three years and abandon education 
after GCSE. After obtaining a Diploma these students could either continue their 
studies in 'Pre-university' (A-level) courses, or seek employment. Students who 
completed all five years would obtain a Higher Diploma. Undoubtedly, giving 
vocational studies the Diploma status promoted its status in comparison with the OSE, 
in which carrying on education after GCSE required extra exams in vocational 
subjccts. 
Since there was no vocational college in the town where I conducted my 
research, I interviewed a director of such a college, about the characteristics of the 
'Vocational' area of study, in a city close to the rural town. According to him, the 
'Vocational' area had become less practical in the NSE. That is, following the 
reduction of high school educational years from four to three, the courses had kept 
their theoretical aspects but reduced their practical workshops. For this reason, he 
believed that the graduates of 'Vocational' colleges would enjoy higher status than 
those of 'Kar-Danesh' schools. He predicted, in other words, that his graduates might 
become technicians, whereas the graduates of 'Kar-Danesh' would play the roles of 
skilled or semi-skilled workers. 
It was nearly impossible for the graduates of 'Kar-Danesh' to go on to 
university. This was because the students in this area, the majority of all Iranian 
students, had to be attracted into the open market after graduation. Discussing the two 
main innovations of the NSE, the Minister of Education at that time considered the 
'Kar-Danesh' as one of those innovations which could encourage students to take up 
occupations (EANSHSE 1993: 11). 
The number of students, who were mainly from the 'Theoretical' area 
of study, selected to study on 'Pre-university' courses was intended to be about twice 
or one and a half times the number of students expected by the Ministry of Higher 
Education to enter university each year (OCFTES 1991: 35). Therefore, only about 
20-30 per cent of all high school students could enter 'Pre-university' courses 
(OCIFTES 1991: 35). The authorities had probably planned that more than half of all 
students would study in the area of 'Kar-Danesh' and the rest would study in 
'Vocational' and 'Theoretical' areas. But the actual proportion were 15% of students 
in 'Kar-Danesh', 5% in the 'Vocational' area, and about 80% in the 'Theoretical' area 
in the educational year 1995-6. One of my informants expected, however, that the 
numbers of 'Theoretical' students would be reduced, to the benefit of 'Kar-Danesh', 
year by year until the planning target was reached. Undoubtedly, such a system of 
education, if it succeeded, would change the face of Iran. 
Response to The New System of Education in Schools 
The effects of implementing the NSE must now be considered but it must also be 
remembered that the NSE had been put into effect only for year-nine high school 
students in 1995-96, when I was conducting my research in that area, while in a 
nearby city it had begun in 1992/93 for a restricted number of students (about 10%). 
Teachers' interpretations of the transfon-nation of educational policies 
were mostly economic and political rather than educational. That is, the Islamic 
authorities had established the NSE in order, in the teachers' view, to solve their own 
economic (and to some extent political) problems: not to deal with the weaknesses 
and insufficiencies of the OSE. Some teachers speculated that educational refonn had 
been necessary because there had hardly been any economic or domestic political 
improvements before or after the revolution. Their speculation about the reasons for 
introducing the NSE fell into five categories: 
(i) the NSE had been put into effect in order to reduce Iran's unemployment 
problems; 
(ii) the NSE would cost less than its predecessor, mainly because General 
Education would be reduced from twelve to eleven years in total; 
(iii) the NSE was designed to prevent too many students entering university 
entrance competitions; 
(iv) the NSE would encourage experimental scicnce and vocational studies; 
(v) the NSE would show to other countries that the Islamic revolution had had 
an impact on the development of the country, while at the same time having a 
religious and Islamic nature. 
Problems Caused by the NSE 
The educational authorities of Iran anticipated that the NSE would entail a number of 
general problems: 
I- the huge amount of planning required for the new system and its complexity; 
managers would require further authority and power to deal with the problems of 
the NSE at all levels of the Ministry of Education, at provincial and regional level, 
and finally at school level; 
3- the moral training and monitoring of students in the NSE would require further 
development, especially in the case of vocational students when they were working 
out of school; 
4- greater co-operation would be required between the Ministry of Education, on the 
one hand, and the ministries of Higher Education, Health and Medicine as well as 
Labour and Social Affairs; 
5- the expansion of vocational studies to such a vast extent would require additional 
resources and facilities; 
6- the remuneration of teachers might not be high enough to motivate them to 
participate fully in the NSE. 
In reality, there were many further difficulties which had not been foreseen by 
the educational authorities. According to my informants, including teachers, head 
teachers and people in charge of the NSE and 'Vocational Education' at the LEA, 
these additional problems included: 
- lack of sufficient knowledge about the NSE among head teachers and educational 
authorities; 
- the growth of indifference among not only teachers but also advisors of the NSE; 
- inability to cope with the moral training of students and to devise ways of occupying 
their leisure time; 
- parental resistance to the NSE and lack of publicity about its introduction; 
- lack of facilities and resources for meeting the requirements of the NSE with 
reference to workshops, laboratories and so on; 
- the delay in providing textbooks and the existence of some problems 
in textbooks 
which neither teachers nor students could solve; 
- the moral and disciplinary problems associated with students visiting other 
institutions; 
- the failure of schools and even the LEA to cope with all the 
different and 
contradictory orders issued by the Ministry of Education day after day; 
- incompatibility between the size of textbooks and the time allotted 
for teaching 
them; 
- inexperience of advisors and the occurrence of administrative problems; 
- increased apathy among students (due to the creation of 
further obstacles to 
university entrance and other failings in the NSE) and the transfer of most students to 
'Kar-Danesh'; 
- lack of co-ordination between the lessons of each course (especially 
in science) and 
between the courses themselves. 
The teachers were not the only ones who complained about a lack of 
commitment among some LEA staff-, some head teachers also accused people in the 
LEA of shirking their responsibilities. For example, a person in charge of a high 
school constantly complained about problems with his school's buildings and about 
the educational authorities' indifference to his reports. In his view, this would not 
have happened before the revolution. It seemed strange to him that although, 
according to the Islamic ideology, everybody, especially those who had been 
appointed as 'servants' (khedmat-gozar) of the nation, was responsible; yet nobody 
accepted the responsibility for dealing with educational issues in practice. 
Furthermore, according to some of my informants, the impact of Islamic 
ideology on the curriculum in the NSE was the same as under the OSE. In their view, 
there was no possibility of, for instance, showing the different stages of the growth of 
an embryo in laboratories in either the NSE or the OSE. 
In addition, approved ways of recording educational and moral activities 
became more complex in the NSE. Apart from the certificate on which a student's 
educational results were printed as a number between zero and twenty, a different 
certificate recorded the choice of courses. Moreover, there was a further sheet on 
which the level of each student's attainment in each course was recorded. 
Furthen-nore, the school's NSE Advisor also supplied comments about each student's 
moral and educational activities. In this there was more emphasis on education than 
morality, according to one advisor, because dealing with morality was the duty or 
teachers of morality, not advisors. This way of recording students' progress was 
certainly different from the OSE, in which there had been a single sheet of paper 
containing students' personal details and their father's occupation. 
Conclusion 
The design of the NSE was consistent with a philosophy of education which could be 
traced back to the ideological roots of the 1979 revolution. The intention to 
'modemise' school-level education, especially at the secondary level, was clear. 
There can also be no doubt that the NSE was supposed to pave the way for a 
distinctively Iranian form of modernity in which vocational and technical skills would 
be encouraged more strongly than in the past. Consequently, attempts were made to 
limit the numbers of high school students whose ambitions were for 'theoretical' 
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studies and employment in government bureaucracies. Instead, the NSE shepherds 
students towards acquiring the skills required for success in the private sector's job 
market. These high-level educational objectives were all legitimated in terms of an 
Islamic ideology and sanctioned by courses in moral education. 
The outcomes of the NSE have been mixed. It has probably succeeded in 
attracting more government funding for schools; and significant progress has been 
made in updating textbooks and rationalising the assessment of students. On the other 
hand, students and their parents have been slow to acknowledge the merits of the 
NSE; managers of companies participating in work experience schemes are critical; 
and teachers have a long list of complaints about inadequate training, resourcing and 
co-ordination. No doubt, some of these shortcomings will be overcome in time as the 
system matures. Meanwhile, it is clear that the NSE represents strong continuity with 
the Islamic ideology which has set the course for Iran's development since 1979. It is 
no less clear that the NSE represents another example of the 'mixed' pattern of 
modernisation in Iranian education. This means that elements of modernity are subtly 
combined with traditional notions of moral integrity. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has sought to examine the validity of the argument that schools have 
served as an important means of creating a new political culture and social structure 
after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Some commentators have gone so far as to 
claim that schools were the 'fulcrum' of ideological attempts to re-islamicise Iranian 
society (see, for example, Richard 1990: 105). According to Nafisi (1992: 163), this 
was because education had previously been 'the fulcrum of a cultural dependency 
which was ruining the Islamic tradition' of Iran under the Pahlavis. In other words, 
education was central to the attempts of pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary 
regimes to shape Iranian society in determinate, but very different, fashions. Others 
have merely stressed the fact that reform of education was one of the highest priorities 
of post-revolutionary governments in Iran. Hunter (1992: 98), for example, notes that 
'One of the first steps taken by the Islamic regime as part of its overall cultural 
revolution was the reform of the educational system'. She also points out that 
successive post-revolutionary governments have continued to accord prominence to 
education in their reform programmes. Sceptics, such as Omid (1994), not only deny 
that the reforms have actually produced the intended changes but also allege that the 
quality of education has deteriorated in the aftennath of the Revolution and the war 
with Iraq. 
The aim of this thesis has not been to judge the merits of these arguments 
about the centrality of educational reforms or about their consequences. Instead, the 
focus has been very largely on the patterns of social relations observed in rural 
schools affected by the reforms. In the spirit of a Weberian analysis, the research 
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reported in this thesis tried to discover how educational reforms have affected the day- 
to-day social relations of school teachers, pupils and administrators as well as their 
relations with parents, Islamic clergy and local authority officials. This required an 
interpretative theoretical stance and research methods which were designed to elicit 
the meanings that relevant actors perceived in their changing circumstances (see pp. I- 
5). 
A note of caution is necessary at this point. Although this thesis does not 
attempt to make explicit comparisons between Iran and other countries, it is important 
to avoid giving the impression that Iran is unique in so far as its state-sponsored 
ideology has tried to impose a particular direction on educational change. In fact, the 
governments of many countries take a highly 'dirigiste' attitude towards education 
(Lee 1991). Iran is perhaps unusual only in the extent to which its pre- and post- 
revolutionary governments have deliberately pursued educational changes whicli 
conformed with 'official' ideologies. The lineaments of the highly distinctive post- 
1979 ideology were set out in Chapter 3. The main questions for this thesis are how 
this ideology has made a social impact on Iranian schools and how teachers have 
responded. Without repeating the detailed findings reported in the preceding chapters, 
it is possible to draw their main implications together as follows. 
Firstly, Max Weber's sharp, ideal-type distinction between tradition and 
modernity is a useful way of gauging social and cultural change in Iran but it cannot 
do justice to the many ways in which the distinction is blurred in reality. Iran has 
certainly tried to modernise its educational system since 1979; but Chapter 6 shows 
that it has done so in ways which restored primacy to some values considered 
traditional in Shi'ite Islam. The precise and shifting balance between tradition and 
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modemity is displayed in such things as encouraging girls to take secondary education 
seriously (see pp. 131-137)but simultaneously making it difficult for them to gather 
information from public libraries (see pp. 164-168). Another example concerns the 
tension between growth in the numbers of female teachers and the imposition on them 
of strict codes of dress and of an expectation that they will take more interest than 
men in Islamic ideology and moral education (see Chapter 7). The combination of 
tradition and modernity in such cases is highly significant for school life. 
Secondly, an equally sharp Weberian ideal-type contrast between 
12atrimonialism and modem Western rational bureaucracy has also proven to give a 
misleading picture of changes in Iranian schools. The crucial significance of the 
authority and power which used to be vested in officials mainly by virtue of their 
kinship relations has been eroded in modern Iran without being totally eclipsed by 
practices and roles legitimated by 'rational- legal' considerations. The situation in 
education is complex. Rational bureaucratic procedures and norms have certainly 
gained in importance, but relationships of patronage and deference based on 
traditional criteria of worth or power are still in place (see pp. 224-227). As a result, 
authority relations are currently a hybrid phenomenon. For example, the 1979 
Revolution paved the way for the establishment of many types of committees and 
councils designed to foster greater professionalism and rationality among teachers and 
their managers, but the operation of these new groupings is still shaped by vestiges of 
patrimonial attitudes (see pp. 190-195). A wider irony of bureaucrat isat ion since 1979 
is that it sometimes clashes with the populist and egalitarian spirit %vhich flourished 
during the early years of the Revolution when non-conformity with the Shah's all- 
pervasive bureaucracy was welcomed. 
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Thirdly, patriarchalism, as a characteristic of many patrimonial arrangements, 
should, according to Weber's scheme, have given way to the objective and impersonal 
practices of rational bureaucracy. Again, however, the pattern ofchange in Iranian 
schools since 1979 displays a bewildering mixture of patriarchal and rational themes. 
For example, the implementation of the value of formal equality among Iranians made 
it possible for greater numbers of female students to enter schools after 1979; but 
Chapter 7 shows that the application of other Islamic values has resulted in stronger 
segregation between male and female students as well as between male and female 
teachers. Indeed, rational procedures have been put in place to monitor and sanction 
gender segregation. Nevertheless, women have also entered the teaching profession 
in greater numbers since 1979. 
Fourthly, Weber's expectation that modernisation would necessarily entail 'the 
disenchantment of the world' does not seem to have been borne out inany simple 
fashion in the schools of post-revolutio nary Iran. Again, Chapter 6 shows that the 
pattern is mixed. On the one hand, the study of science and mathematics has been 
promoted to a high priority, especially for students who show academic promise. 
Vocational and technical education has also been boosted in recent years (see Chapter 
9). On the other hand, the study of Islam and of Arabic culture has been strengthened 
and inserted into various subjects in the curriculum. Moreover, a programme of moral 
education based on clearly Islamic principles has received strong official 
encouragement and support (see Chapter 8). 
Fifthly, and perhaps most subtly, the theme of irony pervades inany of the 
findings in this thesis. This means that the significance of ideological currents ind 
policies for educational change often turns out to be different from what was intended. 
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In some cases, the effect is virtually the opposite of the intention, with results that 
could be considered paradoxical and/or tragic. Indeed, just as Max Weber argued that 
the long-term effects of the Protestant Reformations in Europe ironically contributed 
towards the growth of a 'spirit of capitalism', so it seems that educational change in 
Iran under the influence of Islamic ideology has also had some ironic outcomes. For 
example, the creation of Teachers' Councils was intended to raise the status and 
morale of teachers by giving them a voice in debates about educational policy, but the 
teachers' own financial problems prevented some of them from participating. The 
poor attendance rate, in turn, dissuaded others from participating (see pp. 190-195). 
Another example concerns the tension between the importance attributed to moral 
education in the curriculum and the perceived lack of status on the part or those 
teachers appointed to deliver moral education (see p. 230). A final eNaniple concerns 
the fact that, although Tarh-e Kad was supposed to inculcate certain Islamic values in 
students before they left school, the effect of 'work experience' schernes has been to 
cultivate in students some of the less desirable values of the market and workplace 
(see p. 24 I). 
These five general implications of the empirical findings from the fieldwork 
on which this thesis is based are not exhaustive. There are many other aspects of' 
educational change in Iran since 1979, but, together, these points convey the complex, 
uneven and contradictory character of post-revolutionary situations. Indeed. it must 
be acknowledged that one of the limitations of the present work is that it does not do 
full justice to the wider social, political, cultural and economic context orchanges in 
education. Instead, it has deliberately selected only those contextual factors which 
seemed to be most directly relevant to schools. Another limitation is that, for lack of' 
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time and resources, it has not been possible to compare schools in one rural area of 
North West Iran with those in other parts of the country. No doubt, a wider sample of 
schools would have produced different findings; and longer periods of fieldwork 
spread over more years would have strengthened the findings. Similarly, more 
comparison with educational change in countries other than Iran would have been 
helpful. 
These limitations must be taken seriously, but it must also be recognised that 
the theoretical and methodological strategies chosen for this research have actually 
generated substantial, new information. In particular, the decision to focus research 
on the impact of culture, including religion and ideology, on social relations and the 
meanings attributed to them by actors made it possible to obtain a close-tip picture of' 
the changes currently being experienced in Iranian schools. Since very few social 
scientists have managed to conduct this kind of 'close up', qualitative research in 
Iranian schools, perhaps because of the difficulties reported in Chapter 6, the 
originality of the findings should not be underestimated. 
Yet, it is also clear that many questions remain important but unasked. 
Ideally, the agenda for future research would include more intensive studies of, for 
example, the teaching profession, the gendering of educational opportunities, the 
responsiveness of teacher training institutions to government ideology, tile fit between 
curriculum and the needs of potential employers, and so on. It is hoped that this th"is 
has successfully indicated some of the directions that social scientific research on 
education in Iran could profitably take. 
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APPENDIX 
A comparison of the contents ofsome pre-revolutionary tewtbooks with 
those of their post-revolutionary equivalents 
Pre-revolutionary textbooks and their Post-revolutio nary textbooks and their 
contents contents 
Introductory Philosophy (Siasi 1975) Year Acquaintance with Islamic Philosophv (Abu-talibi 
12: science and philosophy; psychology and 1994) Year 12: philosophy in the Islamic world; science 
philosophy; perceptions (sensory and mental); and philosophy and their differences and relations, 
reactions; actions; language and personality; definition of philosophy in the view of Islamic 
aesthetics; logic; methodology of different sorts philosophers; Islamic intellectual methods, Islarnic 
of sciences and knowledge; theoretical ethics; philosophy of illumination 'eshraq' (of the soul); 
applied ethics; metaphysics (absolute, Peripatetic Islamic philosophy (falsafeh-)v masltsha a). 
appearance and reality, being, non-being; sophism; existence and nature; originality. self-cvideticc, 
essence, causality, necessity, ... ); brief history of communion, and unity and multiplicity of being, truth and 
philosophy: ancient philosophers (Socrates, .. ), wrong; Islamic philosophers' solution; cause and effect. Islamic philosophers (Avicenna, .. ), and modem four sorts of cause; the ontological distinctions of 
philosophers (Bacon, Kant, Spencer, Comte, possible, impossible and necessary being; theology in its 
Sartre, Russell, specific meaning; the ways to God; limitations of sensory 
and experimental methods in theology; the Prophet and 
Imam's ways towards God,... . 
Arabic Literature (Khazaei 1971) Year 11: Arabic Literature (Refa'at 1993) Year 11: the dream-,; 
bringing children up; bravery; from Bozorg- of wakefulness; migrant birds; about Nalyo 7-bal(Wlieh 
mchr (an intellectual minister of pre-Islamic (Imam Ali's speeches); Meitham'Fammar (a revolutionar)- 
Iran); about science; from Imam Ali; maxims disciple of Imam Ali); O'thou Qods (Jerusalem); the 
from the Quran and the Prophet's narrations; tongue of volcano; the mother of her father (a nickname 
Shapour Zo'l-aktaf (a pre-Islamic Iranian king); given by the Prophet to his daughter, Fetenich), the 
Abu-bakr Zakariya Razi (an Islamic scientist); Qur'an, Imams' narration; the First Martyr, positi%e 
discourse of Ardashir (a pre-Islamic Iranian knowledge of God;... . king);... . 
Religious Education (Shoar 1968) Year 11: Islamic Education (Sadat 1993) Year 11: aUthority and 
the Secondary Shi'ite doctrines and religious government: the authority and government of God, the 
precepts (Fru be din and Ahkam): marriage, characters of Islamic governor and exertion of authority, 
divorce, inheritance, ownership, ...; some verses people in Islamic government, acquaintance with the from the Qur'an; ethics: the importance of Islam thoughts of the founder of Islamic Republic of Iran; life 
for relaxation of human beings, respect for after death: human beings and resurrection, resurrection in 
women and loss of divorce, loss of jealousy, the Qur'anic view, reward and punishment in the next 
importance of time; world .... ; ethics: the effects of sin in human beings' life, 
and keeping limits between men and women, religious 
precepts: social system. 
Sociology (Nezami-Taleshi 1978) Year 9: Sociology (TaJgararn & Qandi 1979) Year 9: culture-. 
environment; culture; norms and values; natural socialisation of society; social currents-, social aberritions; 
and social ecology; social system; bases of the conflict of cultures. 
system; sorts of system. 
History of Persian Literature (BPET 1976) History of Persian Literature (BPET 1991) Year 12: 
Year 12: science and literature in the period of political and social status of Iran during the First three 
Mongol Empire and Timorids; Safavid period; centuries after Hyrat (science and Persian poem): political 
Afsharid, Zandich and Qajar periods; the period and social status of Iran from the 3' to 6' Al I (science 
of the Constitutional Revolution and its impact and poems, and the poets of this period ... ), political and 
on Persian literature. social status of Iran from 6' to IOh Al I (pocin and poets 
in this period); Persian poems in the 10". 11' and 12' 
centuries (Al I) with consideration of political and social 
position of Iran; literary return; and poems in the period 
of the Constitutional Revolution. 
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